System : an approach to educational problems and issues. by Greenebaum, Michael L.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1972
System : an approach to educational problems and
issues.
Michael L. Greenebaum
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greenebaum, Michael L., "System : an approach to educational problems and issues." (1972). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February
2014. 2806.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2806

SYSTEM: AN APPROACH TO EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS AND ISSUES
A dissertation Presented
By
Michael L. Greenebaum
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
September
,
(month)
Major Subject
1972
(year)
Education
ii
SYSTEM: AN APPROACH TO EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS AND ISSUES
A Dissertation
By
Michael L. Greenebaum
Approved as to style and content by:
(Member)
A.
7
n
1 h
(Assistant Dean for Graduate Affairs)
September, 1972
(Month) (Year)
SYSTEM: AN APPROACH TO EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS AND ISSUES
September, 1972
Michael L. Greenebaum
B.A. - Harvard University
M.A.T. - Harvard University
Directed by Dr. A. Donn Kesselheim
ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to develop a general theory of concrete systems
and to apply it to educational problems and issues at both the organiza-
tional level (schools) and the organismic level (students in schools).
Part I presents the need for a general theory which is applicable at dif-
ferent levels. The importance of maintaining an appropriate level of
generality is stressed; appropriateness being determined by the ability of
the theory to distinguish clearly the systems it pertains to from the
systems it does not pertain to, as well as the comprehensive application
of the theory to all systems it perports to pertain to. Part I also dis-
tinguishes between concrete systems - those which exist and change in space/
time - and abstracted systems - ideas, theories, and models which, while
contained in concrete systems, are not themselves concrete. The paper con-
tends that while theories may apply to both concrete and abstracted sys-
tems, only concrete systems can be analysed through observation and measure-
ment .
2Part II develops the general theory. First, closed and open systems
are distinguished. Open systems are then classified into three types:
1) non-adjusting systems which have unchanging lines of behavior;
2) adjusting systems which can change their behavior in pre-determined
ways
; and
3) learning systems which can change both their behavior and their
organization through self-regulation.
The relationship between these types of systems, their capacity for
change, and their relationships with changing environments is explored.
The particular characteristics of learning systems are analysed in terms
of their inputs, subsystem processes, and outputs.
Psrt III applies the theory to schools and students. As concrete
learning systems, both the school and the student are seen to share certain
general characteristics; they are open, they control their own transforma-
tions, and they are probabilistic. They are well-adapted to their concrete
environments. They tend towards increasing complexity; including more
differentiation of subsystems, more decentralization of decision-making,
more interdependence of subsystems, and more elaborate adjustment processes.
Their capacity to learn depends upon the quantity and variety of information
stored in the system, the structure of their communications network, the
pattern of subsystem allocation, the function of feedback loops, the memory
facility, and the program determining the systems structure and behavior.
These general characteristics are developed with reference to common
problems and issues faced by educators, including the development of
appropriate learning environments, the relationship between learning and
behavior, and the capacity of both school, and student to learn under differ-
ent environmental conditions.
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11.1
CHAPTER I
THE IDEA OF GENERAL THEORY
1.1 This paper attempts to develop a way of thinking about puzzling
and complex educational issues which may be new and unfamiliar to a great
many educators. Part of its novelty may be terminological; its concep-
tual constructs are drawn from relatively recent developments in system
theory and information theory. However, its intrinsic novelty - and the
test of its ultimate value - extends beyond mere vocabulary. It rest
instead on two fundamental premises, the first shared by steadily in-
creasing numbers of specialists and theorists in diverse disciplines,
while the second is less widely accepted.
1.2 The first premise is that there is an appropriate level of
generality which permits a non-reductionist analysis of complex phenomena .
It develops general principles of organization and of transaction with
environment which all phenomena share. It assumes the Aristotelian dictum
that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and adds to this that
the behavior of the whole is a function both of its parts and of the
relationships among its parts. When rigorously applied, this premise
leads to the discovery of formal isomorphisms among systems of different
types and levels. Non-rigorously , it facilitates the development and
analysis of suggestive and fruitful analogies which can lead to new
insights about familiar systems.
1.3 The second, and more controversial, premise is that all behavior
is well-adapted to the particular environment of the system whose
behavior is being observed . Behavior, from this viewpoint, is a recip-
rocal and transactional relationship between the system and its environ
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ment. An analysis based upon this premise must be both non-j udgmental
and non-normative
. While the notion of being "non-judgmental” is familiar
and comfortable to most scientists, the notion of a "non-normative” analy-
sis is strange to a great many. This Introduction will develop and
elaborate these premises as a context for the theory which follows in
Part II and the application of the theory to educational concerns in
Part III.
1.4 The idea of general theory has been the impossible dream of
poets and philosophers, scientists and mystics, throughout the centuries.
The idea that all knowledge and behavior could be explained by one all-
embracing set of simple ideas or formulae has informed the thinking of
both fools and scholars, and has led theologians to God, physicists to
energy, psychologists to thanatos and eros
,
aestheticians to beauty, and
hedonists to pleasure. Among scientists pursuing what Kuhn has called
"normal science’,” the search for theory which would relate the concerns
of their disciplines to those of other disciplines has been skeptically
received, unless the theory could be shown to adher rigorously to their
own accepted paradigms. The notion of a "discipline,” with its own
fundamental principles, rigorous vocabulary, and distinctive methodology
has been inmical to less rigorous efforts to find commonalities or "hidden
likenesses”^ among the disciplines. The creation of new disciplines is
slow and cumbersome, and generally requires practitioners who are both
skilled and credentialled in the disciplines being combined. The psycho-
linguist is trained in both psychology and linguistics, the biochemist in
^Bronowski, J., Science and Human Values (New York: Harper, 1965).
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both biology and chemistry. As communities of psycholinguists and bio-
chemists continue to grow, eventually university departments are created,
and these new disciplines develop their own paradigms and methods. Their
practitioners, however, tend to guard the boundaries of their new dis-
ciplines just as vigorously as their forerunners had guarded theirs.
1.5 No matter how skeptically regarded, then, the search for theories
of greater generality has been a driving force in the history of ideas,
and we need not be apologetic to be a part of an intellectual tradition
which seeks to discover and analyze commonalities among disparate phenom-
ena. We must be aware, however, of the pitfalls and dangers which beset
the path of general theorists. The first, and perhaps the most important,
is the tendency of general theorists to overlook significant differences
in the phenomena they are exploring . To say that different phenomena are
alike in some ways is not to say that they are alike in other ways as
well. It is inevitable that the more phenomena are subsumed under a
general theory, the fewer aspects of those phenomena will be dealt with
by that theory. A theory of fat, green frumkins will apply to all fat,
green frumkins, while a theory of frumkins will apply to fat, thin, red,
and green frumkins. It is tempting for the theorist dealing with
frumkins to assume that all frumkins are alike, but the truth is that they
are alike only in their frumkinness; they are different in size and color,
and these may be significant differences, indeed. Toynbee has been
severely criticized within the historians* guild for ignoring the
differences among the societies whose commonalities he explicated. Freud
has been criticized by psychiatrists for assuming that early childhood
experiences are similar for most people. General systems theorists have
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been charged with transforming provocative analogies into general prin-
ciples. It is true that general theory cannot account for idiosyn-
chratic behavior, and it is equally true that some general theorists, in
their enthusiasm, seem to forget this. General theory can be a powerful
analytic tool, but it is frequently a weak predictive tool.
1.6 Another danger of general theory is its tendency towards
triviality . The more general the theory - the more distinct types and
levels it encompasses - the less likely it is to illuminate important pro-
perties or characteristics of the particulars it is applied to. That a
theory is trivial does not mean that it is untrue, only that it is obvious.
Of course, one man's triviality may be another man's profound insight.
We tend to overlook the obvious, and sometimes it is helpful to restate
the obvious in a new and different context. For example, the statement,
"all concrete things change over time," may appear to be a trivial
observation, although the corollary, that different kinds of concrete
things change in similar ways, may be novel and significant to many readers.
Likewise, the distinction between concrete things which change over time,
and abstract things (like models and theories) which need not change
over time may well illuminate a difficulty in applying abstract models and
theories to concrete systems. However, the general theorist must still
guard against the possibility that in applying new terminology to old
situations he is merely obfuscating the obvious. The emperor may, in fact,
have new clothes and still be the same old emperor.
1.7 Finally, there is the problem of maintaining a given level of
generality . If we think of a continuum of theories, we might have at
one extreme "content-bound" theories, highly specialized and pertinent
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only to a given class of phenomena. At the other extreme, we would find
"content-free” theories, generally mathematical, which are internally con-
sistent and axiomatic, but without reference to anything, whether concrete
or abstract, other than themselves. Within these extremes there is a lot
of room to wiggle, and general theorists frequently wiggle a lot. To
avoid the conceptual problems which wiggling can lead to, general theorists
most constantly ask themselves two questions: first, does the theory
clearly distinguish the things it pertains to from the things it doesn't
pertain to; and, second, does the theory always pertain to all things it
purports to pertain to? In general theory there are no exceptions which
prove the rule. Any exception questions either the validity of the
theory or the level of generality at which the theory operates. Any
statement which begins "In general. . ." is a wiggly statement and ought
not be a part of a general theory at a given level.
1.8 This paper develops a general theory of concrete learning sys-
tmes. It attempts to avoid the first pitfall by stressing that the system
one is studying is a set of variables drawn from the object one is
interested in (2.4 and 2.11), not the object itself. To look at a human
being as a biological system does not mean that a human being is only a
biological system.
1.9 It attempts to avoid the second pitfall by applying the theory
to the world of schools and students so that the significance of the
theoretical propositions can be judged against their utility. Ultimately,
perhaps, triviality, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. Whether
this paper successfully avoids it must be decided by the reader.
1.10 Finally, this paper attempts to maintain a consistant level of
generality by clearly delineating at every step the classes of systems
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to which the theory refers. These classes are successively restricted
in the following manner; Chapter One deals with all systems, whether
abstracted or concrete. Chapters Two and Three and subsequent chapters
restrict consideration to the subclass of systems called concrete sys-
tems. Chapter Four further partitions concrete systems into open and
closed systems, and then classifies open concrete systems as non-adjust-
ing, adjusting, or learning systems. The remainder of the paper is
concerned only with learning systems. All statements made are true of all
learning systems, and unless otherwise indicated, true only of learning
systems
.
The following tree may help the reader visualize this classifica-
Some words about this classification scheme are in order, since it
has profound significance for the mode of analysis used in this paper.
tion scheme.
systems
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Concrete Systems
the distinction between concrete and abstracted systems
is paramount. The tests of a concrete system are two-fold :
1) The system and its components consist of matter-energy and
occupy physical space ;
2) The system and its components change over time .
Any system not having these two characteristics is excluded from
this inquiry, not because it is unimportant or unreal, but because it is
fundamentally different and requires a fundamentally different mode of
analysis. It is also a contention of this paper that much social science
theory confuses abstracted and concrete systems, that indeed the pre-
vailing mode of social science analysis is based upon the application of
abstracted systems to concrete systems.
1.12 What sorts of things are abstracted systems? They are theories,
ideas, and models that don’t have reference to concrete systems. They are
found in books and heads and frequently have great internal plausibility.
While all theories, including this one, are abstracted systems, they
may have reference to either concrete systems or to other abstracted
systems, which can be then called "abstractions.” While a "general
theory of concrete learning systems" is itself an abstracted system (its
elements being abstracted from the class of concrete learning systems),
all of the systems to which it pertains meet the criteria listed above
for concrete systems. All of its statements can be applied to actual
physical entities.
1.13 Some examples may help to clarify this point. Maslow s hier
archy of needs" is a good example of an abstracted system which applies
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to an abstraction, not a concrete system. Maslow postulated a hierarchy
of basic human needs, ranging from physiological needs at the bottom to
r\
"self-actualization" at the top.
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Presumably, each level of need requires some degree of satisfaction before
the next level emerges into dominance. This theory has intrinsic plaus-
ibility and undoubtedly represents a valuable contribution to human
psychology. It is, however, not a concrete system for two reasons. First,
the elements of the system, "needs," are not concrete according to the
first criterion above, and the system itself does not meet the second
criterion; namely it does not change over time. Second, the system refers
to an abstract entity called "man" and not necessarily to any or all con-
crete persons. A particular individual may or may not exemplify the
theory. A psychologist working therapeutically with a great many particu-
lar individuals may find that the theory is generally true. Abstracted
theory may indeed be generally true, or statistically true, without being
true of particular instances. I must stress that this is not a deficiency
of abstracted systems, it is a characteristic of them. We shall mention
below, however, that one of the fallacies which infects social science
is the presumption that a particular instance which does not exemplify
^Adapted from Hersey, Paul and Blanchard, Kenneth H. , Management of
Organizational Behavior (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 18.
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the abstracted theory is in some way deficient, maladjusted, or deviant.
1.14 Organizational theory is rich in examples of abstracted theories
which are essentially models of abstracted systems. Mersey and Blanchard
develop a three-dimensional model of "leader behavior" with a relation-
ship dimension, a task dimension, and an effectiveness dimension.^
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Presumably, those occupying "leadership roles" in organizations will have
a style which falls somewhere within this cube. Mersey and Blanchard
also maintain that successful leadership calls for an adaptable style, one
that can change as circumstances dictate. Again, this is a theory of
attractive plausibility. It is undoubtedly a useful tool for analysing
leadership styles in concrete organizations, particularly those in which
"leadership" is localized in the "leadership role." Unlike Maslow's
theory, Mersey and Blanchard’s model does not suggest an invariant model
of behavior, but rather stipulates definitional boundaries within which
leadership behavior may take place. Nonetheless, the components of the
system, "leadership" "relationship behavior" "task behavior", and
"effectiveness" are not concrete. Two intelligent trained analysts could
disagree about the nature of these abstracted components. It is interesting
Ibid.
,
pp. 73-80.
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to note that if the components of an abstracted system are themselves
abstractions, then the variables of that system are concrete: the actual
leaders and followers with their particular personalities and styles.
1.15 This can be generalized to say that whereas the components of
concrete systems are themselves concrete, the components of abstracted
systems are relationships among concrete entities. Miller comments:
To some it may appear that the distinction between
concrete and abstracted systems is something like
the difference between saying "A has the property
and saying is a property of A". This trans-
lation is logically trivial. In empirical work,
however, there can be an important difference be-
tween discovering that A has the property r and
finding an A which has the property r.^
Miller is a strong advocate of focusing on concrete rather than abstracted
systems. He suggests five reasons:
1. In the first place, it is easier. . .We are
used to seeing the world as a collection of ob-
jects in space- time. . .
2. Variations in the units of systems appear to
contribute as much or more to the tool var-
iance in the systems than variations in their
relationships. . .
3. Theory which deals with concrete systems avoids
the sort of confusion that arises when theory
in social science or other areas appears to
assume that actions, roles, or relationships
carry on a life of their own, independent of
other aspects of the people or other concrete
systems whose processes they are. . .
4. . . .Behavioral scientists, if they deal with
abstracted systems, easily forget the intra~
system relationships in concrete systems which
influence processes within and between those
systems. . .
^Miller, James G. , "Living Systems: Basic Concepts" in Gray, Duhl,
and Rizzo, eds.. General Systems Theory and Psychiat^ (Boston: Little
Brown, 1969), p. 78.
11
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5. If the social sciences were to formulate their
problems, whenever possible, in the way which
has proved most convenient for the natural
sciences over centuries, unification of all the
sciences would be accelerated .
^
1.16 Miller, I believe, has overstated his position. Natural science
could not exist without abstracted systems any more than social science can.
Natural scientists are increasingly coming to realize that in many instances
variations in relationships are more important to system behavior than
variation in units. Nonetheless, this paper attempts to follow Miller's
advice for three reasons
:
1) Most of the work in system theory of Interest to students of human
behavior has been abstracted theory;
2) Most of the theory included in educational training of school
people has concerned abstracted theory;
3) An emphasis upon concrete systems provides a novel way of looking
at familiar phenomena.
Learning Systems
1.17 The distinction between learning systems and other types of
concrete open systems is also fundamental, and while the technical differ-
ences will be described in Chapter Four, it is appropriate to describe them
generally in this Introduction. The term "learning” is used in this paper
to mean both more and less than it means in colloquial usage. It means
more in the sense that it does not necessarily connote either consciousness
or purpose. It means less in the sense that it does not necessarily
^Ibid
. ,
pp. 80-82.
12
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Include all new behaviors that a system may manifest. Put most simply, a
learning system is one which has the capacity to exercise some control over
j^ts own behavior, in contrast to those systems whose behavior is controlled
from the environment
. The behavior of a learning system cannot be con-
trolled by controlling the inputs into the system. Non-learning systems
are essentially linear: the output can be predicted given the input; the
input can be inferred given the output. Learning systems, on the other
hand, are non-linear; their output can range from highly improbable
(and therefore highly predictable) to a high degree of probable (random
and therefore unpredictable) behavior. Given the same input, a learning
system can produce different outputs; given different inputs, a learning
system can produce similar outputs.
1.18 The behavior of a learning system depends upon both its inputs
and its organization. It is undoubtedly true that learning systems will
vary greatly in their capacity to learn, but it is equally true that a
learning system will learn - not necessarily what another system might want
it to learn - but because it can learn, it must learn. Theory based upon
linear system analysis is clearly not applicable to this special class
of systems.
1.19 The case for a special treatment of learning systems has been
persuasively presented by Miller, Gal^nter, and Pribram , although
admittedly not in a systems context. Looking at human behavior, they
argue that both molecular and molar behavioral acts emanate from "plans”
for action. These plans are formed from the individual's prior exper-
iences, his internal representation of reality, as well as inputs from the
^Miller, Galenter, Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior (New
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960).
13
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environment. Taken together, these form the image of the way things are.
Successful plans are "filed" in the image, to be drawn upon again.
Unsuccessful plans are discarded or revised, tested, and further revised
in a continuous process of modification and adaptation. A plan, thus, is
any process, or combination of processes, in the system which controls the
sequence of behaviors which constitute the system's output. A plan is to
behavior as a strategy is to tactics. Just as there can be strategies
which can generate other strategies, so too there can be plans which
generate other plans. The capacity of a system to learn will depend to
some extent on how well it can learn "how to learn," that is to say,
whether it can generate "metaplans" for generating plans, or whether it is
a prisoner of its program. Nonetheless, any system that has some degree
of control over its behavior is a learning system, and requires a differ-
ent mode of analysis than does a system whose behavior is uniquely deter-
mined by its input.
14
CHAPTER II
TOWARDS A NON-NORMATIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE
2.1
2.1 All concrete systems behave in concrete ways. A concrete system
cannot not behave." An analysis of a concrete system must start with
the way it does behave, not with the way it might behave or the way it
ought to behave. If a class of concrete systems, such as automobiles,
fourth grade students, petunias, or hospitals, customarily behave in cer-
tain ways, students of these systems are likely to see a particular sys-
tme in terms of the customary behavior of the class to which it belongs.
If the behavior of the particular system diverges from the customary or
expected behavior of the class, it is often viewed as "abnormal,"
maladjusted," or "deviant." These are common and useful concepts in
social science as it is generally practiced. They can create serious
analytical problems, however, if the class of systems to which the
behavior of a particular system is compared is not a class of concrete
systems but rather is an abstracted system. The abstracted system has
a "normal" way of behaving which may be unlike the way in which any
concrete system in that class behaves. Any statistical treatment, of
course, will be an abstracted system which may be a reliable indicator
of the way a class of systems behaves but is not necessarily a reliable
indicator of the way any particular concrete member of that class will
behave
.
2.2 A particular concrete learning system behaves the way it does
not only because of the class of systems to which it may belong, but also
because of its own organization and the character of the particular envir-
onment it inhabits. Norms, therefore, can be blinders which inhibit the
15
2.2
analyst or observer from really seeing the behavior of the particular
system under study. It is the contention of this paper that every con-
crete learning system is well-adapted to its environment. Another way
of saying this is that all behavior is adaptive
. From the point of view
of the analyst or observer, the behavior may be good or bad, normal or
abnormal, desireable or undesireable
,
but these judgments are external to
the behavior itself. Laing and his colleagues have adopted this point of
view in their study of schizophrenia
,
maintaining in essence that mental
is an adaptation to an untenable social or familial situation.
In an insane world, Laing suggests, it is the sane person who is mad.
This was the catch in Heller's Catch-22 . Only sane airmen could be
allowed to fly air missions. Only insane airmen would want to fly bomber
missions. Therefore, any pilot trying to get out of flying was clearly
sane and able to fly. In less whimsical terms, this is the dilemma of
all who try to act justly in an unjust world or rationally in an irrational
society. If we remove the blinders which our labels and judgments impose
on our study of behavior, and limit ourselves to a purely descriptive
language of analysis, we can come to a better realization of the trans-
actional nature of behavior. We. are arguing for what some sociologist's
have called a "field view" of behavior. Buckly states that "behavior
is a function of the tendency-system and situational field, not of the
tendency-system alone. In a word, it cannot be supposed that ready-made
g
behavior is carried around in the head."
^Laing and Esterson, Sanity, Madness and the Family (London: Tavi-
stock, 1964).
^Buckley, Walter, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory (Englewood Cliffs
Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 117.
16
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We may add to this the qualification that it is the internal representa-
tion of the situation field, as well as the field itself, that is an
element in the behavior. That the "subject" may have a different inter-
nal representation of a given field than the analyst means that they in-
habit different environments, regardless of their physical proximity. It
is the analyst’s tendency to objectify his own internal representation
of the field - to assume that his internal representation ^ the field -
that allows him to apply normative constructs in analyzing behavior. This
paper attempts to avoid this fallacy by assuming that all behavior is
well adapted to the system's environment.
2.3 There is another kind of construct that a theory of concrete
systems must do without; the construct is exemplified by the concept of
"need." A "need" is the absence or lack of a particular thing, quality,
or process. The thing, quality, or process that is needed is not present
and is, therefore, not a component of the concrete environment. Since
concrete systems exist only in concrete environments, their behaviors can-
not be described or explained in terms of "needs." As Ashby points out,
the absence of an entity can always be converted
to a reading on a scale simply by considering the
entity to be present but in zero degree. Thus,
"still air" can be treated as a wind blowing at
0 m.p.h., "darkness" can be treated as an illumina-
tion of 0 foot-candles; and the giving of a drug
can be represented by indicating that its concen-
tration in the tissues has risen from its usualQ
value of 0 per cent.
When the thing needed is not concrete, however, and is not susceptible
to either observation or measurement, its lack cannot be used either to
^Ashby, W. Ross, Design for a Brain , 2d ed. (London: Chapman and
Hall, 1960), p. 15.
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describe or to explain the behavior of a concrete system. An Infant may
need love, a schoolchild may "need” a positive self-image, but to explain
behavior on the basis of these needs Is to build castles In the sand.
Schools frequently talk about "meeting the needs" of children, or even
"meeting the needs of the Individual child," but most often these needs
are abstractions based upon the observer’s preconceptions. The easily
distracted child "needs" to learn to concentrate because the observer feels
that concentration Is good and dlstractlblllty Is bad. The Introverted or
shy child "needs" to socialize for the same reason.
2.4 I must stress that 1 am not saying that needs do not exist, only
that they cannot be used either to understand or explain the behavior of
concrete systems. Statements of needs and feelings of need both exist;
the first are concrete data and can be dealt with within the theory of
concrete systems, while the second can be considered Implied statements
of a sentient system. I can explain my own behavior In terms of my own
feelings of need, but I cannot similarly explain another's behavior. I
may choose to accept another's explanations of his feelings of need as a
sufficient rationale for his behavior, or I may consider It Inadequate
or specious. One of the advantages of a general theory of systems which
Is applied to human systems Is that It Is easier to avoid talking about
the needs of systems In general than It Is with human systems In part-
icular .
2.5 Finally, a theory of concrete systems must do without sociological
concepts such as "Institution" and "role." The presence of these terms In
an analysis Indicates that the analysis Is dealing with abstractions
rather than concrete systems. An "Institution" Is a abstracted social
system, the components of which are roles. The organizational chart of a
18
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company or school is the model of that organization as an institution.
It defines roles and role-relationships. The actual role-incumbants are
variables that may change without altering the structure of the institu-
tion or the relationships among the roles. In a concrete system, however,
it is not roles that relate to one another but concrete components. In a
human system, human beings are the components, and role-perceptions are
among the myriad variables which may affect the actual behavior of the
human beings. This distinction is well-defined in a colloquy between
Jurgen Reusch, a psychologist, Talcott Parsons, a sociologist, and
Anatol Rapoport, a mathematical systems theorist.
Ruesch: Previously I defined culture as the cumulative
body of knowledge of the past, contained in mem-
ories and assumptions of people who express this
knowledge in definite ways. The social system
is the actual habitual network of communication
between people. If you use the analogy of the
telephone line, it corresponds to actual calls
made. The society is the network - the whole
telephone network. Do you agree with these
definitions?
Parsons: No, not quite. In the limiting conception a soci-
ety is composed of human' individuals
,
organisms;
but a social system is not, and for a very impor-
tant reason, namely, that the unit of a partial
social system is a role and not the individual.
Rapoport: The monarch is not an individual, but is a site
into which different individuals step. Is that
your unit of the social system?
Parsons: Yes. A social system is a behavioral system. It
is an organized set of behaviors of persons inter-
acting with each other: a pattern of roles. The
roles are the units of a social system. We say,
"John Jones is Mary Jones' husband." He is the
same person who is the mail carrier, but when we
are talking about the mail carrier we are abstract-
ing from his marriage relationship. So the mail
carrier is not a person, just a role. On the other
hand, the society is an aggregate of social sub-
19
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systems, and as a limiting case it is that
social system which comprises all the roles
of all the individuals who participate.
2.6 This paper will employ a mode of analysis in which John and Mary
Jones are the components of the system, not their roles. We shall do
this for the simple reason that in the concrete world it is individuals,
not roles, who interact. In rejecting Parson's approach, we do not deny
its usefulness in analysing concrete situations. Many real situations are
susceptible to abstracted analyses. Two Individuals can, indeed, have
conflicting role definitions; there can be ambiguity and confusion about
role expectations in human organizations. Nonetheless, it remains true
that it is the individuals who are conflicting or confused, not their
roles
.
2.7 Therefore, instead of "institutions," we shall be talking about
"systems," and instead of "roles" we shall be talking about "critical
subsystem processes," those processes necessary for the system to func-
tion. We shall see that these processes can be allocated among the com-
ponents of systems in different ways, and that the system's organization
is really its pattern of allocation of its critical subsystem processes
among its components.
10
quoted by Miller in cit . , p. 77.
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CHAPTER III
TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF COMPLEXITY
3.1 Most of the systems of interest to an analyst are exceedingly
complex. Their components are so numerous and are interrelated in so many
ways that any analysis which attempts to understand them in terms of their
components or the interaction among their components is doomed to frustra-
tion. This is particularly true of learning systems, whose essential non-
linearity makes any causal analysis impossible. The selection of relevant
variables from the literally infinite number of variables which comprise
the system is frequently an impossible task, particularly with concrete
systems which change over time.
3.2 One of the significant contributions of general systems theory
to the study of complex phenomena is the proposition that the behavior of
a complex system can be analyzed according to certain principles of
organization which all systems share, regardless of the nature or the
number of their components. Pre-eminent among these principles is the
notion of "hierarchy." The organization of both the natural and man-made
environments appears to be according to hierarchical principles. Any
system one is observing is comprised of other systems and is itself a com-
ponent of a larger system. Given the system one is looking steadily at,
its components can be called sub-systems. The system or systems of which
it is a part can be called suprasystems . An individual human being is a
system. Physiologically he consists of a great many subsystems. Socially,
he is a subsystem in a great many suprasystems. A.t an appropriate level of
generality, principles of organization which can be observed and measured
at one level of system will also be true of systems at both lower and
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higher levels. This is a profoundly useful insight but also one which is
highly susceptible to misuse. For example, human beings and other organ-
isms have sense organs which bring information into the system. However,
at the sub-organismic level and at the supra-organismic level systems do
not have sense organs. They do have, nonetheless, subsystem processes
which bring information into the system, although the components of these
subsystems may have no physical or analagous similarity to organismic
sense organs. Miller's term "input transducer" is at an appropriate level
of generality to refer to a systemic prerequisite at all levels. Miller
states that
the importance of interindividual, intertype, or
interlevel formal identities among systems, and
what makes them of absorbing interest, is that
very different structures, if they can be shown
to carry out similar processes, may well turn out
to perform in ways which are so alike that they can
be very precisely described by the same formal
model.
Such a formal model would be a part of a rigorous general theory. This
paper cannot claim to be a formal model in the sense that scientists and
mathematicians use that term. It can claim, though, that it is a step
in that direction - that both the approach and the terminology are con-
sistent with the rigor that mathematical scientists strive towards. It
remains for specialists in particular disciplines or systems theorists
competent in different disciplines to advance the search for formal
identities which will allow our understanding of complex phenomena to
grow in sophistication.
11
Miller, o£. cit 96 .
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3.3
3.3 School people can be excused if they view with suspicion the
contention that they need more theory, and yet this paper suggests that
a general theory of concrete systems can challenge much of the conventional
wisdom which abstracted theory has supported about schools and the pro-
cess of learning. Some of the insights about education that can be gained
from this approach are listed below.
3.4 The American public day school, with its myriad purposes, is a
poorly-defined system. This is not a deficiency, it is a characteristic.
Neither its inputs, its boundaries, nor its outputs can be well-defined.
To make the school a well-defined system, we would have to design a society
in which no learning took place outside of school, or design a school
whose pupils and teachers could never leave, watch television, or read news-
papers. There is no point in trying to analyze schools according to models
of well-defined systems, or in comparing schools with business or other
human orgainzations which are well-defined.
3.5 Both the school and the student, as learning systems, will, over
time, adapt to their environments and take on the characteristics of
their environment. It must be remembered, however, that whereas the
community is the environment for the school, the school is only a por-
tion of the environment for the student. Nonetheless, it is a significant
part of the student’s environment. Schools that want students to learn
how to learn must be organized in such a way as to develop this competence.
3.6 The movement towards performance objectives, one of the domin-
ant trends in American schools, can be seriously questioned from a
general systems viewpoint. It can be argued that the more precisely
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desired outputs are specified, the more the student will perform as an
adjusting system, and the less likely his performance will result from
learning. Put another way, the more specific the conditions under which
specified behavior is to take place, the more likely that the behavior will
occur only when those specified conditions are present.
3.7 Learning performance appears to be based upon something we may
1^3.rning competence. A strict input~output analysis of the learning
process and approaches to teaching which emphasize the relationship between
given inputs and desired outputs seem to short-circuit the development of
learning competence. The familiar phenomenon of children who have "mastered"
their performance objectives but do not know what they have learned is a
manifestation of this problem. The issue is not one of objectives, which
have great value, but rather one of the relationship between behavior and
learning
.
3.8 It is the ultimate purpose of this paper to give educators a new
way of thinking about the situations they are in. Synecticians talk about
"making the strange familiar" and "making the familiar strange." This
paper is an exercise in making the familiar strange. It provides a differ-
ent set of cognitive tools for those who wish to think seriously about
educational problems and issues. Hopefully, it may lead researchers to
develop new designs for exploring the educational enterprise, designs based
upon theories of schools and students as open learning systems inter-
acting reciprocally with their environments. This approach may also sug-
gest a meeting ground for behavioral and cognitive psychologists, although
the prospects for this are neither Immediate nor promising.
3.9 Finally, this approach may set a direction fro a more rigorous
generalism and allow scholars and scientists in diverse fields to have a
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common, technical vocabulary which, while preserving the integrity of part-
icular disciplines, allows the commonalities to be explored in accord with
accepted scientific principles and methods, to the end that the ancient
dream of poets and philosophers may become more than a pious hope.
PART II
A GENERAL THEORY OF CONCRETE SYSTEMS
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CHAPTER IV
THINGS
4.1 We shall begin by talking about "things." A "thing" can be
anything — an object, an idea, an organization. It can be an extremely
complex aggregate of many inter-related parts, or it can appear to be a
simple, undifferentiated, unitary type of phenomenon. It can be a leaf,
the branch on which that leaf hangs, the tree to which the branch belongs,
the forest in which the tree is located, or the geographic area which
includes the forest. The only requirement we make of a thing is that we
can differentiate it from other things and look staeadily at it. It is
the object of our attention, whereas other things are not. Soon we shall
be substituting the term "system" for the term "thing." This is not
because there is any difference between things and systems; there is only
a difference in the language we use in talking about things as systems.
It is a more rigorous language and more helpful in examining some of the
interesting properties of things, particularly the most interesting and
complicated sorts of things that we have found it difficult to talk and
think about. No matter how complicated our language, however, it will
still be things we are talking about.
4.2 One characteristic which is true of all things is that they
are real - they exist. Some things exist in time and space and are com-
posed of matter, expend energy, and process information. Trees and auto-
mobiles are things of this sort; so are people and groups of people. One
property of such things is that they change, and because they are palpable
things, their change can be measured and spoken about. Two people observ-
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Ing the same thing are likely to notice the same changes and are likely
to agree about what they see.^ Such things which have a palpable exis-
tence will be called concrete
.
4.3 Other real things exist in other ways. Two oranges and three
oranges together are five oranges. These are concrete things. But
"2 + 3 = 5," while just as real, is not concrete. Although it is a pro-
perty of concrete things that they can be added together, the property it-
self is not concrete. It is no less real than concrete things, but it
exists independent of them. Such things, which are properties or attri-
butes of concrete things, will be called abstract things. Abstract things
may be true of great numbers of concrete things; the additive property,
for example, is true of all concrete things. Weight is a property of all
concrete things. Growth is a property of many concrete things. Interaction
with the environment is a property of most concrete things. Change is a
property of all concrete things. None of these things, however, is
concrete. Every concrete thing is a particularized exemplification of
abstract things. Without abstractions we would be unable to think about
or talk about concrete things.
4.4 Many things are neither concrete nor abstract. They are still
real and we have to deal with them. False statements (or true statements,
for that matter), hypotheses, and statistics are examples of things that
are neither concrete nor abstract. All symbol systems exist without being
^Later on (7.35) we shall want to admit that this statement is not
true. A landscape artist and an astronomer looking at a sunset probably
do not see the same thing. However, since we want to introduce complica-
tions very gradually, we shall say that this statement is truer of con-
crete things than of abstract or conceptual things to be treated below.
See Hanson, Patterns of Discovery , Ch. 1, for the arguments against this
statement
.
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concrete or abstract. Abraham Lincoln was, at one time, a concrete thing,
but when the palpable Abraham Lincoln was assassinated, "Abraham Lincoln"
remained. The idea of Abraham Lincoln," the words of Abraham Lincoln,
statements about Abraham Lincoln still exist. "Abraham Lincoln" is now
^ conceptual thing. All ideas are conceptual things. All statements are
conceptual things. All symbols are conceptual things. Concepts are
real; they may be true or false, important or trivial. They may refer to
concrete things or abstract things or other conceptual things, but they
are real. All things are real. Myths, fantasies, and delusions are
real. Monsters, ghosts, and purple cows are real. Concrete things,
3
abstract things, and conceptual things are all real.
4.5 Every thing is composed of things. The thing we are looking
steadily at is composed of things called parts . The parts, of course,
are also things, and every thing is a part of some other thing. There
is no concrete thing so minute and undifferentiated that it is not composed
of other things. Likewise there is no concrete thing so grand and all
4
encompassing that it is not part of something else. The world is made
up of parts which are things and things which are parts. What we look
steadily at, however, is a thing, and the things of which it is com-
posed are its parts. Things which affect the thing we are looking
^The acutal markers which bear the concepts are, of course, concrete
when they are committed to writing. These distinctions can lead us into
muddy waters, but they are important.
^This scheme of classification is taken from J.G. Miller. See
Behavior Science 10: 193-237, 1965, and Behavioral Science 16. 277-
310, 1971.
^We can postulate such things, but they are conceptual and not con-
crete .
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steadily at, or which are affected by it, compose the thing's environment
.
Things which do not affect the thing we are looking steadily at, or which
are unaffected by it are of no interest to us. They are not part of the
thing's environment.
4.6 We have made some fundamental distinctions. The distinction
between concrete, abstract, and conceptual things is intrinsic. It is a
way of classifying reality. We have seen that abstract things are the
properties of concrete things, and that concrete things are the data for
abstract things. Conceptual things are the tools for thinking and talking
about both concrete and abstract things. All of them are real. The
distinction between part, thing, and environment is a conceptual thing.
It is, of course, real. It is also wholly arbitrary and depends upon the
observer or student. No thing is intrinsically part, thing, or environment.
4.7 We may now do away with the ungainly term, "thing.” This paper
is about systems, concrete systems, abstracted systems, and conceptual
systems. It is concerned with the relationships between systems, their
parts, and their environments. If it is helpful, the reader may continue
to substitute the term "thing" for the term "system." There is no differ-
ence .
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CHAPTER V
SYSTEMS
5.1 Everything we say in this chapter will be true of all concrete
systems; that is to say, all statements, definitions, and propositions will
be true of everything that exists in time/space. In subsequent chapters
we shall be making useful distinctions between various types of concrete
systems, but for now we make no distinctions.
5.2 We shall start by developing a vocabulary with which to talk
about concrete systems. The vocabulary will necessarily be very general,
since we are talking about systems in general rather than any kind of
system in particular. Generality should not be confused with vagueness,
however. The test of our terms is that they are useful in making distinc-
tions; while not all systems are alike, they are all alike in some ways .
The terms we use will be helpful in determining these ways and will thus
allow us to make comparisons between very dissimilar things.
5.3 A concrete system is whole thing composed of inter-related parts.
We do not need the term "whole” because the term "system" means the same
thing. We do have to come to terms with the notion of "part," however.
Systems are composed of components , which have attributes , or properties .
The number of attributes which a component may have may be very small or
very large. They may be changing or unchanging.^ They may appear rele-
vant to the concerns of the observer or irrelevent to his concerns. While
the component is always matter/energy, the attributes of the component may
^Some theorists would disagree with this and claim that all attributes
of concrete systems change, some slowly and some quickly, \^^hether the
chnage is observed depends on the relative time scales of the system
and
the observer. See Reusch, in Grinker, ed.. Toward a Unified Theory
of
Human Behavior, 2d ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 317.
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be quantities, qualities, or conditions.
5.4 The important point is that the parts of concrete systems are both
components and their attributes. This may be a simple point, but it is
a source of fundamental confusion among those who think about systems,
particularly in the field of education. It is the reason why models of
abstracted systems so rarely apply well to concrete systems. The components
of abstracted systems can be postulated (and are usually the attributes of
concrete systems)
,
while the components and attributes of concrete systems
must be selected from those that in fact exist in time/space.
5.5 Some examples will help. The components of a human group are
people, but the parts of that human system include not only the people but
also their personalities, perceptions, ideas, habits, expectations, manner-
isms, feelings, prior experiences. . .and so on. We could also include
their heights, weights, complexions, bank accounts, clothing, hobbies, poli-
tical and religious affiliations. . .and so on. There is no end to the list
of attributes that people can have. Not all of them, of course, will be
of interest to the observer. Most likely, not all of them will influence
the behavior of the human group to which these people belong. Some of
them will, however, and those that do are parts of the system.
5.6 As I write, I can look out the window of my study and see a
childrens* swing set. The components of this swing set are swings, ladders,
poles, a slide, and support braces. Each of these components, however,
has a set of attributes which are part of that concrete system. The strength
of the material, the length of the ropes, the angle of the slide, the
stress on the braces are just a few of the attributes that are parts of
the system which is that swing set.
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5.7 A wristwatch is a collection of many specialized components, but
the ratio of the gears and the tautness of the spring are also parts of
the system.
5.8 Further reflection makes it clear that in fact a "component" is
nothing more than a collection of attributes. Any tangible thing has, for
example, size, weight, shape, and composition. A large, red, wodden tri~
angle can only be described in terms of its attributes. Things, in gener-
al, can always be described in terms of their attributes. We may choose
to describe them in terms of their purposes and relationships, also, but
again, closer examination will show that these, too, are functions of
their attributes.
5.9 It would be perfectly possible, therefore, to talk about con-
crete systems without reference to their components but it would be impos-
sible to talk about concrete systems without reference to their components*
attributes. A component is a particular disposition of a set of attributes
at a specific point in time.
5.10 The reader may be tempted to ask whether this approach means
that the entity or "wholeness" of components is unimportant. From a sys-
tems point of view, the answer is "yes." If we recall from 4.1 that a
system is a thing we are looking at steadily, it is, in fact, helpful to
look at its components as particular dispositions of attributes. It pre-
vents us from inadvertantly shifting the focus of our attention and
viewing the component as a system. Whether components exist as entities
is a question of philosophical and legal interest, but of little concern
to our inquiry. The changes which a neonate goes through as he passes
through infancy, childhood, adolescence, maturity, old age, and death
can all be described in specific terms as dispositions of attributes.
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Whether the infant, child, and adult are the same person is ultimately
an unanswerable question. If the large, red, wooden triange changes and
one of its attributes, we will recognize the change and call it a differ-
ent object. That we tend to consider some attributes more essential to
a thing than others is a habit of our thought rather than a quality of the
thing.
5.11 The preceding discussion indicates both why we are justified
in considering a system to be an ensemble of attributes and why it is
preferable to do so. Components are complexes of attributes at a part-
icular point in time. The complex of attributes at a subsequent point in
time might be very different. Moreover, at any given point in time
some of a component's attributes may be of interest to the observer of a
system, while others may be of no interest. To take into account both
the difference in time and the focus of the observer without having to
explain in every instance what we mean, we will use the term variable to
describe those attributes which, according to the interests and needs
of an observer, are parts of the system. A system can thus be described
in terms of its variables, which are those attributes selected from an
often limitless list of attributes which may be ascribed to the system's
components. While the identification of a system's variables is dependent
in some measure upon the interests and needs of the observer, it is not
by any means an arbitrary process; it is based upon relationships that
are observed to exist in the system. A system may be described in terms
of a limited and specific number of variables, regardless of the complex-
ity and large number of the attributes of its components.
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5.12 The condition of a variable at a given point in time will be
called its state . We shall assume that variables may have more than one
state and thus are capable of change. The particular disposition of a
system's variables at a particular point in time will be the state of the
system. The state of the system will thus change as a function of the states
of its variables; however, we must avoid assuming that a system's perfor-
mance will vary with its states. Many systems achieve stability through
the change in their internal states; the human being is such a system.
5.13 A truly rigorous treatment of variables would limit them to
2
attributes whose changes could be measured and quantified. We shall fall
short of that rigor, but shall attempt to treat non-quantifiable changes
as though they were quantifiable. This procedure has real pitfalls, as
many social scientists have found, but as long as we limit ourselves to
dealing with concrete systems whose changes can be observed, we will be
able to avoid these pitfalls.
5.14 For the purposes of illustration, we shall hypothesize a con-
crete system of three variables, each of which can have states. We shall
call the variables "A," "B," and "C" and we shall designate their states
as "+" and
12345678
A + + + +
B + + ++
C + - + - + - + -
The above diagram lists the eight possible states that the system might be
in. The reader might want to imagine a traffic light with three bulbs,
^See Ashby, Design for a Brain , (London: Chapman and Hall, 1960),
pp . 14-15, 33.
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A=red, B=yellow, and C=green, to help him visualize this system, but if he
does so, he must remember that we are not talking about a traffic light
but about any system of three variables which can have two states. This
system could just as well be a human being with
A = mood ("+" happy/”-” unhappy)
B = alertness (”+” awake/”-” asleep)
C = occupation (”+” busy/”-” idle)
The possible states of our system, then, can be determined by listing all
possible combinations of the states of the variables. If there is an equal
probability that each variable will be in either of its states, then any
of the eight states of the system is equally likely to occur at any point
in time.
5.15 It is important to note that this mode of analysis can be used
with any system that has a finite number of variables which can take a
finite number of states over a finite period of time. The addition of
variables or of states of variables does not change the mode of analysis,
although it will greatly increase the number of states of a system. The
addition of one variable with two states to the system in 5.14 would
increase the number of possible states in the system from eight to sixteen:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
A + + + + + + + + ----
B + + -- + + + + -- + +
--
C +- + - + - + -+ - + - + - + -
D + + + + + + + + --------
The addition of a third state to our three-variable would result in a
system of twenty-seven possible states:
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
A + + + + + + + + + _ _ _ _
B + + + -- -000 + + + +
C +-0 + -0 + -0 + - o +
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
^ ~~~~~oooooooo
B + ~ooo"l" + + — — — oo
C “0 + -0 + -0 + -0 + -
5.16 Of course, most systems in which observers would be interested
have many more than three variables and their variables have many more than
three states. The fact that it is possible to ennumerate and specify the
possible states of a system does not mean that it is often practical or
useful to do so. One of the problems with much research, especially in
the field of education, is the lack of a methodology to deal with complex
systems consisting of a great many variables capable of having a great many
states. Researchers are thus obliged to reduce the number of variables to
a manageable number and are therefore no longer dealing with concrete
systems but with abstracted systems. There is a definite need, therefore,
for a method of dealing with complex systems which does not require a
specification of all of their possible states.
5.17 We can get closer to such a method by realizing that concrete
systems do not often behave in such a way that all of their states are
equally probable. Instead, systems are organized in such a manner that
certain states are more probable than other states. The more organized
a system is, the more improbable its behavior becomes. A perfectly
organized system would have absolutely predictable behavior. Most systems
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of interest to us fall between the two extremes of being unorganized (in
which any state is equally probable) and being perfectly organized (in which
every state is absolutely predictable).
5.18 The movement of a system from state to state over time is its
3behavior
. The line of behavior thus is change from state to state .
A system with a single line of behavior is a tightly organized system. If
the observer knows the state that the system is in at a given point in
time he can predict with certainty the state of the system at some follow-
ing point in time. The line of behavior may or may not include all the
possible states the system may take. A traditional traffic light, for
example, which alternates among red, yellow, and green states, utilizes
only three of its eight possible states. These would be states 4, 6,
and 7 in the system of 5.14.
5.19 Some systems have more than one line of behavior and under
certain conditions will change from one line of behavior to another. If
the traffic light has a "Walk" signal, for example, it has the capability
of interrupting one line of behavior (its regular cycle) to follow
another line of behavior, one with only a single state. (In Massachusetts,
this would correspond to state 2 in 5.14, since the red and yellow
together serves as the "walk” signal.) Following Ashby, we shall desig-
4
nate the change from one line of behavior to another a transformation .
^Ibid .
^Ashby
,
Introduction to Cybernetics , (London: Chapman and Hall,
1961), pp. 10-16, 42-46.
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5.20 We are now in a position to make a fundamental distinction:
the distinction between change from state to state and change from trans-
formation to transformation. The latter is clearly of a different order
than the former. All behavior consists of change from state to state.
However, a change behavior is moving from transformation to transfor-
mation. If a system has only one line of behavior, no matter how varied
and intricate, it will be unable to chapge its behavior ; that is to say,
it will be unable to change the way in which it changes.
5.21 The importance of this distinction cannot be overemphasized.
Some systems may have a great number of richly varied states to pass
through and yet have only a single line of behavior. Other systems may
have a limited number of states and yet a great many lines of behavior.
The first system may be capable of richer and more varied behavior than the
second, yet in one crucial respect it is more limited; it cannot change
its behavior. It can neither adjust to different conditions nor adapt
to changing conditions. The point is not that it can behave more richly;
the point is that it must behave more richly. While its behavior consists
of more change, it cannot change its behavior.
5.22 Students of change, and those who consider themselves "change
agents" frequently get trapped by this distinction, and it is easy to see
why. It is frequently Impossible to determine from the system* s behavior
whether following ^ single line of behavior or changing its behavior .
If, for example, a system cycles regularly among its transformations, so
that one line of behavior is followed regularly by another line of behavior,
it will appear to be following a single line of behavior. If, on the
other hand, the system moved randomly from one line of behavior to another.
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an observer would be hard put to determine whether or not that system had
one or more lines of behavior.
5.23 It is, therefore, very difficult to distinguish between those
changes which a^ behavior and changes behavior from the system's
behavior alone. More knowledge is needed; not knowledge of the system's
states, but knowledge of the system's organization. This is particularly
helpful to realize when we are dealing with complex systems. The system's
behavior is a function of how it is organized rather than how its variables
can behave. Any organization which limits the lines of behavior (usually
infinite) introduces powerful constraints into the system, for it means
that the state a variable may assume is a function of either a prior state
of that variable or the state of another variable, or both.
5.24 We can intuitively recognize that without constraints, that is
to say, without organization, it would be impossible to gain any useful
information either from or about the system. If a system did, in fact,
follow all the lines of behavior which it was possible for it to follow,
the practical consequences for the observer would be the same as if the
system had only one line of behavior. Being absolutely predictable and
absolutely unpredictable have the same information value.
^
5.25 In looking at concrete systems, therefore, we shall be more
interested in the nature of the constraints than in the nature of the
variables. Systems of widely differing types can have similar sorts of
constraints, and we can learn much about all systems by studying the
various ways in which systems are organized. This will be the approach
of this paper.
^See sections 8.6-8.20 below for elaboration.
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CHAPTER VI
ENVIRONMENT
6.1 The system we are looking steadily at exists in a field of many
other systems, only some of which affect it or are affected by it. Just
as system components may have an infinite number of attributes which are
not variables in the system, so, too, the system’s field may contain an
inflnte number of variables which are not part of its environment. Only
those variables which do affect a system or which are affected by it are
parts of that system’s environment.
6.2 Environmental variables will be called parameters to distinguish
them from system variables. Most of the systems of interest to us exist
in a rich environment; that is to say, they interact with a great many
parameters. It will frequently be the case that the environments will
manifest some degree of organization; parameters will be subject to similar
sorts of constraints as system variables. We may make the same sort of
observation about environments that we made about systems in sections
5.23-5.24. An unorganized environment, one without constraints, would
be chaotic; parameter values would be completely unpredictable. The only
system which could exist in such an environment would be a system without
constraints. While we can hypothesize such environments and such systems,
no such concrete system or environment can really exist. On the other
hand, a tightly-joined, completely organized environment, one in which
parameter values were completely predictable, would be appropriate for
systems with only singe lines of behaviors ~ that is, completely organized
systems
.
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6.3 Most environments, and certainly those in which human beings exist,
are loosely-joined.^ They fall between being unjoined and tightly-joined
,
just as most systems fall between being unorganized and completely organ-
ized. This observation is highly significant, for it allows us to draw
parallels between the degree of organization in a system and the degree of
"joined-ness” in the environment. It will be particularly useful in the
case of complex systems all of whose variables and constraints are not
known to us. If the environment is known to us and the system is surviv-
ing, we can make highly probable Inferences about the organization of the
system from our knowledge of the organization of the environment. Even
more significant, if we wish to "change” the behavior of a complex system
(or induce the system to change its behavior, which is not at all the same
thing)
,
we can manipulate the environment by increasing or decreasing the
degree of organization which inhers in it. Generally speaking, the greater
the degree of organization in the environment, the easier it is to con-
trol, and therefore change, the system. Conversely, the more loosely-
joined the environment, the more necessary it is for the system to develop
self-control, that is, to be able to change itself.
6.4 The reverse is, of course, also true. We can infer the degree of
organization in the environment from the behavior of the system. Both
lines of inquiry are useful. While the relationship of a system to its
environment will be the topic of the next chapter, for now it will suffice
to note that there is a relationship between the degree of organization
in the system and the degree of organization in the system’s environment.
6.5 Parameters, like variables, ordinarily can have a range of values
which fall within specified limits. If the system variables can assume the
^Ashby, Design for a Brain
,
pp. 193-196.
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same rai^ of states as the system's parameters, then that system has the
capacity to be well-adapted to Its environment. If the system's variables
have a more limited range of states, then the system Is mal-adapted and
Its survival Is In jeopardy, or, at the very least. It will be dystunc-
tional.
6.6 Some simple examples will illustrate this important point. If,
in a particular locality, winter temperatures are likely to fall to -50
degrees and a car owner puts enough anti-freeze in his radiator to protect
it to -30 degrees, then the car is not well-adapted to its environment.
If a piece of music has a range of seven octaves and a particular instru-
ment has a range of only four octaves, then the instrument will not be
able to play that piece. A language which has a great many terms to
describe the nuances of affection and love cannot be well-translated into
a language which has only a few such terms.
6.7 If, on the other hand, the variables have a wider range than the
parameters, the parameters will constrain the behavior of the system. That
is to say, the system will not be able to utilize the full range of its
available behavior. If the environment is regularly more tightly organized
than the system, the system, if it is able to change, will become more
tightly organized; its range of behaviors will become more restricted.
Unneeded organs atrophy, unused knowledge disappears, unpracticed skills
leave the repetoire. What remains, after a period of time, is a system
which is well-adapted to a more restrictive environment.
6.8 These remarks suggest what will have to be the central theme of
the following chapters: the processes whereby systems relate to their
environments. What we have said thus far has been true of all concrete
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systems. What we say hereafter will be true of only certain kinds of
systems: those that have the capacity to change. We will accept as
axiomatic an environment which falls between being unorganized and being
tightly organized, between being unpredictable and totally predictable,
because most concrete systems exist in such an environment. Given such
an environment, the fundamental question we shall be asking is how systems
maintain themselves within it.
CHAPTER VII
A4
7.1
OPEN SYSTEMS
7.1 It is time to make some distinctions among concrete systems. What
we shall do in this chapter is classify concrete systems in accordance with
their capacity to adapt to a changing environment.
Closed Systems
7.2 We must first consider a class of systems which are impervious
to their environments. It is easy enough to conceive of such systems;
classical physics is based upon the study of such systems. We call them
closed systems
; they conduct no transactions with their environment.
They can receive neither matter nor energy nor information from their
environment; they transmit neither matter, nor energy, nor information to
their environment. The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that closed
systems over time tend toward disorganization and attain their most
probable (random) distribution of matter and energy. This tendency is
called entropy . We can see in nature many examples of entropy; indeed,
nature, when left alone, will always assume its most probable, least
organized state. An untended garden is a clear example of this. As
1 2both Norbert Wiener and Buckminster Fuller have reminded us, the universe
to the best of our knowledge, is a closed system which now contains all the
matter and energy it will ever contain. Spaceship Earth is a closed
system.
^
The Human Use of Human Beings
,
(Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1954)
2Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth
,
(New York: Simon and Schuster,
1969)
.
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7.3 Except for this cosmic level, however, it is doubtful that any
concrete system can be completely closed. Certainly the untended lawn
IS part of the eco-system and receives nutrients from its environment.
Aside from trivial examples of hermetically sealed caskets and the like
(trivial from the point of view of our analysis but not necessarily
scientifically trivial), the closed system can be regarded as the logical
limit towards which systems might tend, rather than a state which concrete
systems can manifest.
Open Systems
7*4 The systems with which we are concerned, then, are open systems
which are involved in transactions with their environments. There are
degrees of openness; some systems will conduct more transactions than
others. The degree of openness is clearly significant to system survival;
the richer and more changeable the environment, the more openness becomes
a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of system survival.
7.5 The transactions between a system and its environment consist
of exchanges of matter, energy, and information. When entering the system,
these are called inputs ; when leaving the system, they are called outputs .
While we may talk about transactions with the environment in terms of
larger purposes systems are intended to serve, our point of view in this
chapter will be that open systems depend upon inputs and outputs in order
to maintain themselves so that they may serve what may be considered to
be larger purposes. System survival is the first concern.
7.6 The significance of this viewpoint is by no means widely recognized.
To anticipate our argument somewhat, we may mention that many social
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scientists have developed models of social systems which are essentially
based upon the theory of closed systems.^ The system is seen as ener-
gizing itself, finding its own level of optimal performance which is
described as a state of equilibrium. Inputs from the environment are
seen as intrusions or disturbances, upsetting the equilibrium. System
processes are thus devoted to restoring the system either to its previous
state of equilibrium by extruding the disturbances, or to a new state of
equilibrium by 'assimilating the inputs into the system. The "norm" in
such conceptual systems is thus seen to be a tension-less, disturbance-
free condition. System processes are devoted to counteracting deviations
from this norm.
7.7 Open systems, on the other hand, thrive on deviation. The
characteristics of open systems with which we are most concerned - growth,
change, learning, and complexity - are based as much on deviation-amplifying
4
processes as upon deviation-counterbalancing processes. Without devia-
tions, such systems would not survive.
7.8 We may state axiomatically
,
therefore, that open systems main-
tain themselves through transactions with their environments. We shall
now proceed to classify open systems in accordance with their ability to
maintain themselves in changing environments.
Non-adjusting systems . 7 . 9 We begin with those systems which cannot
survive significant environmental change. Such systems have only one line
of behavior, and that line of behavior can occur only at specified para-
3
see Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory, (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 19671 for a critique of closed system models.
^Maruyama, "The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual
Causal Processes," in Buckley (ed.). Modern Systems Research for the
Behavioral Scientist, (Chicago: Aldine, 1968).
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meter values. It makes no difference whether we speak of one parameter,
as in the case of an electrical appliance which either has an energy source
or doesn’t, or of several parameters, as in the case of a hothouse flower
which can survive only in an environment in which temperatures, light,
moisture, and soil condition are carefully controlled. In either case,
any significant change in parameter values will make it impossible for
the system to maintain itself. The essential point is that the system has
no way of changing or correcting its performance, since it can perform in
only one way.
7.10 One characteristic of such systems is that they are easily con-
trolled. If one can control the parameter values, one can control the
system absolutely. If, however, one cannot control the parameter values,
ot if the parameter values fluctuate a great deal, the system's chances for
survival are slim. Hospitals are equipped to provide carefully controlled
environments for patients who can survive only in those environments.
Incubators, for example, effectively limit the range of parameter values
to those within which the premature infant can survive.
7.11 Systems that can only behave in one way are well-adapted to envir-
onments that behave in only one way. We will refer to such systems as
non-adjusting maintenance systems . The world is full of them and they are
of little interest to us.
Adjusting systems . 7.12 Of much greater Interest is the class of
concrete open systems which we may call adj us ting systems . These systems
have the capacity to adjust their outputs to predetermined environmental
parameters. The thermostatically controlled heating system is the classi-
cal example of an adjusting system. Such a system must have a pre-set
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standard of performance "built in" to the system against which it can mea-
sure its actual performance. The process by which it compares its actual
performance against its desired performance is called feedback
.
7.13 "Feedback" has gained currency in the language as referring to
any information a system may receive about its performance, but we shall
be using the term in a more restrictive sense to refer to any information
a system receives from its performance which serves to regulate its sub-
sequent performance. The essential notion is regulation through a test-
ing of output values against parameter values. If desired parameter
values can be pre-determined
,
the system can be designed to adjust to
them. Thus, the thermostatically-controlled heating system will maintain
room temperature at a predetermined level. It cannot, however, vary that
level. It cannot, for example, decide that the night-time temperature
should be 65 degrees and the day-time temperature should be 72 degrees.
These decisions come from outside the system. The actual room temperature
at any given time is the system,’ s output. Note that this is true whether
or not the furnace is running at that time. The system has two states,
"on" and "off," and it is performing just as well when it is off as when
it is on. (From the home-owner’s viewpoint, the more it is "off" the
better.) If the house "holds" the heat produced by the furnace so that
the output variable and the environmental parameter approximate the same
value, the system will be performing optimally. System variables thus
include the amount of space to be heated, the quality of insulation, the
height of the ceilings, and so forth, as well as the states of the com-
ponents connected by circuitry.
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7.14 The "purpose" of the thermostatically-controlled heating system,
then, is to maintain constancy of output when measured against a pre-
set and pre-determined environmental parameter. We can generalize from
this example and make the same statement about adjusting systems in gen-
eral. Through the mechanism of feedback, the adjusting system can regulate
its actual output by measuring it against its desired output as determined
by the environment. The system will change from state to state depending
on the deviation of the actual output from the desired output. If there
were no deviation, of course, or if deviation within limits was tolerated
by the environment, there would be nothing for the system to adjust to.
While adjusting systems are designed to counter—balance deviation, they
also require deviation as a sine qua non of their existence. This point
is conceptually vital to the argument. Adjusting systems avoid large
and significant deviations from desired outputs by allowing small and
insignificant deviations from the output. It is the deviations which
activate the system and initiate its line of behavior. To speak metaphori-
cally, adjusting systems thrive on small deviations; they cannot survive
without them.
7.15 For all practical purposes, the difference between adjusting
systems and non-adjusting systems is slight and more a matter of convenience
than anything else. After all, in place of the thermostat, one could have
a mere switch that would turn the furnace on and off; the same purpose
would be accomplished with only slightly more inconvenience to the
residents of the house. Conceptually, however, the difference is great
and powerful, for the adjusting system is self-regulating . Admittedly,
it is a very simple and limited sort of self-regulation, one that is
appropriate to very simple and limited sorts of environments, but the
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principal of self-regulation is the basis of organization and life itself.
The simplicity of the adjusting system in actuality, as well as its lack
of adaptability, should not blind us to the significance of this difference.
7.16 At the same time, the attractiveness and conceptual simplicity
of the adjusting system should not lead us into equating adjustment and
self-regulations. Adjustment is a special type of self-regulation
appropriate to special types of environments. Many sophisticated social
and behavioral scientists have developed models of society using the adjust-
ing system as their point of departure. Societal ''norms,” "roles," and
institutions are seen as the parameters; actual behaviors of individuals
and groups are the system outputs, and the system performs by reducing
the deviation between the actual human behaviors and normative societal
expectations. Such theories are attractive but inadequate to deal with
the phenomena of human systems. To show why this is the case, we must
deal more specifically with the limitations of adjusting systems.
7.17 In the first place, adjusting systems have pre-set and pre-deter-
mined lines of behavior corresponding to the pre-set and pre-determined
parameter values the system is to match. The number of lines of behavior
is inconsequential, as is the number of pre-determined parameters. Adjust-
ing systems may be extremely complex, but they are never unpredictable
(unless they malfunction). Adjusting systems are, therefore, deterministic .
Ashby defines determinancy as that situation in which "each part, if in
a particular state Internally and affected by particular conditions
externally, will behave in one way only."^
^
Design for a Brain
, p . 9
.
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7.18 Hare gives a beautiful example of an exceedingly complex adjust-
6ing system - an automatic elevator system which must test and adjust its
performance to a complex set of conditions. However, if at any given time
those conditions are known, the system's behavior can be infallibly pre-
dicted
.
7.19 In the second place, and following from the first, adjusting
systems are appropriate only in environments whose parameters can be con-
trolled and specified. Each state of the system depends upon the testing
of its performance against these parameters. The behavior of the system
is controlled by the environment. This, of course, is a severe limitation
upon the system's ability to regulate itself.
7.20 The popular television series. Mission : Impossible
,
is based upon
the premise that the crooks and tyrants to be thwarted and destroyed are
adjusting systems who will react in predictable ways to specified environ-
mental conditions as contrived by the team of heroes. The entertainment
value of the show is due in large measure to the juxtaposition of a
totally predictable response to a totally improbable contrived environ-
ment. The same comment can be made about Rube Goldberg's marvelously
complicated adjusting systems which accomplish very simple tasks.
7.21 Finally, the system has no choice. It cannot decide whether or
not to counterbalance deviations from its desired performance. It cannot
decide to take a lunch break and come back to its job later. It must
act upon its feedback. If it does not, it is malfunctioning.
7.22 The simplist way of summarizing the limitations of the adjusting
system is to say that it must be programmed by its environment. Given
Systems Analysis: A Diagnostic Approach
,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and World, 1967), pp. 61-63.
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the program, its behavior is uniquely and specifically determined. The
horror of HAL, the computer in ”2001: A Space Odyssey,” was that it some-
how had "learned” to behave without a program.
7.23
Before any given concrete system is construed to be an adjusting
system, therefore, the observer must decide whether the system is subject
to these limitations;
1. The system's lines of behavior can be specified;
2. Environmental parameters can be specified;
3. The system's behavior is programmed by the environment.
Learning Systems
7.24 The next class of systems we consider can exist in environments
which cannot be either entirely predictable nor entirely controlled. We
shall designate such systems as learning systems . Learning systems have
the capacity to adapt their behavior to new and continually changing
environmental circumstances. While adjusting systems can vary their
outputs, learning systems can change their internal organization as well.
While adjusting systems require small deviations in order to prevent
large deviations from desired parameter values, learning systems may
amplify deviation. While adjusting systems maintain a pre-determined
level of organization, learning systems tend towards elaborated struc-
tures and higher levels of organization. While adjusting systems are
deterministic, learning systems are probabilistic.
7.25 In sum, while adjusting systems cannot be responsive to environ-
mental change, learning systems can, and because they can, they must. If
they do not, they will not survive. The difference between adjusting
and learning systems is one of kind, not of degree. Adjusting systems
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and learning systems occupy very different environments, regardless of
their physical proximity. Since the environments in which human beings
exist are neither completely predictable nor completely controllable, the
human being is the best example of a learning system. Phylogenetically
,
the evolution of the species is evedence of learning. Ontogenetically
,
the life cycle of the organism provides the same evidence.
7.26 In using the human being as our prototypical learning system,
we must recognize that we have changed our point of view somewhat from
that of the system designer to that of the system analyst. We shall not
enter the controversy over whether learning systems can be designed, a
controversy which has tended to divide cyberneticians and organismic
theorists. We shall instead ask: given a learning system, how does it
adapt to a changing environment?
7.27 The simple answer, of course, is that it adapts by changing -
both its output and its internal organization - to counter-balance those
environmental changes which would jeopardize the survival of the system.
While the states of environmental parameters at any given time may be
neither predictable nor controllable, the range within which parameter
values may fall is roughly predictable. If the range is larger than the
system can tolerate, the system will create what is, in effect, an internal
environment which will keep those system variables essential to the sur-
vival of the system within the range necessary for their survival. In
other words, the system has the capacity to maintain a steady state in
the presence of an environment which changes unpredictably , but within
predictable limits.
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7.28 The notion of "steady state" has come to have two meanings in
the literature of systems theory. On the one hand, following the classical
work of Walter B. Cannon^, it has come to be identified with homeostasis
,
the complex and intricate processes by which an organism adapts to
variability in the environment. The physiological stability an organism
achieves is not due to the stability of physiological structures or
materials. Indeed, the most vital of these structures and materials are
so unstable that the most minute fluctuation or change in their environment
could well be fatal to the organism. Taken individually, the vital
physiological systems are non adjusting, yet taken together they form a
marvelous learning system.
When we consider the extreme instability of
our bodily structure, its readiness for dis-
turbance by the slightest application of ex-
ternal forces and the rapid onset of its
decomposition as soon as favoring circum-
stances are withdrawn, its persistance through
many decades seems almost miraculous. The
wonder increases when we realize that the
system is open, engaging in free exchange
with the outer world, and that the structure
itself is not permanent but is being con-
tinuously broken down by the wear and tear
of action, and is continuously built up
again by processes of repair.®
7.29 This notion of "steady state," then, emphasizes the processes by
which a system composed of inherently unstable components creates its own
internal stability through a high degree of specialized functions, division
^
The Wisdom of the Body
,
(New York: Norton, 1963).
^Ibid
. ,
p . 20
.
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of labor, and checks and balances. The steady state of the whole system
is achieved through the incessant activity and changing relationships of
Its parts. Change is of the essence of steady state; a system that cannot
change its internal organization cannot survive in an unpredictably chang-
ing environment.
7.30 On the other hand, there is a common view of "steady state" which
makes "growth" of the essence. This school of thought views the learning
system over time, and notes that the steady states achieved by the systems
themselves change - that homeostasis can be dynamic. Adapting (learning)
systems not only maintain their organization through change, but also change
their organization through elaboration of structure and differentiation of
function. Cannon's notion of homeostasis does not adequately allow for
structure-elaborating processes. The biologist, Emerson^, is one of the
most persuasive advocates of extending the notion of homeostasis to
structure-elaborating processes. Cannon, himself, encouraged and
indulged in such extentions of his concept.
Bodily homeostasis . . . results in liber-
ating those functions of the nervous system
that adapt the organism to new situations,
from the necessity of paying routine atten-
tion to the management of the details of
bare existence.
. . The main service of
social homeostasis would be to support
bodily homeostasis. It would therefore help
9
in Grinker, ed.. Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior
,
(New York:
Basic Books, 1967), pp. 147-163.
^^Talcott Parsons acknowledges his debt to Emerson ("On Building Social
System Theory," Daedalus
,
Fall, 1970, p.831) in reinforcing his movement
from equilibria! to homeostatic models of social processes.
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to release the highest activities of the
nervous system for adventure and achieve-
ment. With essential needs assured, the
Priceless unessentials could be freely
sought .
H
7.31 Cannon, in my view, has been richly misunderstood by those who
would extend his physiological notion of homeostasis to non-physiological
domains. While there is no doubt that learning systems require the abil-
ity to maintain steady states among their critical subsystems, we may
question whether the structure-elaborating processes can best be viewed
as dynamic homeostasis. Intuitively we observe that many learning
systems appear to move out of steady states towards greater disequilibrium,
tension, and deviation. What we shall later (13.6B-) call "proactive"
learning describes the learning system’s propensity for creativity,
discover, and inquiry, for dealing with hypotheses, conjectures, and
fantasies. Attempts to subsume these propensities under the rubric of
"dyanmic homeostasis" robs the term of much of its rigor. Learning
systems which manifest these propensities achieve new steady states only
incidentally, and not necessarily as a response to environmental variety.
7.32 In dealing with learning systems, therefore, we shall Incline
towards the first, more restrictive, usage of "homeostasis," and shall
view the steady state as one which achieves stability in a changing en-
vironment through internal change. At the same time, we acknowledge
that change in learning systems can extend beyond homeostasis, that
learning systems require the generation as well as the resolution of
tension, instability, and deviation. In other words, change in learning
systems cannot be ascribed solely to change in their environments. The
11
Cannon, cit
.
,
p. 323.
57
7.32
capacity to dream, to wish, and to hope are among the "priceless unessen-
tials" which, from our point of view, are non-homeostatic in nature.
7.33 Unlike the adjusting system, in which desired environmental
parameters were "built in" to the system, the adapting system must receive
a steady flow of information from the environment, and this information
must be in a form which is understood by the system. The learning system
must include some sort of decoder, and the decoder must be capable of
handling as much information as the system will need to represent the envir-
onment for Its purposes. The adaptability of the system will frequently
depend upon the ability of the decoder to handle the variety which exists
in the environment. We have all had the experience of attending foreign-
language films in which we know that the English sub—titles were only pale
approximations of the spoken dialogue. We knew that we were missing a
deal, but not what it was. Similarly, the usefulness of any code
depends upon its ability to handle all the variety that exists in the
environment. The Morse Code can handle all possible messages because it
has the same variety as the alphabet it is encoding.
7.34 We must remind ourselves that the environment, according to
6.1, consists only of those parameters which do affect the system. A blind
person and a deaf person walking down the same street would inhabit very
different environments, regardless of the fact that they may occupy nearly
identical physical space. Visual data would not affect the first, and
auditory data would not affect the second. There is an important concep-
tual difference, however, in thinking of each as an impaired system unable
to encode important environmental data and thinking of them as different
systems inhabiting different’ environments . The second approach, of course.
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Is the one we are using In this paper. If the blind person and the deaf
person were to join forces the result would be a single system able to
encode both visual and auditory information.
7.35 It is worth adding here that two persons with fully functioning
sensory apparatus walking down the same street may also be inhabiting
different environments. If one is hurrying to make an appointment for which
he is late and the other is ambling down the street taking in all the
sights and sounds, each will be encoding very different information from
the environment. The implication of these examples is that for concrete
learning systems there are no normative environments, only an infinite
number of different environments which may co-exist for different systems
12in the same space/time field.
7.36 Once the information has entered the system as input and has been
encoded into a form that can be processed by the system, the system must
be capable of at least as much variety as the environment it is adapting
to. "When the internal organization of an adaptive system acquires
features that permit it to discriminate, act upon, and respond to aspects
of the environmental variety and its constraints, we say that the system
has mapped part of the environmental variety and constraints into its
13
organization." It is this process of mapping which activates the
homeostatic mechanisms so that at all times they are responding to the
actual environmental conditions which exist.
see footnote 1 to section 4.2.
13
Buckley, Walter, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory
,
(Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 63. Emphasis added.
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7.37 We must note that if it were possible to map in advance all
possible environmental variety into the system we would have a very complex
adjusting system which would behave in precisely the same way as a learning
system. To construct an adjusting system which behaves as though it were
learning is well within the capability of science and engineering. To
assume, however, that in so doing we have explained learning is a serious
14
^ ^error
,
or the learning system is not one which has a greater number of
built-in possible behaviors, but instead has a built-in plan for generating
appropriate behaviors for a great number of environmental situations.
7.38 The learning system can thus adapt its behavior in a way that the
adjusting system cannot. Colloguial language has alwyas made this dis-
tinction. The adaptable person — or organization - is one who can change
his behavior appropriately to the situation at hand without knowing in
advance what the situation may be, thus enhancing his ability to survive
in a wide variety of situations. The question that system designers and
system analysts must ask is whether the environment is more suitable for
an adjusting system or an adapting system. The ability to survive in a
wide variety of situations can be disfunctional if there are not a wide
variety of situations to adapt to. As Ashby has pointed out^^, no part-
icular form of system organization is intrinsically good or bad, but is
relative to the environment in which it exists. An adapting system is not
It is an error that limits the usefulness of Ashby's two extra-
ordinary books. Design for a Brain and Introduction to Cybernetics .
To simulate learning is not the same thing as accounting for it in
learning systems.
^^in Buckley, Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist
,
(Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 111-113.
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"better" than adjusting system in any absolute sense; it is wasteful and
inefficient in a restircted environment. Again, our common vocabulary re-
flects this destinction; we talk of "adapting" to new situations, but of
adjusting to, say, army life. We might comment that we ordinarily talk
of children adjusting" to school, which says something, probably true,
about the school as an environment.
7.39 We may now return to our arguement in 7.36 and ask what enables
an adapting system to both behave appropriately and maintain a steady state.
An essential part of the answer is that the adapting system has a memory
which can store properly encoded environmental input as well as previously
successful plans for behavior. It must be stressed that the use of the
term "memory" implies no vitalistic explanation of adaptive behavior; we
are talking about organization which can both be designed, observed, and
modeled. The memory function stores the inputs and the plans in highly
discrete segments so that the system can not only retrieve the input
but can combine the input data in a limitless number of ways so that the
"interior environment," or the system's image of the external environment,
is extraordinarily flexible. We need think only of the linguistic
capacity of human beings who live constantly with the need to respond
verbally to unpredictable utterances from the environment. A finite num-
ber of sounds and a finite set of combinatorial rules can generate an
infinite number of understandable utterances, none of which was in the
system's memory.
7.40 Thus, in addition to storing the environmental input, the
adapting system can store plans for combining the input data and for
acting upon the various combinations of data that it can generate. It can,
in effect, organize Itself to meet new environmental conditions.
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7.41 The ability of a system to adapt to environmental change by learn-
ing is limited by the plans built-in to the system’s memory. The adapting
system does not have the capacity to change its plans. It can neither
change its template nor adapt to crises or emergencies wherein environ-
mental parameters may assume values beyond their customary limits. Adapting
systems are essentially re-active, not pro-active. They can follow rich
and complex plans for changing both their lines of behavior and their
organization, but they cannot change these plans. Just as adjusting sys-
tems are slaves to their input, so are learning systems slaves to their
plans. It is a higher order of slavery, to be sure, but slavery nonethe-
less. A system which is to survive in an environment characterized by
changing limits of variation must have the capacity to change
its plans as well as its behavior. Such a system must be able to learn
how to learn. We shall be considering such systems shortly.
7.42 Before we leave learning systems, however, we must stress two
characteristics which distinguish them from adjusting systems, both of which
can be inferred from the preceding treatment. First, the enhanced survival
value of learning systems is due to their ability to achieve steady states
independent of initial conditions or prior steady states. Their stability
is always with reference to actual environmental conditions rather than
reference to a set of assigned variable values. For this reason, it is
impossible to predict with certainty what the values of any future steady
state might be from the values of a given steady state. Depending on the
number and complexity of its plans, a learning system can arrive at a
steady state through a wide variety of ways of re-ordering its internal
organization. A steady state may require a greater degree of organization
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(if the environment becomes more highly organized) so that the system must
elaborate its structure and continually amplify the deviation from its
prior conditions. Ecology provides splendid examples of the difference
between an adjusting system and a learning system in this regard. Every
schoolchild knows that there is a relationship between the size of a
species population in a given area and the availability of food. Adjust-
ment mechanisms regulate the size of the population to that which the
supply of food can accomodate. Ordinarily this is accomplished by dim-
inishing the size of the population through death, disease, and declining
birth-rate. Human beings, however, also have the option of increasing
the supply of food to accomodate an increasing population. As Maruyama
X6illustrates
,
the growth of cities can be explained as an example of
deviation-amplifying adaptation.
7.43 This suggests the second important point. Learning systems
can act upon their environments to maintain them within the limits that
the systems can adapt to. There is a nonlinear relationship between
system inputs and outputs; each influences the other. The inputs re-
ceived by the system are more likely to be encodable because they have
been influenced by the system’s outputs. Just as earlier we spoke of the
adapting system's capacity to map environmental features into its inter-
nal organization, so, too, the system can project aspects of its own
organization into the environment.^^ Not all learning systems have this
X6
°0p. cit
. ,
in Buckley, p. 305.
^^Laszlo, Ervin, System, Structure, and Experience , (New York: Gordon
and Breach, 1969), pp. 5-6.
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capacity, but most living systems do. This kind of circular causality,
of course, enhances the chances of system survival by exercising some con-
trol over the environment to which it must adapt.
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CHAPTER VIII
INPUTS
8.1 ''Input” is a generic term denoting the environmental features
which enter the system to be processed, transformed, and utilized both
to maintain the system and to produce outputs which re-enter the envir-
onment. All open systems have inputs as a condition of their existence,
although systems will vary widely in their ability to accept differing
amounts and differing kinds of inputs. All systems have boundaries and
threshholds which serve to limit inputs to those which can be processed
by the system. The boundary and threshhold act as filters to protect
the system from inputs which would disturb system functioning or threaten
system existence. If a system exists in a space/time field which contains
many potentially dangerous inputs, the boundary and threshhold functions
become of paramount importance (7.10). The greater the system's capacity
to process environmental variety (7.33) when that variety is, in fact,
present, the more stable the system will be and the less its survival will
depend upon the vigilant maintenance of boundaries and threshholds. This
hypothesis receives striking corroboration from history; the more energy
a political entity devotes to its boundary functions - to preventing
"harmful” inputs from entering the system - the more "harmful” those
inputs become if they do, in fact, enter.
8.2 By definition, our taxonomy in Chapter Four indicates the cap-
acity of the system to process both varied kinds and varied amounts of
input. The non-adjusting system accepts only specified kinds and
specified amounts of input. If either amount or kind of input varies, the
system will malfunction. In an electrical system, fuses and circuit-
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breakers act as threshholds to prevent overloaded circuits. ^ However,
there are minimal as well as maximal threshholds. Too little Input Is as
damaging to the non-adjusting system as too much or too varied Input.
If the energy Input to a non-adjusting system falls below the threshhold,
the system will also malfunction.
8.3 Adjusting systems require a greater range in the amount of input,
although not necessarily in the kind of input. Generally speaking, the
output of an adjusting system will vary Inversely with the input; thus
variation of input from a specified norm is a precondition of an adjusting
system s existence. The threshholds must therefore be wide enough to per-
mit minor deviations to enter the system but narrow enough to prevent
major deviations to injure the system's processes, which cannot be changed.
8.4 Learning systems require great variety in both the amounts and
kinds of inputs, to the extent that if the environment does not naturally
contain sufficient variety, the system, through its outputs, will enrich
the environment to provide sufficiently varied inputs. The boundaries of
learning systems are less easily ascertained than the boundaries of less
adaptable systems. They are dynamic, as the system is; their threshholds
may be indetectable to an observer whose threshholds are narrower than
theirs. The threshholds of learning systems are idiosynchratic ; they
may expand or contract over time. Two interacting learning systems may
have very different threshholds, even if we remember that we are talking
about the admissability of input, not its interpretation. There is the
story of the child who, when asked by his teacher to describe "infinity,"
^This should not be confused with adjustment processes which use
negative feedback. The circuit-breaker terminates system performance;
it does not correct it.
66
8.4
replied, "Infinity is like a Quaker Oats box." The boy was chastised to
be serious. Test of creativity, or "divergent thinking" are usually
based upon the assumption that the investigator is more divergent than the
subject and can, therefore, ascertain the degree of the subject's creativ-
ity.
8.5 Inputs may be classified in several ways. Miller distinguishes
between matter-energy and information inputs.^ We shall not develop the
notions of "matter" and "energy," for while the reaer may not be know-
ledgeable in the disciplines dealing with them, he will know the approp-
riate domains in which they fall. "Inforamtion, " hoever, is used in the
special sense developed by communication theory and requires special
explanation.
8-6 Information is a measure of the degree of uncertainty in a given
situation, and is related both to the number of choices the sender of a
message has to select his messages from and to the knowledge that the
receiver has of the number of choices from which a particular message
was selected. The Information value of any message will vary directly
with
:
a. the greater number of possible messages from which the particular
message was selected;
b. the degree of organization in the environment sending the message.
The information value of a message will vary inversely with:
a. the constraints upon the transmitter
b. the degree of probability in the environment.
2
Miller, James G., "The Nature of Living Systems" in Behavioral
Science
,
vol. 16, 1971, pp. 279-281.
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8.7 We can see this more clearly by forming the following table
oR6ftNuar/oA/
/ t
3
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environment, ranging from high on the left to low on the right. The vert-
ical continuum represents the degree of choice of the sender, ranging from
high at the top to low at the bottom. Box One represents a highly-organ-
ized environment, one with a high degree of predictability and constraint
and a low degree of probability. The sender has a high degree of choice
in selecting the messages he will send. Because the environment is
highly organized and highly predictable, it will require fewer messages
to describe that environment, and each message will convey more informa-
tion about it.
In Box Two, the environment is poorly organized with a low degree of
predictability. It will take more messages to describe that environment,
and each message will contain less information about the environment. The
sender, however, has a high degree of choice, and so, despite the environ-
ments low degree of organization, given enough time, he can still describe
it, although it will require many more messages to do so.
Box Three posts a highly-organized environment, but a sender who is
highly constrained, with little or no choice; let us say that he is con-
strained to send only one message. Whether or not that message contained
much information for the receiver would depend upon the receiver's
knowledge of both the environment's organization and the sender's constraints.
Because the environment is highly-organized, it is possible for a con-
strained message to convey information about it; however, there is no
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possibility for the accuracy of the message to be ascertained. Put another
way, there would be no room for error since the sender could not correct
his message.
Finally, in Box Four, the environment has little organization and the
sender has little choice. Since it would take a great many messages to
describe that environment, and since the sender is constrained to a few
messages, it will be impossible for the sender to describe the environ-
ment, and the information value of the message will tend towards zero.
8.8 To illustrate, let us imagine an automobile engine and the
dashboard guages. A smoothly-running engine is a highly-organized system;
the performance of each component is dependent upon the performance of
other components. The gauges provide a variety of information about the
performance of this system: temperature, oil level, speed, gas level,
and so forth. Assuming that the gauges are working smoothly, they will
at any given time provide accurate information about the system as a
whole. Note that the driver need not know much about how the engine works
to know that it is working smoothly. This is an instance of a Box One
situation
.
8.9 Now let us assume that the engine begins to malfunction through
some diminution in its degree of organization. Let us say that the temp-
erature guage begins to indicate overheating. The gauge indicates that
something is wrong, but not what is wrong. More information is needed,
and the driver will either examine the engine or take the car to a mechanic
to find out whether the difficulty is a leak in the radiator, evaporation
of fluid, a loose fan-belt, or whatever. The mechanic will have a systema-
tic way of examining the problem, based upon the ease of investigation and
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the probability of error. Some malfunctions are more likely than others
in an organised system. As the system becomes Increasingly disorganized
It takes an Increasingly greater number of messages to describe it. This
is an example of a Box Two situation.
8.10 So far we can generalize to say that the more organized the
system (or the environment) the less information is necessary to describe
it, to predict its behavior, and, as we shall soon see, to control it.
Likewise, the more organized the system, the greater the information value
of any given message. Conversely, the less organized the system, the
more information is necessary to describe, predict, or control it, and
the less the information value of any given message.
8.11 Now let us assume a well-functioning, highly-organized engine,
but a very limited gauge, perhaps a light that goes on when the system is
overheated. In this instance, the gauge can give only two messages -
either the system is overheated or it is not overheated. When the temp-
erature passes the threshhold, a light goes on. The gauge cannot indicate
that the system is becoming overheated, only that it has become overheated.
Or, let us assume a more extreme case: the gauge is broken, the light
bulb is burned out, or a fuse is blown. If the driver does not know
that the gauge is not working, he may assume that the lack of a light
indicates that the system is not overheated. Most of the time he will
be right, but some of the time he will be wrong. Since the gauge can
only sense one message, there is no way of validating its accuracy. In
this case, the driver is getting no information about the cooling system,
but he doesn’t know that he is getting no information. When he dis-
covers that the gauge is malfunctioning, he must either get it fixed or
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make extra effort to maintain the system in a high degree of organization.
Whenever he stops for gas, let us say, he will check the fluid level and
the fan belt to get the information that the gauge, because of its limited
choice, cannot give him. This illustrates a Box Three situation, and
demonstrates that a limitation on the freedom choice of the message
sender reduces the information value of the message.
8.12 Finally, we come to Box Four, the loosely organized system and
the highly constricted transmitter. If the engine doesn't work and the
gauges don t work, the driver can get no information about the system.
When his car is towed in to the mechanic, the mechanic will start probing
the system according to the same two principles we mentioned in 8.9:
the ease of investigation and probability of malfunction. If the car
has been really neglected, the chance that any one repair will restore
it to proper functioning is minimal. The mechanic will have to put the
car through a great many tests, each of which will provide minimal infor-
mation about the whole system, but taken together will provide a great
deal of information. If the mechanic is trained to send a wide variety
of messages to the car, ultimately he will be able to restore it. If,
however, like many do-it-yourself mechanics, he can only kick it, the
chances of restoration are slim.
8.13 Our illustration has chosen a deterministic system, the car
engine, to explain the concept of information. It should be clear to
the reader that the more probabilistic the system and the more that the
system's organization is continually changing, the more difficult it
becomes for a constrained transmitter to send messages about the system.
The messages describing the state of a changing system at any given point
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in time may not, in fact, describe the system at
the receiver receives the message.
the point in time that
8.14 It will frequently happen that the receiving system will not
know the range of the transmitter's freedom of choice of messages. I
can recall with both delight and dismay the first time my baby daughter
pointed to me and said "da-da.” My bubble soon burst when she pointed at
other members of the family and said "da-da." It may take repeated trans-
missions under a variety of circumstances before the range of choice can
be roughly ascertained. The driver may not discover that the needle in
the gas tank gauge is stuck until he runs out of gas.
8.15 There is one more observation we must make about information
inputs. The more probable the message, the less information it contains.
Probability, in this sense, is the inverse of organization; the law of
entropy, developed within the theory of closed systems, states that with-
out inputs a system will ultimately assume its most probable, that is to
say its least organized, state. While open systems are by definition
negentropic, some systems are more open than others and are more capable
of maintaining a high degree of organization. Language systems provide
good evidence of this. Given the phrase, "once upon a ," most
school children could predict the missing word with almost perfect
accuracy, for the high degree of organization of our language makes it
improbable that the missing word would be other than "time." If it were
to turn out to be "mattress" we would receive more information that if
it were "time," since "mattress" is less probable than time. If the
missing word turned out to be "the," this would be so very unpredictable
that we would suspect an error in transmission. Certain words follow
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other words with great regularity In our language. If this were not the
case, If any word were equally probable after any other word, we would be
unable to conmunicate at all. Just so. If our environment were not
organized similarly, if any event or situation with equal probability,
we would be unable to survive in it.
8.16 This is one area where our common vocabulary plays tricks on
us; if we say that a given outcome or result is "highly probable," it
is only because the environment (or the system) is highly improbable.
It IS only because of the constraints in the environment which limit the
probable behavior of its components that any given event or situation
becomes more probable.
8.17 Miller has constructed the following table^ to show the rela-
tionships between various terms used to talk about information and organ
ization. Each term is the antonym of the other in the same row; the
terms in each column are roughly synonymous in that they are different
ways of describing the same phenomenon.
Information
Negentropy
Signal
Accuracy
Form
Regularity
Pattern or form
Order
Organization
Regular Complexity
Uncertainty
Entropy
Noise
Error
Chaos
Randomness
Lack of pattern or formlessness
Disorder
Disorganization
Irregular Complexity
3
"Living Systems: Basic
System Theory and Psychiatry
,
Concepts" in Gray, Duhl, and Rizzo, General
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), p. 67.
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Heterogeneity Homogeneity
Improbability Probability
Predictability Unpredictability
8.18 The value of information to the system will thus depend upon
the character of the environment presenting the input. It will also de-
pend upon the capacity of the system to process the information which
enters it. We shall be talking about system processes in the next chapter,
but for now we shall suggest that the ability of the environment to con-
trol the system is directly related to its ability both to provide infor-
mation to it and to gain information from it. The ability of the system
to control the environment is likewise directly related to its information
processing capacity. If the system is capable of acting upon more infor-
mation than the environment or a particular system in the environment, is
able to send, the environment will be unable to control the system. The
reciprocal is also true. This is but another way of stating the message
of Chapter Four; that there must be (and therefore is) congruence be-
tween the system and its environments.
8.19 Control is closely related to predictability. The abount of in-
formation necessary to predict the behavior of a system is also the amount
of information necessary to control that system. If, in the following
diagram, systems A and B stand in interaction and A must control B,
i.e., A*s output will be B's input, and A requires output ”x" from B, A
must know not only all the ways "y" can be transformed to "x" but also
all the ways in which "y” might be transformed to some other output, say
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"z,” instead of ”x." If, given ”y," B can produce either "x" or "z,”
A’s control over B is lacking. To increase its control, A tnust reduce
the variety in B, and to do this it must have greater variety than B. It
must be able to produce input into B which, in addition to "y" will con-
strain B’s ability to produce "z.” If, by failing to produce ”x," B
in some way jeopardizes A, then B's control over A is greater than A's
control over B. Let us say that B desires or needs input "v.” By pro-
ducing "z" instead of ”x,'' B can induce A to provide ”b" in addition to,
or in place of, "y.” If A produces "v” and "y,” B will produce "x.”
However, "x” input into A leads to "y” output which, in turn, produces
z as frequently as it produces "x." Viewed as B's environment, A must
be able to provide both "v" and "y" to be able to insure that B will
produce "x." Viewed as A's environment, B must be able to provide both
"x" and "z" to insure that A will produce "v." In such a mutually
causitive system, we can say that control is shared; each system has
enough information a variety to control the other.
8.20 Control and prediction are not identical, however. I may pre-
dict with absolute accuracy that the sun will rise tomorrow, that a train
on a track will run in a given direction, or that a child will sneeze if
I throw pepper at his nose. Control Implies the ability to produce differ-
ent results from the same initial conditions or similar results from
different initial conditions. Knowledge of a deterministic relationship
between initial conditions and subsequent states may give the appearance
of control to those who are unaware of the deterministic nature of the
system. Thus there can be predictability without control. There cannot
be control without predictability, however.
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8.21 The distinction between matter, energy, and information has helped
us focus on some distinctive properties of the latter, but we should not
forget that the distinction is highly artificial. Any given input into
the system is likely to be composed of both matter/energy and information.
This is similar to the distinction in Chapter Two between components and
variables. Just as we said that it was appropriate to look at a system
component as a particular disposition of variables at a given point in
time, so, too, we can look at an input datum as a particular disposition
of matter/energy and information at a particular point in time.
8.22 Berrien has provided another helpful way of classifying inputs
according to function. He distinguishes between maintenance inputs and
4
signal inputs. Again, this tends to be an artificial distinction, since
many, if not most, inputs will have both maintenance and signal functions,
t>ut it is helpful, when dealing with open systems, to distinguish between
those inputs which are essential if the system is to function properly
and those inputs, the processing of which ^ the system’s function.
8.23 Maintenance inputs are essentially those which are necessary to
counteract the inevitable entropy which would occur if they were not
available. All open systems require an energy input to maintain them-
selves; all living systems, at least through the level of the organism,
require matter inputs so that metabolic processes may occur. We add the
qualification because it is difficult to conceptualize the nature of
maintenance matter-input at the supra-organism level, e.g. group or
organization, except as new members are added to replace members who
leave the group for one reason or another. Open systems above the non-
^Berrien, F. Kenneth, General and Social Systems , (Brunswick: Rutgers,
1968), p. 25.
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adjusting level require some information inputs to permit the adaptive
processes to occur. Non-adjusting systems do not require information in-
put, since they cannot process it; nonetheless every matter or energy trans-
mission from the environment will contain some information value.
8.24 For the learning system, maintenance inputs are those which
activate the homeostatic mechanisms which enable the system to maintain
a steady state. In the human being, for example, a steady maintenance
input IS required for life, although signal Inputs may fluctuate a great
deal. We might say that the human being when asleep, is receiving only,
or primarily maintenance inputs.
8.25 The case is put nicely by Lashley:^
"... the input is never into a quies-
cent or static system, but always into a
system which is already actively excited
and organized. In the intact organism,
behavior is the result of interaction of
this background of excitation with input
from any designated stimulus."
It is the maintenance inputs which provide and maintain the excitation.
Before any system can process signal inputs, therefore, maintenance inputs
must be present.
8.26 Signal inputs are those that the functioning open system receives
which, through its processes, are transformed into outputs. The non-
adjusting system will accept only specific signal inputs that it has been
^in Berrien, ££. cit . , p. 25.
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designed to accept, and these will be task-specific inputs. The adjusting
system will accept a wider range of signal inputs, although the modes of
their values will be restricted to those the system can process. Thus,
a thermostatically-controlled heating system will accept as signal inputs
both the desired temperature as determined by the environment and the
actual temperature as determined by its output. It will not accept
humidity or dust-content signal inputs. The learning system will accept
all those inputs, both ranges and modes, that it can encode.
8.27 Human beings receive signal inputs primarily through their sen-
sory organs, which also act as filters. The presence of a particular
signal in the environment does not necessarily mean that it is accepted
by the system as input. Learning systems are highly selective in accept-
ing signal Inputs, much more so than is the case with maintenance inputs.
8.28 The distinction between maintenance and signal inputs is
partiuclarly helpful in looking at groups and organizations as systems.
It helps us to distinguish, for example, between working conditions (main-
tenance inputs) and the work itself (processed from signal inputs). Some
useful and researchable hypotheses can be formed about the relationship
between maintenance and signal inputs and the portion of a system's energy
devoted to the processing of each. We might expect, for example, that
the more the system must process maintenance inputs, the less adaptable
it may be. As a corollary, we can suggest that the more components in-
volved in maintenance input processing, the less likely that those compon-
ents or that the system will be learning systems, although the greater the
likelihood that the maintenance functions will be performed.
8.29 If, for example, an organization must expend a great deal of
energy and time determining the rules, regulations, and protocol under
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which it will operate, the less energy and time it will have to operate
those rules, regulations, and protocol. The more members who are
engaged in these activities, the less time and energy these members will
have to process signal inputs.
8.30 This discussion of inputs has been extended because everything
said in this chapter is true of processes and outputs as well. Whether
any phenomenon is considered input, process, or output depends largely
upon the system one is looking steadily at. Since any concrete thing
may be viewed as system, as environment, and as "system and environment,"
what will be input from one perspective will be process or output from
another perspective. This is why it is so important not to change per-
spective in mid-analysis.
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CHAPTER IX
PROCESSES
9.1 We shall limit our attention in this chapter to the most inter-
esting and pertinent classes of systems, the learning systems and the
morphogenic systems, since these are the systems which change their inter-
nal processes, and because all living systems apparently fall into these
classes. If we think conceptually of a system as a "black box" with
identifiable inputs and identifiable outputs, everything within that black
box will be subsumed under the heading, "process."
9.2 This treatment attempts to minimize the distinction between
process and structure, a distinction which has engendered lively de-
bate among philosophers and social scientists, without ignoring the
of the distinction for certain analytical purposes. We agree with
Miller that "the structure of a- system is the arrangement of its subsys-
tems and components in three-dimensional space at a given moment of time
.
This always changes over time."^ Since one of the characteristics of
open systems is the relative instability of their structures (7.28 and
8.25), and since the instability of system structures appears to have no
direct relationship to the stability of the system as a whole in relation-
ship to its environment, we are stressing the dynamic rather than the
static approach by focussing on the processes rather than structures. This
is also consistent with our distinction in 5.9 between components and
variables. The structural approach tends to regard system parts as com-
ponents - entities having a spatial configuration at a point in time,
^in Behavioral Science, vol. 16, 1971, p. 284.
80
9.2
whereas the process approach will view the syste. parts as subsvste.s
which may or may not be identical with components.
9.3 We acknowledge, however, that systems do have a "deep structure"
which remains relatively unchanging when compared to the processes observed
over time. As the song says, "Fish gotta swim and birds gotta fly.
.
and the phylogenetic template of living systems is, for all practical pur-
poses. unchanging. This is to say both that there are effective limits
to structural change and that there are certain essential processes which
systems must have, regardless of how these processes are carried out.
This chapter will identify these critical processes and describe various
modes of system organization for carrying on these processes.
9.4 Several preliminary observations are necessary. First, this
inquiry into system processes would be unnecessary if system processes were
deterministic and if there were an Invarlent relationship between input
and output. If the environment could control the system’s outputs solely
by controllng the inputs, it could treat the system as a black box. The
more probabilistic the system - that is to say, the more variety the
system contains - the more knowledge of system processes is necessary if
the environment is to exercise control over system outputs. It follows
axiomatically that if the system is to exercise self-control, the more
knowledge of its own processes it must have. ''Knowledge'' is not necessar-
ily to be construed as consciousness," but rather in the more general
sense of being able to process internally generated information.
9.5 Second, it may appear that the system one is looking steadily at
is not performing all the critical processes necessary for system sur-
vival. Miller distinguishes between totipotentlal systems which are
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capable of carrying out all critical processes, and partipotential systems
which are dependent upon other^ systems for the carrying out of certain
2
critical processes. Any partipotential system is necessarily a sub-
system of a totipotential system. Totipotential systems may also be sub-
systems of totipotential systems. Totipotential systems may also partici-
pate as subsystems of partipotential systems, and this gives rise to some
interesting complexities at the supra-organismic levels. Presumably, all
organisms are totipotential, unless parasitic or symbiotic, although the
groups they belong to may be partipotential. As members of groups they
must delegate some of their critical processes to the group and become
partially- functioning totipotential systems, while at the same time the
group they belong to is a fully-functioning partipotential system.
9.6 Thus, a public day school may be a fully-functioning partipoten-
tial system, depending upon its environment for the performance of certain
critical processes, while its students and teachers, while in school, are
partially-functioning totipotential systems. Sociologists might say that
an individual can play many different roles, although at any given time
he is not performing all the roles in his repetoire. We would say that
a fully-functioning partipotential system is only a portion of the envir-
onment for the partially-functioning totipotential components. Both
students and teachers receive inputs from sources other than schools. If
the observer is attempting to understand the behavior of a totipotential
subsystem in terms of the inputs from a partipotential supra—system, his
analysis is likely to be faulty. Thus, a school may provide a fully-
^"Living Systems! Basic Concepts" in Gray, Duhl, Rizzo, General Systems
Theory and Psychiatry , (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 74-75.
82
9.6
functioning learning environment, but it will only be a part of a child's
learning environment. The rhetoric of educators frequently acknowledges
this, but their practices just as often deny it.
9.7 It is frequently difficult to determine the boundaries of parti-
potential systems and thus distinguish between inputs, processes, and
outputs. For example, are the students in the school to be seen as inputs
or system components? What are the outputs of a school? These are diffi-
cult questions to answer with any degree of rigor because it is difficult
to look steadily at a school as a system without shifting focus inadver-
tently to another level of analysis. We frequently resort to metaphors
from the world of business and industry where boundaries, inputs and out-
puts are more readily identifiable. This has led us to organize our
schools as though they were businesses and has led the public to hold the
school accountable as though schools' "products" were as clearly identifi-
able as businesses'. However, an industy dealing in products is in fact
a totipotential system, whether or not fully functioning. All the processes
transforming the inputs into outputs can both conceptually and concretely
be located within tempero-spatial boundaries.
9.8 The third and final preliminary consideration has to do with the
relationship between system components and critical subsystem processes.
Miller states that "systems differ markedly ... in their patterns of
allocation of various subsystem, processes to different structures. Such
a process may be (1) localized in a single component; (2) combined with
others in a single component ; (3) dispersed laterally to other components
in the system; (4) dispersed upward to the suprasystem or above; (5) dis-
persed downward to subsystems or below; or (6) dispersed to other systems
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external to the hierarchy it is in."^ This consideration is of great sign-
ificance to those who are interested in changing systems.
9.9 It will be helpful to illustrate these patterns of allocation
schematically. In the following diagrams, the heavy rectangle will represent
the system we are looking steadily at; the external dashed rectange will
represent the suprasystem (environment); the internal dotted squares will
represent components; the small heavy squares will represent subcomponents.
The circle or oval will represent the critical subsystem process.
9*10 Local subsystem — If the critical subsystem process is carried
out by a single component which carries out no other subsystem processes,
this is a local subsystem.
9.11 Combined subsystem - If a component is involved with more than
one critical subsystem process, each of the subsystem processes is a com-
bined subsystem.
^Ibid
.
,
pp. 102-103.
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Laterally dispersed subsystem - If a critical subsystem process
involves more than one component of a system, that subsystem is laterally
dispersed
.
I
9.13
Upwardly dispersed subsystem - If the critical subsystem process
is performed for the system by a component or components in the supra-
system (environment), that subsystem is upwardly dispersed. Such a system
is by definition partipotential
.
9.14
Downwardly dispersed subsystem - If the critical subsystem process
is localized in or laterally dispersed among subcomponents, it si a down-
wardly dispersed subsystem.9.15
Outwardly dispersed subsystem - If the system depends upon another
system which would not naturally be considered part of its suprasystem for
the performance of a critical subsystem process, that process is outwardly
dispersed. The two systems together do, of course, form a single system
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with respect to that process, but the distinction is conceptually useful
to accomodate the difference between, for example, a father carrying his
infant upstairs, which would be an upwardly dispersed subsystem, and a
blind man with a seeing-eye dog, which would be an outwardly dispersed
subsystem. Miller suggests that outwardly dispersed subsystems are either
4parasitic or symbiotic, whereas upwardly or downwardly dispersed sub-
systems are not. The distinction, however, is not as clear as Miller
seems to imply. He says that "such assistance [outwardly dispersed sub-
systems] is required for all partipotential systems and all totipotential
systems which are not functioning fully. It seems, however, that a
fully-functioning partipotential system would require upward dispersal,
while only the partially-functioning totipotential system would require
outward dispersal. Of course, the distinction between a fully-functioning
partipotential system and a partially functioning totipotential system
is not an easy one to make.
^
Ibid
. ,
p . 104
.
^Ibid.
,
p. 105.
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9.16 Miller identifies nineteen critical subsystems, two of which
process both matter/energy and information, eight of which process matter-
energy, and nine of which process information. The following chart
lists these subsystems and shows a rouch relationship between the matter-
energy processing subsystems and the information- processing subsystems.
Matter-Energy
Processing
Subsystems
Ingestor
Distributor
Converter
Producer
Matter-Energy storage
Subsystems which
Process both Mat-
ter-Energy and
Information
Reproducer
Boundary
Information
Processing
Subsystems
Input Transducer
Internal Transducer
Channel and Net
Decoder
Associator
Memory
Decider
Encoder
Extruder Output Transducer
Motor
Supporter
In discussing these subsystems, we shall first quote Miller's definition
^The categorization scheme and chart come from Miller's most
recent writ-
ing on these issues (Behavioral Science, vol 16, 1971).
Earlier papers
(1964, 1965) classified these processes somewhat differently.
Miller s d
flnitive book. Living Systems, is promised for 1972
publication by Wiley
but not available as of this writing.
Quoted definitions in section 9.17 - 9.37 are taken £to” "The
Nature of
Living Systems" in Behavioral Science , vol. 16, 1971,
pp. 289 29 .
87
9.16
and then provide examples of these processes, using the school as the sys-
tem we are looking steadily at.
9*17 Reproducer — the subsystem which is capable of giving rise to
o <-her systems similar to the one it is in.” Few schobls engage in this
process, which is usually upwardly dispersed to the suprasystem of the
school system, school board, and community. In some senses, however, the
notion of the "school within a school,” most frequently observed at the
secondary level, wherein a large school is divided into smaller semi-
autonomous schools, might be seen as an example of a reproducer subsystem.
9.18 Boundary - "the subsystem at the perimeter of a system that holds
together the components which make up the system, protects them from
environmental stresses, and excludes or permits entry to various sorts of
matter-energy and information.” Most literally, the school building is
the boundary of the school, with the doors and windows permitting the
entry of inputs. Occasionally, the front office will be a part of the
boundary subsystem and admit or exclude certain inputs. Viewed thus ,
the perimeter of the school system is a localized subsystem. More real-
istically, however, the boundary processes should be seen as both laterally
and upwardly dispersed among the members of the school community as well,
particularly in terms of information processing. Information which is
literally within the physical boundary of the school may well be effectively
excluded from the system if it is considered to be harmful or inappropriate
to the system. Consideration of "controversial topics such as sex
education can be seen as a discussion of the boundary subsystem process. Cf
course, the more dispersed the boundary subsystem, the more difficult
it is to control the entry of inputs into the system. As of this
writing, the Supreme Court is about to consider the case of the Amish
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in Wisconsin who do not wish their children to attend secondary school.
Disregarding the legal implications of the case, this can be seen as an
effort by the Amish to control the boundary subsystem of their community.®
Similarly, the stationing of uniformed policemen in school corridors is
an effort to control the boundary subsystem of the school.
9.19 Ingestor - "the subsystem which brings matter-energy across
the system boundary from the environment." Literally, school buses,
delivery trucks, and the postal service perform this process which is
thus both upwardly and outwardly dispersed. We would also include per-
sonnel who unpack boxes, open mail, and perform similar functions which
prepare matter-energy for internal distribution within the system.
9.20 Distributor - "the subsystem which carries inputs from outside
the system or outputs from its subsystems around the system to each compon-
ent." This subsystem is laterally dispersed among many components, and
is also combined with other subsystems. The secretary who distributes mail
to the teachers ’ boxes
,
the teacher who hands out paper and pencils to
students or who collects milk money are both participating in the distri-
buting subsystem process.
9.21 Converter - "the subsystem which change certain inputs to the
system into forms useful for the special processes of that particular
system." Cafeteria workers who cook the food for a hot lunch program
are clear participants in this subsystem process. So is the teacher who
makes copies of a prepared ditto—master , and the teacher who makes a
transparency from a chart in a book. There are clearly numerous examples,
mostly trivial, of this process.
®see Saturday Review , January 15, 1972, p. 52.
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Producer - "the subsystem which forms stable associations that
endure for significant periods among matter-energy inputs to the system or
outputs from, its converter, the materials synthesized being for growth,
damage-repair, or replacement of components of the system, or for provid-
ing energy for moving or constituting the system's outputs of products or
information markers to its suprasystem. " Since schools are generally seen
as information-processing systems, it is difficult to think of non-trivial
examples of this crucial subsystem process. Of course, physical plant
maintenance would be a part of the producer subsystem, but also the organ-
ization of students and teachers into groups such as classes, teams, and
special interest clubs would be an example of this subsystem. The organ-
ization of a learning center or a materials resource center would also be
an example. This subsystem is ordinarily dispersed upwardly, downwardly,
and laterally, which is another reason that it is difficult to conceptu-
alize .
9.23 Matter-energy storage - "the subsystem which retains in the
system, for different periods of time, deposits of various sorts of
matter-energy." Storage and supply closets provide this subsystem, as
to teachers' and childrens' desks, cubbies, and pockets.
9.24 Extruder - "the subsystem which transmits matter-energy out of
the system in the form of products and wastes. Children take home pic-
tures and worksheets they have completed in school. Custodians empty the
wastebaskets at the end of the school day. Of course, if one views students
as inputs, one could also view them as matter-energy outputs.
9.25 Motor - "the subsystem which moves the system or parts of it
in relation to part or all of its environment or moves components
of its
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environment in relation to each other." Miller intends the notion of move-
ment to be taken quite literally. On the level of the organism this is
easy to conceive, but at the level of the organization it is more difficult.
School field trips would be examples of motor functions, as would choral
groups singing at nursing homes, but aside from these atypical examples
it is significant that this subsystem is mostly lacking in schools.
Schools—without—walls attempt to provide this subsystem, but most schools
do not literally move in relation to their environment.
9.26 Supporter - "the subsystem which maintains the proper spatial
arrangements among components of the system, so that they can interact
without weighting each other down or crowding each other." Walls, doors,
furniture arrangement are all part of this critical subsystem. The
term "proper" may be unfortunate, since it introduces a matter of judgment
into what is otherwise a relatively value-free description of system
processes. Schools vary widely in terms of their organization to maximize
flexibility of spatial organization and to combine the supporter sub-
system with other subsystems. Thus, a portable blackboard may serve this
subsystem as well as several information-processing subsystems such as
internal transducer (9.28), decoder (9.30), and memory (9.32). The more
flexible a school, the more laterally dispersed this subsystem will be.
It is only recently that school people have recognized this as a critical
9 10
subsystem. The work of Hall and Sommer suggests that possibly this
^Hall, Edward T., The Hidden Dimension , (Garden City: Doubleday,
1966).
^^Sommer, Robert, Personal Space: The Behavioral Basis of Design ,
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
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subsystem should be seen, along with the reproducer and boundary, as
processing both matter-energy and information.
9*27 Input transducer - "the sensory subsystem which brings markers
bearing information into the system, changing them to other matter-energy
forms suitable for transmission within it.” This is a widely dispersed
subsystem which is combined with many other subsystems in the school's
living and non-living components. All persons in the school bring infor-
mation into the school with them and change the information into matter-
energy forms - speaking and writing most frequently - that can be trans-
initted within the school. It must be recalled from 8.6 that we are using
"information” in a technical sense having no necessary reference to the
content of the message. Anything that can be seen, heard, smelled,
touched or tasted will have some information value. This subsystem is
responsible for bringing information from the environment into the school
across the boundary (9.18). Other subsystems are responsible for gener-
ating and transmitting information within the school.
9.28 Internal transducer - "the sensory subsystem which receives, from
all subsystems or components within the system, markers bearing informa-
tion about significant alterations in those subsystems or components,
changing them to other matter-energy forms of a sort which can be transmitted
within it.” It is a distinctive feature of the school as a system that
the internal transducer subsystem is combined with the input transducer
subsystem within the same components. Children bring information with them
to school and presumably gain information within the school which is
transmitted to their teachers and classmates as a "significant alteration.
While the school as a system can exercise significant control over its
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internal transducer subsystem, it can exercise little control over its
input transducing subsystem. Some schools, recognizing the difficulty
that these combined subsystems entails, attempt to control their input
transducer by running a boarding school, by Increasing filter vigilence
and admitting only students who meet certain kinds of criteria of wealth,
background, intelligence, and so forth. However, such boundary vigilence
is successful only to a degree; information introduced into the system
and information generated within the system are inextricably intertwined.
They are not always congruent or complementary; information brought into
the school may inhibit the internal transducing subsystem. It is, of
course, also true that the system may generate incongruent or conflicting
information. Interpersonal relationship theory stresses that verbal and
non-verbal messages sent simultaneously are frequently perceived as con-
tradictory. The school as a system is uniquely intended for information
processing; it is curious that so much of the information internally
transduced in the system is neither intended nor attended to.
9.29 Channel and net - "the subsystem composed of a single route in
physical space, or multiple interconnected routes, by which markers
bearing information are transmitted to all parts of the system." Like the
other information processing subsystems we have considered thus far, the
channel and net is laterally dispersed and combined with other subsystems
in the components which make up a school. Ignoring trivial examples such
as public address systems, the essential channels of communication in a
school are comprised of unmediated human interactions, non-discrete,
multiple, and simultaneous. Organizational theorists frequently distinguish
between "formal" and "informal" channels of communication, but from a
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system theory point of view the distinction is of little significance. The
sorts of questions which systems theorists ask about channels - their
capacity, reliability, and entropy - require no such distinction. Instead,
we can substitute the notion of a network of nodes of interaction which
comprise the communication channels of an organization. An observer
spending enough time in a school could observe and chart such a network by
noting who talks to whom, under what circumstances, and with what
frequency. Formal channels, as when the principal holds a staff meeting,
or a teacher conducts a class lesson, would certainly be included in such
a network, although they would probably be less significant than many
school people imagine. The most acute observer, however, would be unable
to include in his network the essential channels of non-verbal communica-
tion which exist between individuals and groups in a school, communication
generated both consciously and unconsciously by body and eye movement.
Intonation and inflexion, dress and use of time and space. Because human
beings are capable of transmitting and receiving simultaneous messages, we
may want to think of a school as having a number of superimposed networks,
through all of which information is being transmitted incessantly.^^
The channels which comprise these networks will have varying capacities
and characteristics. For instance, the eye can "take in" and follow sev-
eral things happening at once by shifting focus very rapidly from one
phenomenon to another. The ear, however, does not have the same sort
of capacity for simultaneous reception. We cannot listen to two conver-
sations simultaneously; we must tune in and tune out. Simultaneous sounds
of the same volume and frequency will be heard as a babble. Individuals
^^Cherry, Colin, On Human Communication , second ed., (Cambridge:
MIT, 1966), pp. 29-30.
94
9.29
will differ, too, in their capacity to process the rate of information
being sent over these simultaneous channels, particularly if the messages
are incongruent or contradictory. It is not possible in a complex system
including human beings to calculate with any rigor the capacity of commun-
ication channels. It is possible, however, to state axiomatically that the
channels will have finite capacities; that the capacity of any given
channels will be effectively reduced if other superimposed channels are
simultaneously carrying incongruent messages; and that if either the rate
of transmission or the number of simultaneous or proximal incongruent
messages transmitted exceeds the capacity or the number of channels avail-
able, the system will be unable to process the information either entering
it or generated within it. Overloaded channels will not transmit effect-
ively. Too much information can have similar consequences as too little
information. Communication theorists have introduced the notion of
redundancy to describe characteristics of messages which serve to increase
the likelihood of reliable transmission in the face of limited channel
capacity. Briefly and simply, if a message is repeated, or if it contains
elements which have relatively little information value, it is more likely
to be reliably transmitted than if the message is unrepeated or if every
element of the message is crucial to its reliable transmission. The more
redundancy a message contains, the more likely a receiver is to receive
it accurately, even if he misses some of the message or if there is some
0]-ence (called "noise" by the theorists) in the channel. Lecturers
have long known that if a point in a lecture is important it had best
be repeated. They also know (or should know) that the more important points
a given lecture contains, the less likely any given point is to be remem-
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bered. Redundancy is directly related to organization and predictability,
and IS inversely related to the information value of a given message. In
other words, the less information a given transmission contains, the more
likely that it will be transmitted reliably. The more organized the envir-
onment sending the transmission, the more redundancy that transmission
will contain and the more reliable it will be. The syntactic and semantic
redundancy of our language is such that much could be eliminated without
a significant loss in meaning. Cherry illustrates this by pointing out
that "the ventious crapests pounted raditally" can be parsed and trans-
lated into French ("Les crapets ventieux pontaient raditallement") even
though we have no idea of the meaning of the individual words. Likewise'^'^,
the string of nouns "Woman, street, crowd, traffic, noise, haste, thief,
bag, loss, scream, police" tell a story to which the reader can add the
missing elements. Given the multiplicity of channels in complex human
systems like schools, and the finite capacity and different character-
istics of these channels, a significant degree of redundancy is necessary
for reliable transmission, even at the expense of the amount of informa-
tion transmitted.
9.30 Decoder - "the subsystem which alters the code of information
input to it through the input transducer or the internal transducer into
a 'private' code that can be used internally by the system." Again, this
subsystem process is widely dispersed and combined. At its most elemen-
tary level, the decoder assigns common meanings to words and other signals,
^^
Ibid
.
,
p. 120.
^
^Ibid
.
,
p. 121.
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both verbal and non-verbal. More specifically, the decoder in schools
translates the common meanings of words into the technical vocabulary and
symbols of education. Frequently, this special ’private’ code appears to
outsiders (and some insiders) as obfuscating jargon, and frequently it
is, but it does have the advantage of allowing a great deal of information
to be processed with economy and uniformity. The designation of students
as "slow learners," "bright," "emotionally disturbed," and so forth, serves
as a private code, as do grades, test scores, inventories, and other such
data. Most curriculum materials produced for schools are decoded into a
language deemed appropriate for a particular group of children according
to age and ability; to this extent, this subsystem is outwardly dispersed.
A basal reader enters the system in its decoded form, whereas a teacher
teaching economic theory to third graders using her old college text would
have to do a great deal of decoding. In schools, as in many organizations
whose existence depends upon the reliability of human communication, the
decoding process is both essential and Ineffective. What is frequently
called "a failure of communication" is often in reality due to the multi-
plicity of incongruent messages being sent simultaneously over different
channels, requiring different decoding processes. Just as there are
multiple overlapping networks of channels, so there are multiple codes,
both verbal and non-verbal, requiring different decoding processes.
People who spend enough time in a given school, both adults and children,
find that their first priority must be to deciding which of the conflicting
or incongruous messages reflects the true intention of the sender. If
the message is paradoxical, this task can be insoluble. Consider, for
example, the following concotanationi of conflicting messages.
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A. The open classroom is the approach to education which
best encourages active learning in children.
B. A school should be able to accomodate a variety of teach-
ing styles and educational philosophies.
C. It is important for teachers to feel comfortable with
innovations they introduce into their classrooms.
D. Teachers should be able to specify learning objectives in
behavioral terms.
It is not, uncommon to find messages such as these coming from administrators
of progressive school systems. How should they be decoded? Is it more
important to have a variety of teaching styles or to have an open class-
room? Is it more important for teachers to feel comfortable or to use
behavioral objectives? Is it more important to use behavioral objectives
or to have an open classroom? What does the administrator want? What
does he really want? Children ask the same questions of conflicting
messages from their teachers. The real communication problem in complex
organizations such as schools is that there is no rigorous and reliable
decoding process for dealing with Information about relationships, and
it is just in this area that messages are most likely to be incongruent
and conflicting.
9.31 Assoclator - "the subsystem which carries out the first stage
of the learning process, forming enduring associations among items of
information in the system." We must remind ourselves at this point that
the system we are looking steadily at is the school, not the individual
learner, and while we can see that this subsystem is also dispersed and
combined, it is no easy task to distinguish between the associator sub-
system of the school and the associators of the individuals who are the
components of the system. We must start with the assumption, by no means
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certain in all instances, that the school is a learning system (7.24-7.43),
that it is capable of a dynamic homeostasis that allows it to adapt to
a wide variety of unpredictable input without jeopardizing its survival,
that it is continually mapping environmental variety into its internal
processes. Many educational reformers, usually outside the schools, in
from the opposite assumption, that the school is an adjusting sys-
tem with a highly developed boundary subsystem which filters out the
environmental variety that the school cannot adjust to. However, if the
boundary is as v/idely dispersed as we claim (9.18), it is difficult to
see how this view can be supported. Instead, we shall advance the hypo-
thesis in Part III that the school is ordinarily a well-adapted learning
system that inhabits a different environment than educational reformers
inhabit. We assume that the school does have an associator subsystem,
but one that is not as widely dispersed or combined as the other infor-
mation processing subsystems we have thus far considered. Instead, it
is usually quite centralized, and deals with what we might call second-
order information - information about information - which is the domain
of administrators, curriculum specialists, and psychologists. The school
as a system does not learn reading, geometry, and current events; instead,
it learns about reading, geometry, and current events. Some schools also
fall into a radical confusion between these two orders of information and
assume, for example, that because structural linguistics does describe
how our language works, it is, therefore, the way to teach language.
Teaching language and teaching about language are two very different
things. Second-order information is, of course, information, and is
processed by all of the subsystems we have discussed thus far. It can
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enter the system from the environment or It can be Internally generated
by system components or ensembles of components. It travels through the
same channels and over the same networks as first-order Information. It
Is striking, therefore, that the assoclator subsystem Is less widely
dispersed than the other subsystems which process Information. Put an-
other way. we can say that the school as a system uses only a small portion
of the information it processes, that it expends much energy processing
information from which it does not learn. This is not necessarily In-
appropriate nor Inefficient, since it does leave the assoclator subsystems of
its components, i.e. students and teachers, with energy to process second-
order information for their own purposes. Put concretely, the more time
teachers and students spend on curriculum committees, the less time they
will have to attend to their own Intellectual growth. This Is not unlike
the observation in 8.28-8.29 that the more the system must attend to
maintenance inputs, the less it can process signal inputs. Depending on
the size and complexity of the system, it may be both efficient and pro-
ductive to have the associative processes less widely dispersed than they
might be. The danger, of course, is that the fewer the components engaged
in this process, the less enduring the associations are likely to be and
the more localized the learning is likely to be.
9.32 Memory - "the subsystem which carries out the second stage of
the learning process, storing various sorts of information in the system
for different periods of time." At any given time, the school's memory
will be widely dispersed in all directions, among people and file cabinets
and bookshelves, but over time it is really the file cabinets and book-
shelves which serve as the enduring repositories of the school's memory.
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student records, curriculum guides, test scores, trled-and-true learning
activities are the components of the school's collective memory. As
students and teachers leave the school they take with them irretrievable
information, both first-order and second-order, and what is left is only
the information committed to writing, which tends to remain forever
fossilized in the system’s archives. The ability of the memory to store
both second order and first-order information corresponds to the computer's
ability to store both programs and data and allows associations to be
made between the two, as well as allowing a wide range of combinatorial
possibilities (7.39-7.41). Thus the memory subsystem and the associator
subsystem are closely related, and while Miller describes memory as the
second stage in the learning process and association as the first stage,
their relationship is reciprocal rather than linear. That the memory
subsystem is generally more widely dispersed than the associator subsystem
means that much of the information stored in the system is not used in its
learning, although it may be used by components for their learning.
9.33 Before proceeding with Miller's definitions of critical sub-
system processes, we must interject here a process which does not appear
in Miller s list, but which, given his approach, seems to be critical.
We may call it the disassociator
,
and define it as the subsystem which
breaks up associations among items of information which are either mal-
adaptive or inhibiting to new associations. In everyday language, we
may say that the system, to learn, must be able to forget, and to forget
not only its mistakes but also its successes. Successfully learned
behavior is the greatest inhibitor of new learning, and learning systems
tend to bind successful learning into their memories. Learning systems
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totally lacking in dlsaasoclators may over time evolve into adjusting sys-
tems at the point that their learned behavior precludes the learning of
new behavior. The dlsassoclator
,
to be effective, should be combined with
the assoclator in the same components. This does not often occur, since
few of us willingly diverge far from behavior we find successful to test
new behavior which has an element of risk in it. What many schools need
is not more efficient memories but more efficient forgetting. We shall
return to this topic in Part III.
9.34 Decider - "the executive subsystem which receives information
inputs from all other subsystems and transmits to them information on out-
puts that control the entire system." Miller states that of the critical
subsystems, "only the decider is essential, in the sense that a system
cannot be dependent on another system for its deciding. A living system
does not exist if the decider is dispersed upwardly, downwardly, or out-
wardly. From the point of view of the system analyst, this means that
he should be sure to conduct his analysis at the level that includes the
decider. If, for a particular school, all decisions were made by the
superintendent of schools, he would have to be considered a part of the
school, not a part of its environment. We must note that Miller is re-
ferring to living systems. A non-adjusting system - one that had no
decisions to make - could not be a living system. On the other hand, it
is possible to conceive of adjusting systems, which are effectively
controlled by their environments, as having a built-in decider, since the
output of the system is measured against a specific criterion of perfor-
mance. Even though living systems at the human level must be learning
systems, they can and frequently do act as though they were adjusting
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systems with the decider upwardly dispersed. A concrete example of this
would be the football team whose plays are decided by the coach on the
sidelenes and transmitted to the quarterback by regular substitutions.
So the case is not as unambiguous as Miller’s statement appears to imply.
Whether the decider is dispersed upwardly or outwardly seems to depend
upon system definition. The organizational charts of schools would seem
to suggest that the decider subsystem is essentially localized in the
principal, and in some instances this is effectively true, although in all
cases the principal is dependent upon the information he receives.
Whether or not the decider is laterally dispersed does seem to depend upon
the principal's style and preference, so that we may say the basic decision,
whether and when to disperse, the decider subsystem, is localized. The
principal who chooses not to exercise all the control vested in his role
could, in most situations, revert to a more controlling style if he so
chose. The decider is, of course, laterally dispersed among other members
of the school community
,
and if we were to take the organizational chart
as a model of system organization, we might be tempted to say that it
is dispersed downwardly, in contradiction to Miller’s statements. How-
ever, whenever decisions regarding the school as a whole, as distinguished
from classrooms or other components, are dispersed, the dispersion is
always lateral, regardless of what positions the deciders may occupy on
the organizational chart.
9.35 We must, at this point, enter an important theoretical caveat
,
one which brings into question the: isomorphic relationship of human sys-
tems with other levels of systems. In a profound sense, decision making
in a human group or organization is always shared. Decisions made must
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be accepted by those who. the decisions affect. The outputs fro. the de-
cider .ust be received as controlling Inputs by other co.ponents of the
human system, i.e. by other human beings. However, since these other human
beings are learning systems, not adjusting system, they will „ot neces-
sarily accept inputs from their environment as controlling. They must.
In fact, decide to accept the control of the decider, or the decider will
not control them. If the human being, or group. Is a true morphogenlc
system, it may well be impervious to the attempts of the decider to
control it. Revolutions, rebellions, and mutinies, on both a grand and
minute scale, attest to the fact that deciders frequently cannot control
the entire system. This element of choice exists in all learning and
morphogenic systems, and the fact that in most functioning human systems,
decisions are accepted, must not blind us to the realization that this
acceptance is itself a decision.
9.36 Encoder - "the subsystem which alters the code of information
inputs to it from other information processing subsystems, from a 'private'
code used internally by the system into a 'public' code which can be
interpreted by other systems in its environment." We saw in 9.30 the
difficulties inherant in the decoding process, and we might expect the
encoding process to be the mirror image of them. However, the problems
attendant upon encoding are of a very different nature, since encoding
deals only with signal inputs, while decoding must deal with obth main-
tenance and signal inputs. Information encoded by the school as a system
is often of a statistical nature - performance of students in aggregate
measured against national norms - and often of a platitudinous nature -
annual reports to the Board of Education. Members of the school community
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take home with them each afternoon Information which la shared by parents,
spouses, and acquaintances. The grapevine and the rumor mill both are
vital parts of the encoding process. Indeed, because it Is so difficult
to Identify Its encoding processes. The problem Is exascerbated by the
fact that the language of education is so similar to the language of the
vironment, with so little rigor and so many euphemisms, that little
encoding appears necessary to allow outsiders to interpret its informa-
tion. The only exception to this seems to be when the school is proposing
or attempting a significant departure from its traditional program or
organization and must gain community support for its plans. At this
point, significant attention is paid to the encoding process and the
school becomes very sensitive to public opinion. These occasions are
relatively rare, however, and atypical of the enterprise. More typically,
the school's private code is so similar to the environment's public code
that little encoding is required. The essential issue that school people
deal with is not how can the public know what goes on in school," but
rather "what should the public know?" This is a boundary problem, not
an encoding problem.
^•37 Output transducer — "the subsystem which puts out markers bear-
ing information from the system, changing markers within the system into
other matter-energy forms which can be transmitted over channels in the
system's environment." Report cards, news releases, special announcements,
and Johnny's verbal dinner-table report on what he did in school today are
all parts of the output transducing subsystem. Johnny himself, his be-
havior, attitudes, and opinions, is also an output transduced by the sys-
tem. Presumably, his performance outside of school over time conveys
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information about the school as a system. Perhaps the same could be said
of the teachers in a school - they, too, should grow and change as a re-
sult of being components of the school as a system, and their enthusiasm,
fatigue, interests and opinions should convey information about the system
to the environment. We must bear in mind, though, that if we view compon-
ents as outputs, we are shifting our focus and redefining the system to
the point where the school is now seen as environment and the particular
individual is the system of interest to us. Since the school is only part
of the individual's environment, we must avoid the temptation to ascribe
any changes in the individual soley to the school.
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CHAPTER X
OUTPUTS
10.1 Outputs are those transmissions of matter, energy, and informa-
tion which cross the boundary from the system to its environment. Berrien
distinguishes between "useful” and "useless" outputs\ suggesting that the
environment places some value on system outputs. While this is undoubt-
edly true, no output is inherently useful or useless; from the point of
view of the observer or analyst it is more appropriate to classify outputs
as used" or "unused," since these are more rigorously verifiable, and do
not compel the analyst to accept the environment’s evaluation. Berrien’s
distinction becomes significant when one is interested in purposeful or
goal-directed behavior. In terms of attainment of a specific goal, whether
the system’s or the environment’s, it can be helpful to distinguish be-
tween useful and useless outputs. In a trivial sense, all behavior can
be seen as goal-directed, the goal being inferred from the behavior. In
a non-trivial sense, goal-directed behavior is characteristic of adjusting
systems using negative feedback to meet behavior specifications. Learning
systems may have a multiplicity of simultaneous goals, either congruent
or incongruent. They are capable of instantaneously substituting one goal
for another, altering priorities, developing new goals and abandoning old
goals. While cyberneticians have made great headway in "de-mystifying"
goal-directed behavior and in developing complex adjusting systems which
can simulate learning, the application of their work to concrete learning
systems has not yet arrived at a point which would permit an observer of
^Berrien, F. Kenneth, Op . cit
.
, p. 24-25.
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a concrete learning system to distinguish between useful and useless out-
puts
.
10.2 This point is worth stressing because the distinction between
useful and useless behavior is ubiquitous in education as well as other
arenas of human activity in which evaluation plays a significant part. Out-
put is observable behavior, and what behavior is observable depends in
large measure upon the observer
,
his characteristics, sensitivity, training,
experience, and bias. The observer is very much a part of the system’s
environment, and which of the system's outputs the observer will accept as
his inputs will vary with the characteristics of the observer as a learn-
ing system. Outputs which an observer does not notice are unused
, although
not necessarily useless. From the point of view of this analysis, there
are no useless outputs, only unused outputs. A teacher may be insensitive
to - or unaware of - a students’ non-verbal behavior; the observer of the
student-teacher dyad may find it very useful. Indeed. The notion of "pur-
y pose, therefore, can frequently serve as a filter for the observing sys-
tem; we prefer the view that sees all behavior as useful from the environ-
ment’s viewpoint, although not necessarily used by the environment.
10.3 Of particular interest to us are those outputs which either
directly or Indirectly affect the system’s subsequent behavior. If output
directly affects the subsequent behavior of the system, we refer to it as
feedback . If feedback serves to amplify deviation from the prior state
of the system, it is positive feedback . If it serves to reduce deviation
from the prior state of the system, it is negative feedback . Change,
growth, and evolution are evidence of positive feedback. Stability,
homeostasis, and steady state are evidence of negative feedback. Open
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systems that grow and change by developing new steady states have an intri-
cate Interconnected network of feedback loops, both positive and negative,
so that change occurs within acceptable limits and does not jeopardize the
survival of the system. Theorists have stressed the importance of nega-
tive feedback in maintaining system stability, but they have tended to
Ignore the significance of positive feedback in promoting change. They
have tended to see negative feedback as "good" and positive feedback as
"bad." This has been largely due to the influence of cybernetics on system
thinking, since cybernetics has been largely concerned with complex ad-
justing systems actuated by negative feedback.
10.4 Marayama, in his article "Toward a Second Cybernetics" focuses
upon positive feedback, and gives, as a compelling example, the growth of
2
cities over time. The following illustrations use his method. An "+"
over an arrow indicates positive feedback, and a "-" over an arrow indicates
negative feedback.
10.5 The population of non—agrarian societies, like most animal species,
was regulated by the available food supply;
fopuu/lTiaN Soppty
As population increased, the food supply decreased, an indication of neg-
ative feedback. As the food supply decreased, the population likewise
decreased, an indication of positive feedback. As the population decreased,
the food supply Increased (negative feedback)
,
and as the food supply in-
The analysis which follows was stimulated by Marayama 's example, but
does not come from his article.
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creased, so did the population. Thus, negative feedback held the relation-
ship between population and food supply in a delicate equlllbrlun,. using
minor deviations to prevent major deviations.
10.6
The advent of cultivation upset this equilibria! mechanism:
^oPu i^ATio i\j poop Supply
cui-Ti vA?r/£)A/
When conditions were favorable, increased population led to more cultiva-
tion, which increased the food supply, which further increased the popula-
tion.
\
10.7
However^^^s population increased, so did density and disease;
D e/VS/T'Y
'P
^ ^ ^
ropou nTiofJ Food suPPLy
c.ounv^T’/ofsf
As disease increased, population decreased, density decreased, and disease
ultimately decreased, thus leading to an increase in population once again.
Here we see two independent feedback loops affecting population growth, one
negative and one positive.
10.8
With increased population density comes increased division of
labor and specialization, including, presumably, medical services.
P^ Prices
J-
T^oPoLA-rfoA/ ^
D€A/ siry
Food Suppf. /
G-ouTiv/9r/ofy —
We have here an example of how the deviation-counterbalancing relationship
between disease and population is itself counterbalanced by the deviation-
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counterbalancing relationship between medical services and disease. Two
Joined negative feedback loops have the effect of positive feedback; In this
case, in spite of disease, the population will continue to grow, what we
have today In over-populated poor countries Is the negation of such nega-
tive feedback loops as may exist in the system.
10.9
This observation is easily generalizable to many areas of concern
to educators. It has been supposed - and recently re-advocated by the
President - that the massive application of federal funds to deteriorat-
ing schools would improve the quality of education in those schools.
Fua/oS Ciof\ur'^ oP £ducatio^
This simplistic, linear input-output relationship has not proven effective.
Poor schools continue to deteriorate in spite of highly funded Title I
projects. Much of this can be explained by mis-application of funds and
inadequate project design, but it is equally true that a host of intervening
feedback loops can effectively negate the influence of federal funds on
poor schools.
10.10 Positive feedback, thus, promotes change, while negative feed-
back promotes stability around assigned values. Whether the change - or
lack of change - is desirable or undesirable depends largely upon the per-
spective of the observer. If he desires to inhibit change, he must design
effective negative feedback loops. If he desires to inhibit change, he
must design effective positive feedback loops.
10.11 In making this point, it is essential to distinguish between
feedback and other input. Feedback is the direct input of the system's out-
put; it is the output that is fed back into the system. There is a sign-
ificant difference between information from performance and information
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about performance. When a teacher corrects and returns a student's paper,
this is Information^ her performance. In neither case Is this feed-
back, although we colloquially refer to It as such. It Is, Instead,
Information Input from the environment which the student or teacher may
choose to use or Ignore. When a student, though, sees that a spelling
word doesn't look right, or when he finds that a math problem he has worked
doesn't check, or when a teacher senses her class getting restless or
finds that her class did poorly on a particular test, this Is Information
from performance and Is genuine feedback. It is, of course, quite possible
for the student or teacher not to act upon this Information; human beings
are learning systems, not adjusting systems, but assuming that they wish
to Improve their performance, they are more likely to use It and less
likely to question its reliability.
10.12 Many of a learning system's outputs affect its subsequent be-
havior indirectly rather than directly. A system, may, through its out-
puts, affect its environment so that the environment will present it with
inputs it desires and to which it can more easily adapt. The reader may
more easily conceptualize this by thinking of two systems standing in
interaction, each of which is the environment for the other.
A
r—
^
<
^ B
}
< ^
A's output "w" leads to A's input "y."
B's input "w" leads to B's output "y."
"z." If A prefers "y" to "z" it will
it should happen that B prefers "w" to
(We could as easily have said that
) A's output "x" leads to A's input
transmit "w" and not "x" to B. If
"x," it will transmit "y" and not
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"z” to A. Thus each is inducing the other to behave in such a way that it
can behave the way it prefers. This is functionally the same as a pos-
itive feedback loop; A’s "w” behavior is reinforced and leads to still
further "w" behavior. A and B as reciprocal system and environment are
well-adapted to each other.
10.13 Life rarely works out so beautifully, however. B may prefer
"x" to "w," while A prefers "y" to ”x." The only way B can induce A to
give it ”x" is to give A "z.” In this instance, each must accomodate to
the other; A must give B a certain amount of "x” so that B will give A
a certain amount of y . This is functionally the same as a negative
feedback loop; A's "w” behavior is discouraged, so that at any given
time w behavior will subsequently lead to less "w” behavior. In this
case, A and B, as reciprocal system and environment, each adapts to the
other through a subtle process of manipulation and negotiation. Each,
through its outputs, is attempting to create the environment it wants.
10.14 This is the nature of most interpersonal encounters. If we
translate our model into interpersonal terms, so that A and B become two
people, perhaps husband and wife, perhaps student and teacher, and if
we let "w” and "z” represent dominant behavior, and "x” and "y" represent
submissive behavior, our model would represent a not uncommon interpersonal
situation. Both A and B wish to dominate the relationship and wish to
receive submissive behavior from the other. But the more A transmits
dominant behavior, the more B transmits dominant behavior. Each, to
receive the submissive input he desires has to transmit some submissive
output to the other. However, each's submissive behavior reinforces the
other's dominant behavior, which in turn requires each to transmit sub-
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missive behavior. This kind of spiral never ends. Schools, too, modify
their environment by continually replenishing it with "schooled" adults,
those who through the process of schooling share the values of the school
so that the social environment which the school inhabits has been, to
a significant extent, shaped by it.
10.15 There are, of course, many less subtle ways in which systems
influence their environments through their outputs. Men build houses and
heating systems to modify the natural weather. They wear clothes to
protect their bodies. Spiders spin webs to trap food. The essential point
to be made here, however, is the reciprocal and mutually causative nature
of adaptation; the system is both shaping and being shaped by its environ-
ment. From this perspective, the significant difference between adjust-
ing and learning systems is that adjusting systems use their outputs to
return to an initial or specified state, while learning systems use their
outputs to create new steady states.
10.16 Samuel Butler, in The Way of All Flesh
,
said it more simply,
more eloquently, and more powerfully than any theoretical language can.
All our lives long, every day and every hour, we
are engaged in the process of accommodating our
changed and unchanged selves to changed and unchan-
ged surroundings; living, in fact, is nothing else
than this process of accommodation; when we fail
in it a little we are stupid, when we fail flag-
rantly we are mad, when we suspend it temporarily
we sleep, when we give up the attempt altogether
we die. In quiet, uneventful lives the changes
internal and external are so small that there is
little or no strain id the process of fusion and
accomodation; in other lives there is great
strain, but there is also great fusing and accom-
modating power. A life will be successful or not,
according as the power of accomodation is equal
to or unequal to the strain of fusing and adjust-
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ing internal and external changes.^
What Butlar call "accomodation" we call "adaptation," and perhaps Butler
does not adequately stress the active role the system plays In shaping Its
environment through Its outputs, but he has captured the essence of the
reciprocal relationship between system and environment that this paper has
been about.
quoted by Menninger, Karl in The Vital Balance
,
(New York: Viking
Compass, 1963), p. 125.
PART III
SCHOOLS AND STUDENTS
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CHAPTER XI
SYSTEM DEFINITION
11.1 In Part III we shall be testing the usefulness of the theory
have developed by applying it to some common areas of concern to educa-
tors. The test of its usefulness will be whether or not it provides help-
ful and new ways of thinking about educational problems and issues, not
whether it contributes to their solution. Because a general theory is
just that, "general," it must be translated into specifics before it can
be applied to a particular situation. However, because it is a general
theory of concrete systems, its hypotheses and propositions can be tested
and applied to particular situations, whatever their complexity or con-
figuration.
11.2 We select the school and the student as the two systems we are
looking steadily at because they can well test the validity of a theory
which proposes to be applicable to all levels of systems. If we can make
statements which hold true for both the organism and the organization
,
then presumably such statements may be equally relevant to sub—organismic
and supra-organizational levels as well. If such is the case, scientists
will have a rigorous tool to supplement their use of analogy in dealing
with complex phenomena.
11.3 There is another reason why the school and the student well fit
our purpose in testing the theory. From the analytical point of view,
they offer very different, but complementary, problems. The individual
student is a well-defined concrete system with a clear physical boundary
which permits rigorous distinctions between system and environment, and
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specific delineation of outputs as observable behavior. The internal or-
ganization of the student, however, is not observable, particularly in
the information-processing domain, and can only be inferred from observable
behavior. This has led the behaviorist schools of psychology to con-
centrate solely on the relationship of inputs and outputs, and to assume
an essentially linear and causal relationship between them, eschewing
any mentalistic" explanation of behavior. Essentially, this school
treats the individual as an adjusting system whose outputs (observable
behavior) can be controlled from the environment by the careful regula-
tion of inputs. This paper takes the position, instead, that while the
internal organization of the human organism may not be observable, it
does exist, and is isomorphic with the observable organization of learning
systems at the supra-organismic level. This proposition is not currently
provable, although the tremendous strides taken by cyberneticians in the
simulation of both behavior and learning lends powerful support to the
hypothesis
.
^
11.4 The school is such a supra-organismic system whose internal
organization is observable. At the same time, it is not a well-defined
system; it does not have a clear physical boundary (9.18), and it is not
easy to distinguish between the school and its environment. The delineation
of system outputs, as distinguished from the collective outputs of its
components, is difficult indeed. We can talk with some assurance about how
a school is organized, but we cannot talk with assurance about how a
school behaves. Faced with this dilemma, many theorists have assumed an
^see Apter, Michael J., The Computer Simulation of Behavior
,
(New York:
Harper and Row, 1970).
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anolcgy between the school and a business whose outputs can be .ore easily
Identified. Educational organization theory has been essentially based
upon research and theories drawn from the world of business and Industry.
Yet, it is a characteristic of the school as a system that its outputs
are not clearly defined; any theory which assumes that they are is
clearly not a theory dealing with concrete schools.
11.5 Thus, the two systems we are dealing with have complementary
analytical problems: one has clearly defined outputs but unobservable
processes; the other has poorly defined outputs but observable processes.
A general theory, then, ought to help us think about student processes
and school outputs in a way that conventional discipline-bound theory
cannot
.
11.6 In this chapter, we shall deal with a series of propositions
drawn from Part II which will help us define the system we are looking
steadily at. System definition is crucial; as we stated in 5.11, the
variables of a system are selected from a usually infinite collection of
attributes. The selection of variables thus defines the system under
study. "The term system does not refer to ’that thing over there,’
which may be described by an infinite number of systems, but to a parti-
cular list or collection of variables and relationships selected by the
2
analyst for a particular purpose." We will not presuppose the analyst’s
purposes in this chapter; instead, we shall examine some of those issues
which the analyst must consider regardless of his purpose. In the next
chapter, we shall consider a series of propositions concerning the rela-
tionship of the system and its environment. In Chapter 13, we shall ex-
amine some propositions relating to system organization.
2
Hare, op. cit., p. 136.
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Our method in each of thse chapters will be similar. First, we
shall state and explicate the proposition on a general level. We shall
then, in paragraph "A” relate the proposition to the school and in para-
graph ”B" relate the proposition to the student. The reader interested
in the application of a general theory to systems at different levels may
choose to read the chapters as written. The reader primarily interested
in the school as a system may choose to read all "A” paragraphs consec-
utively, while the reader primarily interested in the student as a system
may read all "B” paragraphs consecutively. In either of the latter two
cases the exposition will be as sequential and self-contained as in the
first case.
11.8^ cqncrete systems are open . Not all systems are equally open,
but all conduct transactions with their environments, and no system
definition or description can neglect these transactions; that is to say,
no system can be defined without reference to the nature, range, and
amount of its inputs. Regardless of the analyst's purpose, the unit of
analysis must be the system-in-environment, not the system alone. The
next chapter will elaborate upon this proposition, but for purposes of
system definition it is fundamental.
11. 8A The school is commonly analyzed as though it were a closed
system which could be understood solely in terms of its internal organiza-
tion and relationships, and the internal dispositions of matter, energy,
and information.
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iewed this way, the school is seen as a totipotential system existing
within the physical boundary of its building walls. More realistically,
however, the school should be viewed as a partipotential system whose
components are also input transducers
.
Teaching and learning go on outside the school walls as well as inside;
the nature of the environment: rich or poor in stimuli, organized or
disorganized, placid or turbulent, will be a prime factor in determining
the character of the school. The relationship, of course, is not a simple
or causal one. Because it is a kind of learning system, the school will
tend to reflect its environment; if the environment is rich in stimuli,
the school will be rich in responses; if the environment is highly organ-
ized (and predictable), so will the school be; if the environment is
placid and regular, the school's behavior will be placid and regular. It
is generally the radical critics of schools who consider them to be closed
systems^ unresponsive to their environments, while at the same time
criticizing society in general on many of the same grounds that they
criticize the schools. It may well be that many schools do not meet the
"needs" of children or of the larger society, but "needs" are not among
the parameters which comprise the school's environment. They are con-
ceptual, not concrete. Statements of needs, of course, are concrete.
as are statements of demands, expectations, and requirements. Such
statements may well be part of the school's environment and be accepted
by the school as inputs. If these statements are unambiguous, uncon-
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tradxctory, and congruent, they may well be processed by the school and
affect its outputs. If, however, as is frequently the case, they are
ambiguous, contradictory, and incongruent, they tend to cancel each other
out, or are filtered out by the school’s boundary processes. It is impor-
tant, too, to realize that the school's output will play a significant
role in determining the nature of these inputs. Because nearly everyone
in the school’s environment has been to school, the statements of needs,
demands, expectations, and requirements will be shaped in large measure
by the culture of the school. If, for example, the environment places a
high priority on the development of "basic skills" of reading, writing,
and computation, this is at least partially to be explained by the fact
that the school has always placed high priority on the development of
these skills. Conversely, if the school appears to place high value on
docile, submissive, and conforming behavior, it is because the environ-
ment, enculturated by the schools, places high value on such behavior.
Indeed, the general presumption must be that the school, like any other
open system that survives over time, is well-adapted to its environment.
The nature of this adaptation will be explored in subsequent sections of
this and the next chapter.
11.8b School people frequently resort to a curious dualism in think-
ing about student behavior. On the one hand, formal "learning behavior"
is seen in an environmental context; in other words, learning is somehow
the result of teaching, or at least the result of the student’s inter-
action with persons and materials in his environment. Non-learning be-
havior, however, as in "behavior problem" is rarely viewed in the same
way. Any particular molecular behavior is related first to prior behavior
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and only secondarily and occasionally to the environmental situation In
which the behavior occured. Put In another way. when things adjudged good’'
happen to a child. It is because he Is an open system and the school can
take the credit; when things adjudged "bad" happen, it is because he Is
a closed system, and the school abjures responsibility. There are respon-
sive children (who conform to our expectations), and unresponsive children
(who do not conform to our expectations); there are bright children (who
are open to environmental Inputs) and "slow learners" (who are relatively
closed to environmental Inputs). It Is, of course, true that for any given
parameter value, whether a national norm on a reading test, or the teachers
expectation of classroom deportment, there will be a wide range of devia-
tions in any student population, but it is equally true that any given
parameter value is but one of a myriad inputs which at any time will be
part of a student's environment. We are not arguing, of course, that
all students have the same learning competence or that all students can
process the same degree of environmental variety, but we are arguing that
an students are open systems, that all behavior must be seen in its
interpersonal and environmental context, and that the individual student
is well-adapted to his environment. This last proposition may appear
extreme and overstated, since we ordinarily talk so easily about "mal-
adjustment," since we all know children who are not happy in school and do
not do well in school, and since our jails and mental hospitals are full
of people who apparently could not adapt to the larger social environment.
Yet the proposition follows inexorably from the analysis of Part II; any
molecular behavior of an open system is an adaptation to its environment.
The proposition forces us to study the student-in-environment if we wish
123
11. 8B
to understand his behavior. If „e wish to do more than understand - If „e
wish to control or change, or to use the currently popular term, "modify"
his behavior, we must be able to exercise the appropriate amount of control
over his environment. We must remember, however, that we will always
share this control with the student himself. We all recall the cartoon
of the two mice In the cage commenting on how well they had trained the
experimenter: every time they stepped on a lever he was conditioned to
give them food. Such is the essence of open systems. This topic will be
developed more extensively in the next chapter.
11.9 A learning system controls its own transformations : an adjusting
n^jtrolled ^^ _^vironment ; therefore a learning system can
^havior , while m adjusting system can only changed ^ its
environment
. One of the paramount questions involved in defining a sys-
tem is identifying the locus or locii of control. If the locus of control
is in the environment, that is to say, if the system changes its line of
behavior only in response to new parameter values, we can define the
system as an adjusting system, particularly if the system’s output does
not affect the parameter values. If, at the other extreme, the locus of
control is entirely within the boundary of the system, that is to say, if
the system changes its line of behavior without regard to parameter
values, we can define the system as morphogenic. If, as is most often
the case with living systems, there are locii of control both within and
outside the system, that is to say, if the system must accept certain
inputs but can refuse others, and if the system can process these inputs
in more than one way, and if the manner of processing these inputs is
selected by the system, and if, finally, the system’s outputs affect in
some way subsequent inputs, we can define the system as a learning sys-
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tem. The essential factor, thus, is whether there Is a linear relationship
between Inputs and outputs. If there is, then the system can be entirely
controlled by the environment; If there Is not, the system cannot be
®i^tirely controlled by the environment.
11. 9A The school is a learning system. There are many among its
critics who wish it were not, that it could be more readily controlled
by the environment. There are other critics who claim, in effect, that
the school is an adjusting system, controlled by school boards, politicians,
and professional educators. These critics would like, at the least, to
share control, and, at most, to wrest control from these forces. There
is no doubt that the environment imposes many constraints upon schools;
legislators through statutes, school boards through budgets, central ad-
minstrators through requirements; however, we must be careful to distin-
guish between constraints and controls. If such constraints functioned
as controls, if schools could be designed to specifications as adjusting
systems are, so that given inputs would lead to predictable outputs,
most of the critics of education, from whatever point of view, would be
satisfied. However, as we have seen (9.36), it is difficult to identify,
much less predict, the school's outputs. Unlike business, where profits,
products, and gross sales can be identified, measured, and altered, or
hospitals, which deal with a circumscribed and measurable segment of the
human condition, public schools deal with a totality of complex, toti-
potential learning systems, and they attempt to deal with them in their
totality, even though in the concrete world, people spend only a small
portion of their time in school. One of the most widespread trends in
schools today is the attempt to assert, as environment, greater control
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over the inputs and outputs of their students through the use and develop-
ment of behavioral objectives. We shall be analysing this trend from a
systems point of view in Chapter 13. Here we need only point out the para-
doxical implications of attempting to facilitate learning by treating the
learner as an adjusting system. The concomitant movement on the level
of the school is generally referred to as "accountability,” and while the
term means different things to different people, in system terms it also
means the establishment of a greater linear relationship between inputs
and outputs. The implications here, too, are for greater environmental
control over the school as a system, to the point where parameter values
are specified and output values can be measured against them, and
deviations corrected. As things stand now in most schools, it is possible
to assign parameter values (national norms, for Instance), and to measure
some actual output against them (test results), but not to correct the
deviation. Most schools lack the mechanisms to utilize this information
as negative feedback to correct their performance. In spite of this lack,
most schools still exert more control over their own behavior, for better
or for worse, than do their environments. The great battles over aid
to education during the past decade have generally been over local versus
federal control of the schools. The truth of the matter in most instances
is that no level of control has much influenced the school, whether national,
state, or local.
11. 9B The student is a learning system. This may, at first, appear
to be an unexceptional statement, since the term "student" implies
"learning," as commonly used. However, this is a catagorical statement
which in terms of our analysis in Part II has implications beyond the
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common use of these terms. The salient characteristic of a learning sys-
tme is not that it can learn, but that it must learn (7.25). To use Pask's
evocative phrase, "man (is) a system that needs to learn. "Not to learn"
IS simply not an option open to man. We must hasten to add that this
need to learn is not necessarily volitional. We are not saying that all
men want to learn or seek to learn; we are saying, instead, that all men
do learn, and while the rate of learning and the amount of learning may
fluctuate over a lifetime, learning never ceases entirely as long as the
brain is functioning. The statement does not imply that the learning will
be necessarily appear relevant from the envrionment
' s point of view. It
does not mean that a student will necessarily learn what someone else, like
a teacher, wants or expects him to learn. In fact, it implies quite the
opposite, since a learning system cannot be controlled by the environment.
The more control the environment attemtps to exercise over the learning
system, the less likely that learning will take place, or, to state the
proposition more clearly, the less likely that the output behavior will
result from learning. This is not a value judgment; not all behavior of
learning systems can emenate from learning; if this were the case there
would be no point in learning since the environment would be totally un-
predictable and no learning would be useful in any subsequent situations.
Those aspects of the environment which are predictable do not require
learning or re-learning; the school legitimately deals with these aspects
as well as the unpredictable aspects. A student must have a repetoire
of learned behavior to apply in familiar or repetitious situations, much
3
Pask, Gordon, "Man As a System That Needs to Learn" in Stewart, ed..
Automation Theory and Learning Systems
,
(Washington, DC: Thompson, 1967).
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as an adjusting system has built-in lines of behavior to deal with its
predictable input. Learning is valuable only in situations which are
unfamiliar or novel. The Implication of the statement that man needs to
learn, however, is that he requires novelty and variety in his environment.
If the school as environment does not provide sufficient variey for a stu-
dent to learn, he will behave in such a way as to create variety in his
environment. Such is the etiology of divergent behavior, whether or not
considered creative or deviant by the environment. From all of this, it
follows that environmental variety is a requisite for learning. Rich class-
room environments are better for learning than sterile environments;
heterogeneous populations (along whatever dimensions) are more conducive
to learning than homogeneous populations. It is Important, in terms of
this analysis, not to confuse "variety” and "organization," two very
different concepts. There can be organized variety and disorganized
variety. A relatively impoverished environment can be either organized
or disorganized. We will deal with these issues in the next chapter, but
it is important to remind ourselves here that in arguing for the impor-
tance of environmental variety to learning we are not arguing for any
Particular degree of orgnaization, although we can anticipate our argument
enough to say that variety must occur within a matrix of higher level
organization. Just as in a transformational grammar a finite number of
symbols and a finite number of combinatorial rules can generate an infinite
number of words and sentences, so, too, there must exist in the environment
some underlying regularity if the learning system is to survive in it.
This argument may appear to be evading the central issue that schools are
concerned with - not whether a student learns, but whether he learns what
128
11. 9B
the school is intentionally teaching. The argument is frequently advanced
that, for some students at least, a rich and varied environment distracts
them from learning certain skills and concepts that they "need" to learn.
Our analysis denies the validity of this argument; all students do, in
fact, learn what they need to learn, although they do not necessarily
learn what we want them to learn. The "abstracted student" may "need" to
have a "positive self-image" and a "respect for others." The concrete
student, negotiating his own environment, may not have these particular
needs; he may need to be dependent, he may be fearful of competence, he
may have a desk- top calculator at home, he may, as a condition of his
survival, need to taunt, bully, and ridicule others. He learns what he
needs to learn. The only way the environment can change his learning
pattern is to exercise more control over him, but by exercising more
control, by reducing the variety in the system, it is actually reducing
the likelihood that the student’s behavior is the result of learning.
By focusing on specified outputs, the environment restricts the ability
of the student to cope with environmental variety when he encounters it.
11.10 The more probabilistic the system
,
and the more changing its
organization
,
the more difficult it becomes for ^ constrained transmitter
to send information about the system . All open, learning systems are
probabilistic. This means that at any given time, the state of the system
cannot be predicted from its state at a prior point in time, and its sub-
sequent state cannot be predicted from its state at the given point in
time. The system, in simpler words, will have a repetoire of behaviors
to select from, and if it cannot find a suitable behavior in its repetoire
it can, through its associator and memory processes, create new behaviors.
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Again, the creation of granunatical sentences is the clearest and best ex-
ample of this. The number of unique sentences that a human being can
generate is literally infinite, and except for special circumstances such
as an actor playing a role, unpredictable. Just as remarkable as the
ability to generate original and unpredictable sentences, however, is the
ability of human beings to receive and immediately understand and act upon
sentences that they have never heard before and could not anticipate. Most
human beings share an underlying linguistic competence which governs their
linguistic performance, both as senders and receivers of information.^
So ingrained is the competence that most people, when instructed to talk
"gobbledygook," emit a series of gutteral and labial sounds totally un-
related to the structure of their native language, accompanied by emphatic
body gestures that they would ordinarily not employ. If asked to create
a list of nonsense words, they could probably do so, but if asked to
create nonsense sentences, their basic linguistic competence would make
this an arduous and slow task. Men are "naturally” grammatical. While
this competence permits the generation of unlimited understandable mes-
sages, therefore, it also inhibits the generation of messages which may
lie outside the canon and conventions of the language. Put more generally,
and within the context of our theory, the capacity of a system both to
decode and encode information is constrained by the very competence which
allows it to generate and understand an infinite number of meaningful
messages. Furthermore, the capacity of a channel to transmit information
is finite, and if its capacity to transmit information is less than the
"^see Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax , ch. 2, (Cambridge:
MIT, 1965).
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capacity of the information source to generate it, this capacity will be
a constraint on its ability to transmit information. Still further, most
communication channels are ’•noisy;” elements of uncertainty and distortion
not emanating from the information source enter the channel at points be-
tween the transmitter and receiver, and this noise further constrains the
ability of the channel to transmit information reliably. Finally, and
particularly in the domain of interpersonal communication, there are
frequently multiple channels simultaneously transmitting incongruent
and even contradictory messages. For any one such channel, the information
in the other channels will function as noise. All of these constraints
serve to limit the reliability of transmitting information, and the
greater the variety (information, uncertainty) in the information source,
the more serious are the constraints on the transmission process.
ll.lOA The school is a probabilistic system, and it generages a
greater variety of information than it can transmit to its environment.
The problem we are dealing with here is not, as school people often like
to think, one of selection of data. Rather, the data that is selected for
transmission will itself be subject to the systematic distortions of
constrained transmission. One reason for this is that in selecting infor-
mation for transmission, schools are subject to the problem of infinite
regress. The most Important information that the school transmits is
about its components (Miss Smith’s class, the football team, Johnny),
each of which is also a probabilistic system. Pask makes this profound
point in a somewhat different context when he asserts that "the least
distinguishable or describable component of [an active control system] is
also an active control system."^
^Pask, op. cit., p. 138.
(Pask’s term "active control system"
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is isomorphic with our term "probabilistic.”) This means that the infor-
mation from these components which the school wishes to transmit will
have been subject to the systematic constraints we have described before
the school considers it as information to be transmitted to the environ-
ment, at which point it is subject to the same constraints at the system
level. Another reason, endemic to all complex systems, is the problem of
distortion through generality. Any general statement conveys less infor-
mation than the less general statements from which it is drawn (an instance
of the whole being less than the sum of its parts). Every meaningful
message exists at some level of generality, and thus contains this kind
of systematic distortion. If a school reports that its sixth grade students
achieved a mean grade level score of 6.8 on a battery of achievement tests,
this conveys more distorted information than the report that the students
received mean grade level scores of 7.2 and 6.4 on the vocabulary and math
tests respectively. Each of these scores transmits more distorted infor-
mation than the next lower level of analysis. When we come to the scores
of individual students, they convey more distorted information than an item
analysis, and so on. Schools searching for adequate reporting systems
must become aware that distortion is "built-in" to the process, and while
up to a point it can be minimized by reducing the variety of information,
or by increasing channel capacity, or by reducing the noise. in the channel,
or by reducing the number of simultaneous channels, it can never be entirely
eliminated without changing the system to a deterministic one. Most
schools, faced with this problem, tend to deal with it by reducing the
variety of information. They transmit information at a high level of
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generality; thus requiring fewer symbols, reducing the likelihood that the
channel capacity will be exceeded or that noise will distort the transmis-
sion. They achieve this greater reliability of transmission, of course,
at the expense of distortion through generality. If we consider the
report card, the traditional five-point system (A, B, C, D, F) conveys
very little information but is likely to convey it accurately. At the
other extreme, an extended anecdotal, narrative statement of as many aspects
of a student’s work and growth as the teacher can discuss is going to con-
vey much more information about that student, but will be much more sub-
ject to the first kind of distortion due to constraints on the process
of transmission. There is more opportunity for misunderstanding, ambiguity,
and incongruity. In trying to devise reporting systems which strike a
balance between generality and specificity, between cognitive, affective,
and psychomotor concerns, and between generalized learning skills and
particular basic skills, schools should realize that their job, like the
job of the cartographer, is not to eliminate distortion, but to select
the distortion which is least likely to jeopardize the communication
process and to develop means of counteracting the distortion which is
inevitable to the greatest degree possible.
ll.lOB The student is a probabilistic system. This means that the
relationship between his input transducers (largely his sensory apparatus),
his channels, his associator and memory, and his output transducer is
subject to systematic distortion for all the reasons described in 11.10.
But most clearly and colloquially, we can say that there will always be
systematic distortion between the "real world" and the student’s experience
of that real world, as well as between the student’s experience and his
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behavior. As schools and curriculum developers place increasingly greater
emphasis upon behavioral objectives, this point assumes increasingly greater
significance. The "language” of experience and the "language" of behavior
are incommensurate. The first is semantically rich but syntactically
poor, the second is semantically poor but complex in syntax. In other
words, our behavior is by necessity more highly structured than our exper-
ience. When behaviorists attempt to translate "learning" into a list of
active verbs, no matter how extensive the list it will never accurately
reflect the image that the learner has of the information he has processed.
We shall deal with this issue more extensively in Chapter 13.
11.11 The organization of learning systems tends towards increasing
complexity
. The notion of "organized complexity" is important for system
definition. System theorists have attempted to define the concept of
complexity with some rigor, in terms of the amount of information neces-
sary to describe or control the system. As we have seen (5.17 et passim),
this amount of information is not related to the number of components or
the size of the system, but rather to the degree of organization and to
the relationships among the variables. The more complex the organization
of a system, the more improbable its behavior (in a statistical sense)
and the more information about its organization is necessary. At the same
time, the more organized its complexity, the more likely that the amount
of information necessary to control the system can be attained at the
appropriate level with the appropriate effort. Thus, "organization" and
"complexity" are independent concepts. Systems can increase in complexity
without increasing in organization - can change in the direction of
"chaotic complexity" — and the only reliable information about the system
13A
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becomes statistical and relatively useless for controlling the system at
any given point in time. If systems continue to evolve in the direction
of chaotic complexity, at a certain point they loose their systemic pro-
perties and become mere aggregates of systems. Systems can also increase
in organization without increasing in complexity, and the amount of infor-
mation required to control the system correspondingly decreases. If
systems continue to evolve in the direction of "organized simplicity,"
at a certain point they can no longer be considered learning systems, but
instead become deterministic. Systems can increase in size and in number
of components without increasing either their organization or the complex-
ity, although this rarely happens with concrete systems if the increase
in size or number is considerable or sudden. The statement that the
organization of learning systems tends towards increasing complexity thus
says something significant about the properties of learning systems as
well as about the mode of analysis the observer employs in thinking about
the system he is looking steadily at. If, as he observes the system over
time, he finds that he needs increasing less information to control the
system, he can infer that the system is not learning (taking into account,
of course, the problems of the constrained transmitter discussed in
11.10). If, on the other hand, he finds that the only reliable information
he can obtain about the system is statistical, he may infer that he is
operating at an inappropriate level of analysis and that the "thing" he
is looking steadily at is not, in fact, a "thing" but an aggregate of
things
.
ll.llA If one defines the school as an open, learning, probabilistic
system, one can expect it to increase in organized complexity. We will
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maintain that for most schools this is the case, although there are excep-
tions and the exceptions are significant. Both of the current "trends"
in public schools, "behavioral objectives" and "open classrooms," while
dissimilar in many respects, are movements towards greater organized
complexity, and while the observer of any particular school must be care-
ful to distinguish between rhetoric and actual practice, the evidence
appears to support the contention that these two alternative approaches to
individualizing the learning process both require the analyst to have more
information of a different order.
If a system is able to formulate its own goals
and plans, to switch goals and plans at will,
and to adjust internally its own allocation of
resources and priorities of action, knowledge
of current structure is less useful for predic-
tion and control than knowledge of the guiding
goals and values which integrate and guide the
total system. Moreover, for very large systems,
a detailed definition may not be feasible, even
if it were useful. In short, the analyst's re-
sources must be redeveloped and his thinking
shifted to a different level if he is to make^
headway in an environment of true complexity.
Information about goals and values is difficult to obtain, since statements
about goals and values may or may not be reliable indicators of operational
goals and values. Furthermore, in human organizations such as schools
there may be a multiplicity of conflicting and incongruous goals and values,
as well as conflicting priorities among common goals and values. Decision-
making processes in actuality may differ significantly from those inferred
from an organizational structure. When these considerations are taken
together with the constraints on information transmission mentioned earlier.
6
Hare
,
op . cit
.
, p. 200.
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we can understand that gaining reliable information about complex systems
IS an awesome task. It is a possible task, however, since if our analysis
is at the appropriate level, and if the school, in fact, tends towards
increasing organized complexity, fewer statements will each contain more
information than a great many more statements would if the school were
moving to chaotic complexity. The amount of information needed must not
be confused with the number of data needed. As Herbert Simon amusingly
put it, "Mother Hubbard did not have to check off the list of possible
contents to say that her cupboard was bare."^ The job of the school
analyst is to discover that level of analysis at which the fewest possible
statements will convey the most Information. The increasing complexity
of schools means that the number of statements will have to be greater
over time and the level of analysis will have to become more general. How-
ever, the increasing organization of this complexity means that a limited
number of these statements will do an adequate, if not optimal, job of
describing the system for the analyst's purposes, whether they be predic-
tion, control, or mere understanding. Chapter 9 provided the essential
elements of this level of analysis by identifying the subsystems of which
complex systems are composed. If for our purposes we omit from consider-
ation matter-energy processing subsystems and focus only on information-
processing subsystems, we can see that systems characterized by organized
complexity can be described in terms of eleven subsystem processes, a
perfectly feasible analytical task.
ll.llB The growth of the organism and the evolution of the species are
both clearly examples of increasing organized complexity; from both the
^Simon, Herbert, The Sciences of the Arti f
i
pi (Cambridge: MIT, 1969),
p. 110.
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biological and psychological points of view, this point is beyond debate.
That the student as a learning system shares in both the ontogenetic and
phylogenetic propensities of the species is at this point a trivial obser-
vation. What is not trivial for our purposes is the realization that for
the student, moreso than for the school, this propensity is innate and
develops with a remarkable regularity. With the exception of special cases,
all children appear to pass through developmental stages in roughly the
same sequence and at approximately the same chronological ages. The work
of Piaget, Bruner, and their colleagues strongly suggest that this develop-
ment has relatively little to do with ability or schooling. From infancy
through adulthood, cognitive competence develops through increasing differ-
entiation and discrimination, classification, generalization, and abstrac-
tion, and the reciprocal processes of assimilation and accomodation. This
is not to say that there will not be significant differences between
children and between cultures. It is fair to say that the more the world
into which the child is born manifests organized complexity, the more his
own cognitive competence will develop in this direction. But while there
can be significant differences in degree and rate of development, there
is evidently little difference in the characteristic of the developmental
g
process itself. There is, furthermore, some neurological evidence to
suggest that if the environment is singularly deficient in variety
(complexity) or is markedly unorganized in its causal texture, the indiv-
idual will compensate for these characteristics by creating an internal
representation of reality which is richer and more organized that the envir-
8
Pribram, Karl H.
,
Languages of the Brain
,
(Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1971).
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onment. Daydreams, fantasies, obsessions, and compulsions may be explained
as compensatory strategies. The student thus can be seen as a morphogenic
system which, up to a point at least, will develop increasing organized
complexity regardless of the characteristics of his environment. Colloquial-
ly, we might say that the student cannot tolerate boredom or confusion.
What the school cannot provide in terms of variety and sense, the student
will provide for himself. Truency and deviant behavior are evidence of this
from children who cannot create rich and sensible interior lives for them-
selves
.
11.12 In this chapter we have defined both school and student as open,
learning, probabilistic systems which develop in the direction of increased
organized complexity. We have attempted to indicate some issues involved
in looking at schools and students as such systems. We will discuss these
issues at greater length in Chapter 13.
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CHAPTER XII
SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT
12.1 For concrete learning systems there are no normative environments
.
We recall from 6.1 that a system’s environment consists of those parameters
which affect It (as Inputs) and which are affected by Its outputs. The
mere existence of a set of attributes or phenomena outside the boundary of
a concrete system does not mean that these attributes or phenomena are
necessarily parts of that system:' s environment. Before the environment
can be Identified, the system must be Identified; that Is, we must be
clear about the system we are looking steadily at. We cannot make any
general statements about the environment of a concrete system, although we
can make general statements about the concrete environments that concrete
systems Inhabit. We shall use the term "field” to describe the general
characteristics of concrete environments. A concrete system's environ-
ment will be seen as that protlon of a field which at any given time af-
fects the system or Is affected by It. The characteristics of the field
will play a large, but by no means sufficient, part In determining the
nature of the system's environment.
12.1.1 There are three essential dimensions which determine the
character of the field. The first Is the dimension of variety ; we can say
that fields are either rich or poor In the number of distinguishable
elements they contain. The richer the field, the greater the possibility
of variety In the environment. But we must emphasize that It Is only the
possibility of variety that Is greater; the actual variety In the envrlon-
ment may be a great deal less that the possible variety. If It Is less.
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the difference between the possible variety and the actual variety will be
the measure of r^undancy in the environment. Of course, the amount of
variety in the environment cannot be greater than the variety in the field.
12.1.2 The second dimension is the dimension of organization
. Emery
and Trist have called this "the causal texture of organizational environ-
ments." We have remarked (6.3) that most environments are loosely-joined;
they fall between being tightly organized, in which every element affects
every other element, and being unorganized, in which each element is unaf-
fected by any other element. This is so because this is true of the field
in general; a change in any given variable will ordinarily affect some
but not all other variables. That it is true of the field in general,
however, does not mean that it is equally true of all segments of the
field; there will be some segments in which elements are tightly joined and
other segments in which elements are loosely joined. The degree of joined-
ness in the field, therefore, will not play as large a role in determining
the concrete system's environment as the degree of variety, since the envir-
onment cannot contain more variety than the field.
12.1.3 If we put these two dimensions together, we can have rich,
organized fields and rich, unorganized fields; we can have poor, organized
fields and poor, unorganized fields. When we add the third dimension, the
dimension of change
,
we have a typology of eight kinds of fields. Emery
and Trist use the picturesque terms "placid" and "turbulent" to describe
2
the dimension of change, but we must be careful to note that this dimen-
^in Emery, F.E., ed.. Systems Thinking
,
(Baltimore: Penguin, 1969),
pp. 241-257.
^Ibid.
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Sion exists on the next higher level of analysis, since we are interested
in change in the degree of variety and the degree of organization, and
not the change implicit in variety and organization (5.18-5.20). While an
unorganized field will be more turbulent than an organized field, we will
use the term to refer to a field which changes its organization and variety
at an observable rate and to a significant degree. A field which is becom-
ing more or less organized, or is increasing or decreasing its variety will
be said to be changing, whereas a field which maintains a relatively fixed
level of organization and variety will be said to be stable, even though
within that stability there can be a great deal of change.
12.1.4 The distinction between "field” and "environment" is frequently
ignored by analysts and observers. They tend to assume that a description
of the field from their point of view is also a description of the envir-
onment that the concrete system inhabits, and because one can make general
statements about types of fields one can also make general statements
about concrete environments. For learning systems that exercise control
over their boundary and input transducer subsystems, it is not possible to
assume that a description of their field from the observer's viewpoint will
necessarily be a description of their environment. In a very real sense,
the analyst's description of the field is a description of his environment,
and, as we have said (7.34), concrete systems inhabiting the same field
may have very different environments.
12.1.A.1 It may generally be said that schools inhabit environments
which are less rich in variety, more organized, and less dynamic than the
field, although this will not necessarily be true of a specific school.
The reason for this generalization is rooted both in the history of American
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public education and the nature of the learning system. Until very recently,
the prevailing mythos of public schools was the metaphor of the "melting
pot," wherein a common "American" culture was created by conscientiously
reducing the variety which a culturally heterogeneous population presented
to the schools. The population which left the schools to become part of
the schools' environment was (and for the most part still is) less varied
than the population which entered the schools. The human environment which
most schools inhabit is itself a product of the acculturation process of
public schooling. For a long time, we felt that this was true of the field,
too; school people tended to ignore those elements of the population who
were not successful products of American schooling. The American dream of
cultural homogeneity is no longer so firmly entrenched; "cultural Pluralism"
and "human diversity" are becoming familiar slogans in schools, and I
believe that many schools are fumbling their way towards making them more
than slogans. Yet it would be a profound mistake to assume that schools'
environments change as rapidly as schools may change. There is a built-in
generation-lag; products of "heterogeneous" schools will not become signifi-
cant parts of those schools' environments for several years. School boards,
whether elected by majority or appointed by the community power structure,
reflect the previous generation of schooled people, not the current gener-
ation. Adminstrators of schools, too, generally represent successful pro-
ducts of an earlier generation of schooling. This is less true of teacher
candidates, although since teachers are usually selected by administrators,
successful candidates - those who actually enter the classrooms - are
generally less diverse in their characteristics than those who apply.
Because learning systems tend to project their characteristics onto their
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environment (7.43) as well as map characteristics of their environment into
their internal processes (7.36), the system and environment will generally
resemble each other much more closely than will the environment and its
field. Since the school is such a loosely-bounded system, the character
of its environment can perhaps best be ascertained by observing the
characteristics of the school rather than the characteristics of the field.
12.1.
A. 2 One more important point must be made in this section relat-
ing to schools as well as the next section relating to students. Because
we are dealing with concrete systems whose variables must, in fact, exist
concretely in time/space (5.4), the absence of a variable is not a variable
^ the system , and the absence of a parameter is not a parameter of the
system. In the language of education, neither system nor environment
can be characterized by its "needs.” Certainly, the environment of a
school may contain many statements and assertions about needs, and those
statements may be part of the school's environment, but it is only the
statement and not the need that the school can deal with. The reification
of "needs" is one of the prevailing fallacies of much social science,
and emenates from the confusion of abstracted systems which inhabit norm-
ative environments and concrete systems which only inhabit concrete envir-
onments. One of the simple tests of whether an analysis is dealing with
concrete systems and concrete environments is the extent to which state-
ments of "needs" enter into the analysis.
12.1.
B.1 It is relatively easy to distinguish among classroom envir-
onments according to the three criteria described in 12.1. It would be
fallacious, however, to assume that the environment of the student in the
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classroom necessarily resembled the classroom environment as the field. We
can say that a rich, organized, dynamic classroom is more conducive to
learning than a poor, unorganized, static classroom, but we cannot say that
a student in the first type of classroom will necessarily inhabit an envir-
onment with those characteristics. It is easier for a student in a rich
classroom to Inhabit a poor environment than it is for a student in a poor
classroom to inhabit a rich environment. Likewise, it is easier for a
student in a loosely-structured
’ classroom to inhabit a highly-structured
environment than it is for a student in a highly-structured classroom to
inhabit a loosely-structured environment. Rich, loosely-structured, dynamic
classrooms can provide a greater range of concrete environments than poor,
highly-structured, static classrooms, and are therefore more appropriate
for learning systems. The more the classroom resembles the second type,
the more the successful" student’s behavior will be adjustment behavior,
although, as we have seen (11. 9B), the student requires a certain degree
of variety for learning to take place, and he must learn. Since the
classroom is only a portion of the student’s environment, it is not necessary
that it provide this variety, although to the extent that it fails to do
so the less relevance it will have to the rest of the student's life.
The theory of concrete learning systems thus powerfully supports the move-
ment towards greater classroom variety and less classroom structure as
being conducive for a wide range of learning environments for particular
students, without prescribing that these particular environments resemble
the classroom as a field.
12.1.B.2 We must stress here as we did above (12. lA), that "needs"
are not variables of either students or classrooms. A teacher may detennine
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that a student may have a particular need and may attempt to structure the
field accordingly. This determination thus may well affect the student's
environment. Likewise, the student may well feel a "need," and this feeling
becomes a significant variable, whether it is a need to eat, to love, to
read, or to learn. It is the feeling, though, and not the need, which is
the variable. We may state almost catagorically that a system's feelings
of needs will result in particular behaviors (the only exception being
when a particular need gratification is deferred because of other more
pressing feelings of need)
. The only needs that can be generally ascribed
to learning systems are the need for varied and loosely-joined environments
and the need to learn, and we can only say this because we are attempting
to develop a general theory. At any given time, a particular learning sys-
tem may need less variety and more structure. What we commonly talk about
as needs in this context are really "necessary conditions" of the same sort
as physiological "needs."
12 . 2 All concrete learning systems are well-adapted to their environ-
One of the consequences of adopting a non-normative analysis is the
abandonment of the notions of maladaption and deviance (in its ethical
sense). A learning system may deviate from its prior behavior but it cannot
deviate from the way it ought to behave, since "oughts," like "needs," do
not describe concrete parameters. This point of view allows us to divest
ourselves of much cumbersome analytical baggage, and also significantly
simplifies the analysis of complex systems by forcing the analyst to focus
on actual behavior which does exist while relieving him of the obligation
of inquiring into behavior which might exist, but does not. To this extent.
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at least, this approach conforms to a strict behaviorism which studies
actual rather than desired behavior. (It departs from behaviorism, of course
by refusing to accept linear and causal explanations of the relationship
between input and output.) Most important, however, it forces us to under-
stand situations before we evaluate them. Perhaps the most significant
contributions of post-war psychiatry have been the work of Laing,^ Bateson
4
and Ruesch, Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson,^ and their colleagues to
remove familiar but inhibiting evaluative labels from human behavior and
to examine that behavior in the social context in which it occurs. Such an
examination reveals that behavior which we might ordinarily label "dis-
turbed is an understandable adaptation to an environment which manifests
the same characteristics. The focus of investigation thus shifts from the
disturbed behavior of the system to the relationship between the system
3-nd its environment. Just as an understanding of mental illness has been
profoundly changed by this change in focus, so too, our understanding of
other forms of disturbed behavior - crime, drug addiction, alcoholism -
is slowly changing to the point where we are beginning to recognize all of
these behaviors as adaptive rather than maladaptive. Recognizing behavior
as adaptive does not require that we approve of it or that we should not
desire to change it. To understand is not to justify. But to understand
the situation makes it more likely that the situation can be changed, since
3
Self and Others
;
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^
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the field can play an important part in changing the environment and thus
changing the behavior of the system we are looking steadily at.
12. 2A Schools are well-adapted to their environments. It was, I believe
Jonathon Kozol who first made this observation several years ago in an art-
icle in the to York Times, in which he argued that the "problem" with
American public schools was not that they worked so poorly but that they
worked so well. One need not share Kozol 's viewpoint to acknowledge the
cogency of his position. The environment that most schools inhabit is
the environment that they largely created and continue to perpetuate. We
might wish that schools might have a larger and more creative vision of
their place in the social order; we may think that schools should become
agents of social and cultural change. What we are actually saying in this
case is either that we wish the school were less well-adapted to its envir-
onment or that the school's environment could be expanded to include more
of the variety in the field. It is ironic that so many critics and re>-
formers who are willing to absolve the individual of responsibility for his
anit-social acts are unwilling to absolve the school of responsibility for
its behavior, and yet from a general systems viewpoint there is no differ-
ence; all learning systems are well-adapted to their environments. Whether
this calls for sympathetic understanding or catagorical condemnation is
purely a function of the observer's prejudices. The rapid development of
alternative and free schools both within and outside the public school sys-
tem is undoubtedly the healthiest and most encouraging acknowledgement of
the proposition that different schools can inhabit very different environ-
ments within the same field.
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12.2b Every student is well-adapted to his environment. If we start
from this assumption, some remarkable changes in perception occur. We
find, for example, that most of our vocabulary for talking about students
disappears. There are no more "over-achievers” or "under-achievers," only
achievers. There are, in fact, no "slow learners" or "fast learners," only
learners inhabiting different environments with different degrees of variety
and organization. We must emphasize that we are not suggesting that all
students, as learning systems, have similar learning competence, for this
is certainly not the case. We are saying, however, that each student's
learning competence will serve to limit or extend the variety and organiza-
tion of his environment, and that each student's competence and environment
be reciprocally well—adapted . Neither is fixed or predetermined; they
will tend to expand and contract together.
12.2b. 2 A further implication of this assumption is that when teachers
choose or intend to change a student's behavior, either through teaching
him something or through "behavior modification," he is dealing with be-
havior which is already well-adapted and functional. This is not to say
that all behavior is optimally functional, but rather that it is minimally
functional - it satisfies the minimal requirements for existing in its
environment. If we choose to change behavior or to move a system towards
an optimally functional behavior, we must treat the system as an adjusting
system and make sure both that the inputs into the system are carefully
controlled and that negative feedback loops are fully functioning. In
other words, the variety in the environment must be significantly reduced,
and the organization of the environment significantly increased, so that
the behavior that was satisfactorily adapted to its original environment
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no longer is well-adapted to a contrived, more restricted environment. The
assumption is that when the new behaviors are "learned" they can be used
by the learning system in more expansive environments. This is the under-
lying assumption of schooling, and while the first part of it is probably
true learning systems are capable of adjustment behavior - the second
part is questionable. We have said that adjusting systems cannot learn;
whether learning systems can "transfer" adjustment behavior to less pre-
dictable environments is by no means clear. It is frequently the case that
what a student "learns" in restrictive classroom environments is useful
only in subsequent similar environments. Most people "forget" most of
what they "learn" in school because the environments in which they exist
are so unlike their classroom environments. For most people, "learned"
algebra is useful only in algebra classes, "learned" history only useful
in history classes, and so forth. If life was carried on in environments
that resembled most school rooms, then sophisticated adjustment behavior
would be the optimal kind of behavior. If, on the other hand, most
schoolrooms more closely resembled the environments that the real world
presents, adjustment behavior would be mal-adaptive since the environment
would be much less predictable. At the same time, in such a classroom,
the control of the students’ behavior would rest much more with the stu-
dent than with the teacher, and learning would be less likely to be the di-
rect result of teaching.
12.2B.3 The modification of well-adapted learned behavior is there-
fore more likely to occur in open classrooms, whereas the modification of
adjustment behavior is more likely to occur in restrictive classrooms. Since
adjustment behavior is useful only in environments which repeat themselves
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with a high degree of regularity, „e have theoretical grounds for question-
ing the efficacy of schooling in restrictive classrooms.
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CHAPTER XIII
SYSTEM ORGANIZATION
no £uch _thing as ' good organization' in any absolute
The relativity of this proposition has been implied throughout
this paper, but it is well to make it explicit and to elicit the support
of so rigorous an inductive theorist as Ashby in its behalf. He continues,
I am prepared to assert that there is not a single
mental faculty ascribed to Man that is good in the
absolute sense. If any particular faculty is usually
good, this is solely because our terrestrial environ-
ment is so lacking in variety that its usual form
makes that faculty usually good. But change the en-
vironment, go to really different conditions, and
possession of that faculty may be harmful
. . .
Here are some examples in illustration.
The first is Memory. Is it not good that a brain
should have memory? Not at all, I reply - only
when the environment is of a type in which the
future often copies the past; should the future
often be the inverse of the past, memory is actually
disadvantageous.
. .
As another example, what of the "organization" that
the biologist always points to with pride - the
development in evolution of specialized organs such
as brain, intestines, heart and blood vessels. Is
this not good? Good or not, it is certainly a spec-
ialization made possible only because the earth has
an atmosphere; without it, we would be incessantly
bombarded by tiny meteorites, any one of which, pass-
ing through our chest, might strike a large blood
vessel and kill us. . .Thus the development of organs
is not good unconditionally, but is a specialization
to a world free from flying particles.
2
In this spirit, then, we wish to stress that our typology and classification
sense.
13.1
,.l
^Ashby, W. R.
,
"Principles of the Self-Organizing System" in Buckley,
Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientist
,
(Chicago: Aldine,
1968), p. 112.
^
Ibid
.
,
pp. 112-113.
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of systems is descriptive and not evaluative. A learning system is in no
absolute sense better than an adjusting system; a complex system is not
better than a simple system. When we describe schools and students as
learning systems, we are not patting them on the back or asserting that
the things they learn will necessarily be true, good, or beautiful. We
are merely saying that they have certain properties which distinguish them
from other kinds of systems, and that it is useful to understand these
properties if one is dealing with them.
13. lA Following Ashby’s approach, we can say that there is no such
thing as "good school organization," in an absolute sense, although we
must be careful not to follow him too far down this road. If a school is
intentionally attempting to reshape its environment, to be an "agent of
social change," it may be that its internal organization is deliberately
chosen to be at varience with the environment’s organization. One thinks
of the rural schools in North Dakota consciously creating classrooms
distinctively richer and more complex than the social environments they
serve. The impetus for this particular organization comes not from the
immediate environments of the schools but rather from a localized inten-
tion of the New School at the University of North Dakota to "change" the
environment by changing the schools which both create and reflect the
environment they inhabit. There are many such examples of schools which
intentionally create organization which appears maladapted to their part-
icular environment, although in other environments they might appear highly
adaptive. The survival of such schools over time is by no means assured,
and not infrequently they succumb in a state of crisis and recrimination.
Roland Barth describes an instance of several Harvard graduate students
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attempting to introduce open classrooms into an inner-city Boston school.^
In retrospect, their failure can be ascribed to a combination of naivete,
stupidity, and insensitivity, but even had they been more sophisticated,
thoughtful, and sensitive it is unlikely that their efforts would have
been successful, since they were so clearly an intrusion into a functioning
system with a very different mode of organization which, for better or
worse, was well-adapted to its environment. One is tempted to use the
analogy of the body’s rejection of an organ transplant, although it is not
entirely apt. To the extent that some transplants are not rejected, the
operation may be worth the risk in the light of the alternative, but the
rate of success is not reassuring. The problem with so many major innova-
tions in schools is that reformers assume that because schools are "bad"
in some sense they are also mal-adapted to their environment; thus they
see no need to make efforts to reduce the risks of rejection. Survival
may not be the highest purpose the school reformers aspire to, but it is
a necessary, if not sufficient, prerequisite if any higher purposes are to
be served.
13. IB A thoughtful, if somewhat cynical, school superintendent once
observed that the crucial turning point in a schoolchild's life is
Christmas vacation of the second grade. It is at that point that the
difference between work and play becomes crystal clear, and work becomes
closely identified with reading. If he can read, he knows that if he works
the chances of his future success in school are good; if he can't read,
he realizes that there isn't much point in working; his chances for success
In a talk at a NESDEC Conference, Newton, Mass., March 23, 1972.
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are minimal. For both the reader and the non-reader, reading, work, and
school tend to go together, as do ”not-reading,'' play, and vacation.
Although this is an overstatement, I do not think it is wrong. We know
that early readers are not necessarily better readers later in life, but
it is probably true that children who learn to read before reading becomes
the primary mode of learning in school will read more for pleasure and
personal enrichment than those for whom reading is primarily associated with
formal classroom learning. We know, too, that success in reading is highly
correlated with success in school, and that success in school is highly
correlated to subsequent success in school. One would like to think that
success in school is also correlated to success in life, but this is a
dubious proposition if one goes beyond measurements
. of income and status
into more subjective areas. We would like to think that success in school
is correlated with happiness, creativity, productivity, co-operation, and
wisdom, but the evidence is not reassuring. The student who succeeds in
school is not necessarily going to be happy, creative, productive, co-
operative, or wise; he is likely to be able to read. As particular class-
rooms change their organization by emphasizing the importance of other
input sources besides books and worksheets, and other output behaviors be-
sides writing and speaking, they may, ironically, be increasing the like-
lihood of success in life while decreasing the likelihood of subsequent
success in school. In any case, the successful student is a learning
system who can adapt his level of organization to the requirements of his
classroom.
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13.2 s^sten^ devej^ ^ the direction of: a) more differen-
tiation ^ subsystems; b) more decentralization of decision-making :
c) mo^ ijiterdependence of subsystems
; d) more elaborate adjustment
£rocesses ; and e) sharper subsystem boundaries .'^ Miller’s criteria above
pretty well characterize the notion of organized complexity. A system which
manifests these characteristics is developing in the direction of increas-
ing organization. A system which does not manifest these characteristics
is probably not a learning system. A system which manifests the reverse
characteristics, i.e. in which subsystems are becoming less differentiated,
more independent, and less distinguishable, is moving towards decreasing
organization, and, at a certain point, will no longer be a system. If one
of the above characteristics is observable, it is likely that most of the
other characteristics are also present. In other words, if the observer
notices more differentiation of subsystems, he can expect to find that the
subsystems are more interdependent - that the state of any given, subsystem is
constrained by the state of other subsystems. If he notices that subsystem
boundaries are becoming sharper and more easily defined, he can expect to
find that the decider Subsystem of the whole system is laterally dispersed
among many components and that, therefore, information input is subject
to increasing numbers of boundary and filter processes and is subject to
greater systematic distortion. One further implication of this proposition
is that the more the system grows in the direction of organized complexity,
the more difficult it becomes to have a sense of the system as a whole.
The sharper the subsystem boundaries become, the vaguer and more diffuse
^from Miller, J.G.,
vol. 16, 1971, p. 297.
"The Nature of Living Systems," Behavioral Science ,
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the boundaries of the whole system become, and the more difficult it is
for the analyst or change agent to deal with the system as a "thing" rather
than a confederation of things. Conceptually, it becomes easier - and
analytically it makes more sense - to treat the more sharply defined and
differentiated subsystem as the system we are looking steadily at, and to
treat the rest of the system as environment.
13. 2A We shall in this section give brief examples of Miller's five
characteristics as applied to schools.
a) more differentiation of subsystems - As schools grow in population
and as knowledge increases, several kinds of increasing differentiation
occur. Teachers become more specialized in subject areas, and schools
become departmentalized into semi-autonomous departments. Specialists in
administration, curriculum, and psychology become regular members of
schools' hierarchial staffs. Business managers deal with matter-energy
maintenance inputs and outputs.
b) more decentralization of decision-making - As subsystems become
more differentiated, the decider subsystems play a greater role in deter-
mining what inputs to send to the decider subsystem of the whole system. If
we assume that in most schools the decider subsystem is localized in the
principal, the information he receives is Increasingly selective and in-
creasingly distorted. His decisions will be subject to the decisions of
many others as to what information he should have and in what form that
information should be transmitted to him. No matter how highly centralized
the decisionmaking process may appear to be, and no matter how routinized
the formal communication channels may be, the decentralization of decision-
making is a necessary concomitant of increasing organized complexity.
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ir^terdependence of subsystems - Specialization and interde-
pendence develop concomitantly as schools grow more complex. However, we
must keep xn mind the distinction between components and subsystems when
thinking about interdependence in schools; subsystems may be differentiated
without being localized in particular individuals or groups of individuals.
A school may consist of a number of self-contained classrooms and still
manifest increasing interdependence of subsystems. As specialization
increases, schools tend to place more emphasis upon the "inter-” and less
emphasis upon the "-dependence." The plethera of specialists frequently
has little actual effect upon the interactions taking place in schools,
even though the "team" approach is frequently used to deal with curri-
culum and personnel. The increasing number of specialists requires
increasing numbers of meetings of people increasingly unable to talk with
one another using a common technical vocabulary. The concerns of the
school psychometrist and the guidance counsellor and the classroom
teacher become increasingly separated from one another. The classroom
teacher accuses the counsellor of being unconcerned with a particular be-
havior problem she cannot cope with; the counsellor accuses the classroom
teacher of being insensitive to the needs of the child; they both accuse
the psychometrist of being concerned only with research and statistics.
In schools, as in society as a whole, interdependence based upon special-
ization produces stress, conflict, misunderstanding, and resentment
quite different from the abstracted picture of the team approach - happy
specialists working together, sharing their expertise, and solving prob-
lems to their mutual satisfcation. It is not surprising that schools, as
society as a whole, are currently undergoing a reaction against special-
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ization. The movement towards "community" in schools is a movement away
from increased dif fentiation
; all members of a community are expected to
deal with the total range of inputs, both signal and maintenance. There
are no domains reserved for administration or governance; the whole com-
munity becomes involved with such domains; expertise is an object of
suspicion. From a systems point of view, this is a movement away from
the interdependence of differentiated subsystems and towards the inter-
dependence of undifferentiated components, each of which combines the
subsystem process of the whole within itself. If all members of a school
community are equally responsible for administrative and curricular deci-
sions, for establishing priorities and policies, the physical and temporal
proximity of the members becomes crucial, as does the size of the commun-
ity. Communities of undifferentiated members must be relatively small,
and closely bound in time and space, or interdependence is lost and the
system as a whole becomes fragmented and factionalized
. In human systems,
then, personal knowledge and personal contact among components is essen-
tial when subsystem processes are shared and diffused, whether or not they
are differentiated. Interdependence under these conditions is fragile
and precarious. The more totipotential components become, the less they
need or desire other components to survive. It is no wonder, then, that
schools which attempt to diffuse subsystem processes laterally in the
name of "community" are prone to fragmentation and conflict when their
membership grows too large or too dispersed over space.
d) more elaborate adjustment processes - We refer here not only to
the adaptation of the school to its environment but also to the internal
adjustment processes which must occur with increasing specialization and
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interdependence. A mundane example would be the problem of scheduling in
a school wherein different individuals have special functions in dealing
with a common school population. Not only is the creation of a schedule
a specialized administrative function, but the schedule itself must reflect
the special needs of the specialists. In a school where all classes
regardless of subject or organization meet the same number of times and
class periods are all the same length, this is merely a problem of avoid-
ing as many conflicts as possible in scheduling classes. But when time
itself is a variable - when different classes have different schedules -
the internal adjustments become exceedingly complex, and frequently com-
puters must be called upon to create a master schedule. In the inter-
personal domain, too, adjustment processes must become more elaborate.
As soon as schools acknowledge that both students and teachers have
different learning, teaching, and personal styles, the process of "match-
ing" these styles becomes very intricate. Ability grouping is a common
adjustment process employed by schools when the population becomes large
enough! to allow such differentiation. Sex and age groupings are, of
course, so common in schools that it may be difficult to see them as
adjustment processes. All grouping, whether by subject, age, sex,
ability, or interest, is an adjustment to the increasing complexity of
system organization. That the rationale for various kinds of grouping
are of questionable educational validity does not question their efficacy
as internal adjustment processes. As'^the growth of the system makes pos-
sible greater variety of adjustment process, so does it require more
elaborate adjustment processes to deal with the greater range of variety
in the system. At the same time, this increased adjustment flexibility
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of the school as a whole is at the expense of diminished adjustment flex-
ibility of the components, whether individuals, classes, or other groupings.
A school consisting of undifferentiated, quasi-autonomous self-contained
classrooms does not require elaborate adjustment processes, but the oppor-
tunxty for elaborate adjustment processes within each of these classrooms
is great. On the other hand, a school with highly differentiated and inter-
dependent classes requires - and is capable of elaborate adjustment proces-
ses, while the adjustment processes of each of these classrooms is greatly
constrained.
e) sharper subsystem boundaries - Schools have typically not sharpened
their subsystem boundaries to the same extent that they have sharpened
the distinctions among components. Particularly if the area of information
subsystem processes, the school by necessity continues to combine and
laterally disperse these processes among its components. Since we have
dealt with this issue extensively in secs. 9.27 - 9.37, we shall not repeat
it here. It is worth noting again, however, that the formal organization
of the school as an institution, as reflected in organizational charts
and job descriptions rarely reflects the actual organization of the school
as a concrete system. The formal organization will frequently suggest
sharper subsystem boundaries than in fact exist. l*Jhile this is true to
some extent of all human organizations, in few organizations is the
functional infra-structure more at variance with the formal structure than
it is in schools. Many analysts have seen this as pathological, and
have attempted to reduce the inconcruence between the formal and functional
organization of the school by sharpening subsystem boundaries. Whether
or not this would be desireable, it does not seem possible without changing
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the school Into an adjustment system. No human organisation which attempts
to deal with human beings as totlpotentlal systems without Itself being
a totlpotentlal system can do this. In this regard, It Is Instructive to
compare the public school with other instructional or training contexts
in which both formal and functional subsystem boundaries are sharper. The
army provides such a context. It is a totipotential system which deals
with human beings as partipotential systems. Its training is for immediate
and specific purposes, and its hierarchial organization sharply defines
subsystem boundaries. Soldiers are trained for very specific functions
within the whole, and these functions are clearly related to specific
subsystemf processes
. While all soldiers receive an initial basic training,
subsequent training is highly specialized according to which subsystem
process the individual is participating in. Typically, information pro-
cessing and matter-energy processing are both hierarchically organized
but are rarely combined. Personnel in the motor pool and the warehouse
will have totally different jobs than personnel in the orderly room or
intelligence office. In all subsystems, decision-making is highly
localized, while at each echelon there is a specifically delineated
sphere of responsibility and power. Those responsible for maintaining
records have no responsibility for decoding or encoding the information
in those records, and so forth. There is something seductive about such
a highly organized system; it appears to be efficient and productive.
Schools frequently aspire towards such ai model in the name of efficiency
and productivity. Without arguing the case as to whether the army is in
fact efficient and productive, we can nonetheless state that its organiza-
tion is based upon the assumption that its personnel are partipotential
—
162
13 . 2Ae
that they are trained to perform rigidly circumscribed functions, and that
the individuality of the role incumbants, to the extent that it cannot be
eliminated, is made irrelevant to the performance of their duties. This
would appear to be a pre-requisite of sharply defined subsystem boundaries.
In system terms, we can say that the more sharply defined these boundaries,
the less the vairiey in the system, and the less the variety in the system,
the less it will be able to adapt to Increasing variety in the field.
This is an essential reason why military and, for that matter, industrial
models are inappropriate for comprehensive public schools which take
seriously the job of educating individuals rather than role incumbants.
13. 2B Most of the evidence in support of this proposition at the
level of the organism comes from neuro-physiology and neuro-psychology
and is beyond the competence of this paper to deal with. Moreover, that
human beings develop in these directions is generally agreed upon by
specialist and non-specialist alike. Since this is essentially a morpho-
genic process, one which follows inexorably from the organismic template,
we shall not elaborate upon these characteristics here but shall accept
them as "givens” and shall comment upon their implications for the student
in secion 13. 6B.
13.3 "The capacity of a complex organization to learn depends upon
a) the quantity and variety of information stored in the system;
b) the structure of the communications network ;
c) the pattern of the subsystems within the whole ;
d) the number
,
location
,
and function of negative feedback loops
in the system and the amount of time-lag in them ;
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e) the nature of the system's memory facility
;
f ) t^ operating rules
,
or program
, determining the system's struc-
ture and behavior
, including ;
1) rules . . . determining range of inputs
,
2) rules ^sponsible for the routing of information throughout
the network
,
3) rules about the identification
, analysis
,
and classification
of information
,
4) priority rules for input
,
analysis
,
storage
,
and output
,
5) rules governing feedback mechanisms
,
6) instructions for storage in system's memory
,
7) rules regarding the synthesis of information for the output
of the system .
Cadwallader's admirable synthesis provides a useful analytic tool for look-
ing steadily at systems which manifest the characteristics noted in 13.2.
Analysis is made easier by focusing strictly upon internal system organ-
ization and disregarding system-environment interaction. Analysis is made
more difficult by the fact that in concrete systems each of these areas
of focus is systemically related to all others and cannot really be
analysed separately. Nonetheless, each of them suggests useful questions
the analyst can ask, and we shall examine them seriatem .
13.4 The quantity and variety of information stored in the system .
Deutsch suggests three kinds of information which a complex system must
store if it is to be able to learn: 1) information of the world outside;
^Cadwallader
,
Mervyn L., "The Cybernetic Analysis of Change in Complex
Social Organizations," in Buckley, Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral
Scientist
,
(Chicago: Aldine, 1968), p. 439.
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2) information from the past, with a wide range or recall and recombination;
and 3) information about itself and its own parts. ^ Information of the
world outside comes from inputs; some inputs are acted upon immediately
and produce outputs with little time-lag; some inputs are acted upon but
are also stored for future use; some inputs are stored without being acted
upon. Information from the past was originally brought into the system
the input transducers but was stored in either the long-term memory or
external memory for future use (see sec. 13.8). It thus is the basis of
the system's "image" (13.9) of reality, against which subsequent input is
evaluated and upon which subsequent input is mapped. The range of recall
and recombination will depend in large, measure upon the ability of the sys-
tme to break up stored information into smaller discrete chunks. This is
the job of the associator subsystem. The third kind of information is
uniquely associated with human systems and implies a certain level of
consciousness that does not exist in any non-living system and only in
a few non-human systems. Awareness of "self" is essential for any system
whose self-regulation extends beyond physiological homeostasis. Further-
more, systems which have the capacity for self-awareness must use this
information if they are to learn and survive. As an example, we can point
to the relationship between hunger and nutrition. All sentient systems
will "feel" hunger and will eat to satiation. In systems without the
capacity for self-awareness, diet and nutrition are homeostatically con-
trolled; an animal will eat only what his system needs and only as much
as his system needs. The same is true of human infants, to a large
^mentioned by Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory , (Engle-
wood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 56.
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extent. However, as consciousness and self-awareness develop, human beings
must apply them to this basic physiological area. Proper diet is no
longer something which the body itself regulates. Human beings can overeat
and can have nutritionally deficient diets. If a system, therefore, has
the capacity for processing information about itself, it must do so.
13. 4A The school stores a vast quantity and variety of information
in a great many different forms. Each human component of the schools
is a repository of information from the world outside; the school's
library and archives contain large amounts of information from its past.
The school also has a quantity of information about itself and its parts,
although this Information is so dispersed among the components that it
is more difficult to Identify. It is also difficult to validate this kind
of information; the school’s consciousness of itself may be at varience
with the perceptions of its components or of those in its environment,
just as an individual's view of himself may be at varience with the views
others may have of him. Nonetheless, the school as a system acts upon the
basis of its self-awareness, and anyone who would wish to change a school
must first change the school’s image of itself.
13. 4B Of the student in the school we can say much the same as we have
said of the school, although the range of individual differences will be
greater than the range of differences among schools. All students pro-
cess information from the world outside, although l the range and variety
of that information will vary significantly from student to student accord-
ing to the acuity of their sensory apparatus. All students have memories
which store information from the past. The capacity of the memory sub-
system not only varies individually, but also varies with age, as does the
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associator subsystem. The capacity of the student to abstract properties
of phenomena, essential to recombination, is developmental, and while all
students will develop it, not all will develop equal facility or predispos-
ition to do so. It is the third kind of information, again, that appears
to be crucial. "Self-image" and "self-concept" have become such overused
terms that it is important to emphasize that they have a specific place
in systems thinking which extends beyound how a person "feels" about him-
self to what a person knows about himself. The two, of course, are closely
related; the information a person receives about himself through his
engagement with his social and physical environment will be the basis of
both his thinking and feeling about himself. However, his ability to
learn depends upon his consciousness of his self-concept, and the degree
of consciousness will vary tremendously from person to person. "Self-
consciousness" is not generally considered to be a deslreable trait; the
person who dwells excessively upon his self is frequently considered
"poorly adjusted." Our culture prizes the extrovert over the introvert.
This is particularly true of children, since self-consciousness in young
children is unusual and frequently symptomatic of incipient pathology.
We want children to have a "positive" self-image, but we do not want
them to be conscious of it. Neither conceit nor inferiority seems
appropriate for school-age children. Schools have thus stressed competence
rather than identity as the basis for self-concept, and the information
a student stores about his self is information about what he can do,
rather than what he is. The effect of this frequently is to reinforce
areas of greater competence and to constrain the development of areas of
lesser competence. This approach to self-concept thus serves to con-
strain the range and variety of information from the outside world and
from the past which is likely to be stored in the system.
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13.5 structure £f the communication network - We have already
seen (9.29) that the processing of information inputs depends upon the
particular configuration of the network of channels, their capacities and
characteristics. The capacity of a complex organization to learn depends
upon its ability to regulate the flow of information and to monitor the
reliability of its channels. Since complex organizations will have mul-
tiple overlapping channels, and since human organizations will have both
formal and informal channels, such regulation will always be difficult
and will never be total. Not only will the communication network be
subject to systematic distortion, but the informal channels will frequently
operate out of the range of awareness so that they are less controllable.
Formal communication channels are generally verbal, oral or written,
while informal channels are frequently non-verbal and non-intentional
.
If there is incongruence between the verbal and the non-verbal communica-
tions being sent simultaneously, we generally take the non-verbal commun-
ications more seriously, precisely because they are less subject to
the conscious control of the sender. We familiarly recognize this discre-
pency by exhorting others to "do as I say, not as I do,” but most of us
still remain largely unaware of the discrepancies between our own verbal
and non-verbal behavior.
13. 5A Schools generally pay strict attention to the structuring of
the formal, verbal communication network and pay very little attention to
the informal, non-verbal communication network which overlaps the formal
channels. "Official” communications are put forth in written memos or
bulletins and disseminated to the appropriate individuals. Teachers
regulate formal communication in classrooms by recognizing raised hands
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and by prohibiting unrecognized verbal communication. Communication net-
works in small groups have been extensively studied by social scientists,
and while such networks as teacher talk in the Teacher's Lounge and student
talk over the lunch table are not "official," their typologies have been
so well documented by small-group theorists that they must be considered
formal. It is the "silent language"^ of non-verbal behavior which is so
generally ignored in schools. All behavior communicates; it is impossible
not to communicate. As Hall has persuasively pointed out, "time talks,"
and "space speaks;" how we organize time and space in schools is a potent
form of non-verbal communication. We shall not enlarge upon this topic
here, since it is so large, but we shall reiterate that the non-verbal
communication in schools is so frequently at variance with the verbal com-
munication that what is often described as a "lack" of communication is
instead a multiplicity of overlapping, incongruent messages. As a con-
sequence of this, the capacity of the school to act upon any specific
information is constrained by the simultaneous transmission of contradic-
tory or incongruent information. The resulting ambiguity vitiates the
value of transmitted information. From- a systems viewpoint, ambiguity
inhibits learning; in any situation which allows a variety of interpre-
tations of available information, the system will invariably select the
interpretation which is most comfortable and familiar and which requires
the least strain. Life may be full of ambiguous situations, but they do
not tend to be the situations from which we learn.
13. 5B The first job of the student in the classroom is to discover
which of the myriad messages he receives simultaneously he should pay
^Hall, Edward T., The Silent Language , (Greenwich: Fawcett, 1959).
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attention to. He quickly learns that what the teacher says or does is
more important than what his classmates say or do; he also learns that
what the teacher says may or may not be more important than what the
teacher does. Outside the classroom, the reverse is generally true; what
his classmates say or do is more important than what his teacher has said
or done. Likewise, in the classroom eyes and ears, rather than nose,
tongue, or hand, will be the important input transducers; the student must
learn to ignore information from these sense organs. The student is
always processing information carried by multiple channels simultaneously.
Messages are always tri-partite: they have a "content" dimension, a
"metacommunication" dimension, and a "relationship" dimension. That is
to say, they are about "something," they are about "themselves," and they
are about the relationship between the sender and the receiver. Conven-
tional discussions of communication processes concentrate on the "content"
dimension. "Information," in its colloquial usage refers to the "some-
thing" the message purports to be about. The other two dimensions, however,
are less frequently remarked upon, and because they are always present,
they deserve close attention. Furthermore, because they are frequently
non-verbal, they tend to be out of the sender's awareness, although not
out of the receiver's awareness. Any theory which focuses on "intentional"
message-sending and neglects "non-intentional" message sending is dealing
with an abstracted notion of communications networks, not a concrete
notion. Intentional and non-intentional messages are always sent simul-
taneously; the non-intentional messages are usually non-verbal, metacommun-
icational, and dealing with the relationship between sender and receiver.
Metacommunication says of the message content that it is important or
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unimportant, serious or humorous, fact or opinion, certain or dubious,
interesting or uninteresting, statement or question, demand or request,
and so forth. Metacommunication is rarely verbal; we may occasionally
preface a message with a metacommunicational comment, as when a teacher
says "this is important," or when President Nixon says "let me make one
thing perfectly clear," but more usually metacommunication is accomp-
lished through inflection, intonation, stress, gesture, and timing. If
the metacommunication is congruent with the content, it provides powerful
reinforcement of that content; if it incongruent, it can lead to confusion
and anxiety in the receiver. A joke told with a straight face may or may
not be a joke; should one laugh? Sarcasm is a weapon in the arsenal
of many a teacher. How is the student to interpret a sarcastic comment?
A lecture full of brilliant insights delivered in a flat, monotonous style
provides metacommunicational incongruence which students are quick to
perceive. When there is incongruence between content and metacommunica-
tion, it is the latter which has the greater potency. The third dimension
of messages, the relationship dimension, is equally potent. Every message
implies a particular relationship between sender and receiver; relation-
ships are construed either as symmetrical or complementary. In complemen-
tary relationships, one part holds the super-ordinate position and the
other party hold the subordinate position. The two parties may or may not
agree about the nature of their relationship, but every message sent
between them will include their perceptions of their relationship. Again,
this is rarely verbal or intentional, although in times of stress or
crisis it may become so. If students question the authority of the teacher
or dean, the content of their messages may in fact be their relationship.
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but more generally the relationship dimension of messages is implicit
rather than explicit. The person making a demand of another is concomit-
antly asserting his right to make that demand. The other, by acquiescing,
confirms the right of the first to make demands, or by not acquiescing,
challenges that right. Leadership may be asserted by one party, but it
may either be confirmed or rejected by the subordinate party. Students
are continually processing all three dimensions of messages, whether or
not intentional, and whether or not verbal. If they are incongruent, the
student as a learning system may well learn more from the metacommunica-
tional and relationship dimensions than from the content dimension.
13.6 The pattern of the subsystems within the whole - It will be
helpful to think of two prototypical systems; in the first, subsystem
processes are highly localized in discrete components, while in the second,
subsystem processes are widely dispersed and combined among the compon-
ents. It is easy to see both the advantages and the disadvantages of
both kinds of organization. The first has the advantages of efficiency,
speed, and uniformity. Each component, having a specialized sub-
system function, can concentrate its energies on the performance of that
function without being distracted. Decision-making for the whole sys-
tem is highly centralized; decisions can be made quickly and dissemin-
ated with a high degree of accuracy. Both matter-energy and Information
inputs can be regulated and allocated with efficiency and dispatch.
System malfunctions can be quickly identified, located, and repaired.
Job descriptions can be specified with a minimum of confusion and ambiguity.
When such a system is working well, it is working very well, indeed.
The disadvantages, however, are concomitants of their advantages. Such
systems rarely work well, since the malfunction of a single component will
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jeopardize the performance of a critical subsystem process. Highly special
ized systems are so highly constrained that the performance of each sub-
system is 'dependent upon the performance of all other subsystems, and
when these subsystems are localized in single components, a malfunctioning
component will affect the entire system. Such systems are, therefore,
vulnerable and fragile; they are dependent upon maintenance inputs to
maintain the components in working order and upon boundary processes to
filter out any inputs which might jeopardize the functioning of the compo-
nents. At the other extreme is the second propotypical system in which
subsystem processes are widely dispersed and combined. This system has
the advantages of dependability, flexibility, adaptability and durability.
Because it is not dependent on discrete components for the performance of
specific subsystem processes, the malfunction of particular components
will not so easily jeopardize the performance of the system as a whole.
Because individual components are involved in more than one subsystem
process they can allocate their attention and energy to different tasks
depending upon the exigencies of the moment. Such systems are capable of
maintaining steady states in a wide variety of environmental conditions,
since components will be capable of different lines of behavior. If the
needs of the situation require extreme boundary vigilance, the system
can deploy its components to boundary maintenance. If the needs of the
situation require greater decoding capacity, the system’s components can
all participate in this process. Because the system has the flexibility
to re-organize itself as needed, its ability to survive and function is
enhanced; it can endure. Such systems have significant disadvantages,
however. They tend to be inefficient; while they will dependably perform
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at a satisfactory level, they will rarely perform at an optimal level.
The energies and attention of components are too diffused and changeable
to allow for more than a portion of their time to be devoted to any given
task. They tend to be slow; the decision-making process is the clearest
example of this. When decision-making about the system as a whole is
diffused among many components the process is cumbersome and time-consum-
ing without any guarantee that the decision will be better for the situa-
tion at hand. Such systems, when they do malfunction, are difficult to
repair. They are not susceptible to either analysis or testing, since the
components are only minimally constrained. Any dysfunction might well
reside in many places or in many relationships among the components.
Finally, such systems have so many modes of critical interaction that they
are less likely to adapt speedily to new situations presented by the
environment. Their very cohesiveness mitigates against significant alter-
ation in their internal organization. Most systems fall midway between
the two extremes described above and will have, to some degree, the
advantages and disadvantages of both. In terms of learning, it is not
possible to give priority to one type of organization over the other. The
first may have the advantage in terms of executive decision-making, while
the second may be better able to integrate new patterns of behavior
throughout the system. The first may have a more specialized and elabor-
ate memory facility with a more efficient recall capacity, while the
second may have an associator subsystem with greater creative potential.
As we have seen in 13.2, as systems develop, they tend to become more
like the first prototype. Whether or not this is desireable, or course
depends upon the nature of the environment, as Ashby points out.
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13. 6A Schools vary widely in their patterns of sub-system alloca-
tion (9.16-9.34). To some extent, pattern of allocation will be correlated
with size; a small school will necessarily tend towards more combined
subsystems while a large school will tend towards more localized sub-
systems. The fabled one-room school house, in which the teacher would come
in early in the morning to stoke the furnace, go out to drive the school
bus and return to teach all subjects to all pupils, would be at one extreme
of the continuum; the large comprehensive high school, highly depart-
mentalized with a wide range of special services would be at the other end.
However, as we have seen in Chapter Nine, regardless of how localized
and specialized subsystem processes may appear to be from an organizational
chart, the actual allocation of significant subsystem processes is highly
combined and dispersed, moreso than in other kinds of human organizations
with which schools are frequently compared and from which organizational
theory is largely derived. As long as schools deal globally with compre-
hensive inputs and intend to transmit, as outputs, "educated men," their
real organization as concrete systems will be at variance with their
formal organizations. In terms of their defined functions, they will
be partipotential systems, sharing the education of their students with
the society as a whole. The effort to more closely relate the school to
the larger community it serves is thus more than a rhetorical flourish;
it is an expression of an educational reality. As long as the education
of children takes place both in and out of schools, the school is only
a part of the concrete educational system for any given child. What this
means practically is that the techniques of management, planning, budgeting,
and producing which are appropriate for organizations tending towards the
175
13. 6A
first prototype will be less appropriate for schools. PPBS, for example,
may be an excellent management tool for organizations whose subsystems are
highly localized, but it will be exceedingly difficult to apply honestly
to organizations in which these processes are combined and dispersed.
13.6b Physiologically, the human organism includes both combined
and localized subsystem processes dealing with matter-energy inputs;
psychologically, the same statement may be made about the processing of
information inputs. In thinking about the student as a learning system,
however, we shall be more interested with how he organizes the information
he processes. We shall avoid a neuropsychological discussion not by choice
but by necessity as beyond our competence at this time. It is possible
to say, though, that there does appear to be neuropsychological evidence
g
to support the important assertions made in this section. We shall
begin by suggesting that two types of learning must co-exist in a learn-
ing system. We shall call one type "reactive" learning and we shall
call the other type "pro-active" learning. Reactive learning requires
the existence in the environment of a stimulus which elicits some line of
behavior not already in the system’s repetoire. When the system discovers
the behavior that reduces or eliminates the stress or strain presented
by that stimulus, it has learned, and presumably whenever that stimulus
reappears it will "trigger" the successfully learned behavior, unless
the behavior has been forgotten, in which case it must be relearned. The
frequency with which the stimulus reappears in the environment will in
large measure determine whether or not the behavior is forgotten or stored
^see Pribram, Karl H.
,
Languages of the Brain , (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1971).
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in the system's memory. Reactive learning is stimulus-dependent; without
the concrete presence of the stimulus in the environment the learning will
not occur. Most formal schooling calls for reacive learning. The stimulus
is provided by the teacher or curriculum materials; the student provides
the appropriate line of behavior, whether novel or familiar. Reiteration
of the stimulus elicits repetition of the successful behavior. Generaliza-
tion and abstraction are developed as the student discovers that a given
line of behavior will successfully respond to more than one stimulus, and
that more than one line of behavior will successfully respond to a given
stimulus. Depending upon the frequency with which stimuli are likely to
recur in the environment, reactive learning can be a sufficient mode of
adaptation for a learning system. It is essentially a problem-solving
mode and is appropriate to situations which are problematical. One the
other hand, "pro-active" learning occurs in the absence of concrete
stimuli in the environment, and, as far as we know, is limited to only a
few species of living systems. Most of what we refer to as "creativity"
is pro-active learning. The interior life of the mind which deals not
only with the here-and-now but also with the past and future, with
imagination and fantasy, is pro-active. We have commented throughout
this paper on the capacity of the learning system not only to map aspects
of the concrete environment into its internal organization but also to
project aspects of its interior representation on to the concrete environ-
ment. This is pro-active learning, and it is the way in which learning
systems compensate for deficits in their environments. The propensity
for investigation, invention, and discovery cannot adequately be explained
by any theory of learning which is predicated upon the presence of concrete
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stimuli in the concrete environment. Von Bertalanffy, in his oft-repeated
criticism of behaviorism, refers to the "robot model of human behavior"^
and includes in his indictment the S-R theories of Pavlov and Skinner,
the environmentalism of J. B. Watson, and even Freudian reductionism which
explains adult behavior on the basis of early childhood experiences.
Indeed, the theory of open systems was initially extended to human behavior
as an alternative to the "robot mod^l," just as in the biological sciences
it was an alternative to the equilibria! assumptions of closed systems
models. The question we must ask ourselves is what kind of system organ-
ization is most conducive to pro-active learning, one in which subsystem
functions are highly localized or one in which they are highly combined
and dispersed. We limit our discussion of information-processing, since
matter-energy processing is regulated largely by homeostatic mechnaisms.
We can point to two extreme kinds of information processing, similar to
the two prototypes discussed in 13.6. In the first kind, in which sub-
system processes are highly localized, all sorts of information enters
the system. What reaches the memory are highly diverse and varied data
which
,
depending upon the memory’s storage capacity, are available to the
associator and the decider subsystems for use in constructing the internal
representation of reality. This internal representation is likely to be
rich in detail and rich in potential for association. It is also likely
to contain more information than, oat any given time, the system is likely
to use, although at any given time there is more information available for
^von Bertalanffy, Ludwig, General System Theory , (New York: Braziller,
1968), p. 188.
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use than is present in the immediate environment. There is more likelihood
for unique associations of seemingly unrelated data and thus more likeli-
hood for creative and fresh internal representations of reality. The
student, therefore, who is capable of processing and storing a wide variety
of potentially although not immediately useful or pertinent information
is more likely to have that information available at a time when it is
useful and relevant, even if it does not pertain to the environment as
it exists at that time. Contrast this student with one at the other
extreme. His input transducers are highly selective and admit only
information pertinent to the situation at hand. He is a "focuser" not a "scan
ner." His senses are disciplined to exclude the extraneous. Sense-data are
classified by the time they reach the brain. These built-in classification
schemes restrict the data that the associator subsystem can process. The
second student’s memory may have just as great a capacity as the first
student’s has, and there may be just as much data stored in it. However,
the data are so highly organized into such rigid classification schemes
that the possibility of novel or fresh associations is minimal. While
both of these examples are extreme. Individuals do tend towards one
extreme or the other. Those tending towards the first type are more
likely to have the capacity for proactive learning than those tending
towards the second. Curriculum in schools tends to be highly compart-
mentalized. Math is math, and reading is reading. They are taught in
separate time periods and in different ways. The opportunity for the
student to discover that they are both symbol systems, both languages,
ordinarily does not exist in the classrooms. Even subjects that might seem
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to have an even greater natural affinity, like literature and social
studies, are ordinarily presented as separate domains. Life's experiences,
though, do not fall neatly into subject areas. The mind which is accus-
tomed to processing pre-classified data will have difficulty in processing
information which is not so neatly arranged.
13.7 The number
,
location
,
and function of negative feedback loops
in the system and the amount of time-lag in them. We recall from 10.3 and
10.11 that negative feedback is a portion of the system's output which
re-enters the system as information to regulate the system's subsequent
performance. Both adjustment and learning systems require negative
feedback, although while the adjustment system must act upon its feedback,
the learning system may choose not to act upon it. Without feedback,
however, the learning system could not distinguish between successful
and less successful behavior; it could not change its line of behavior to
accomodate a changing environment. Indeed, we are justified in claiming
that the ''feedback loop" is the basic behavioral element in a learning
system. If we recall Pask's contention (ll.lOA) that the least distin-
guishable or describable component of an active control system is also
an active control system, we are now in a position to identify this ele-
ment as a feedback loop. We can think of a learning system with its
critical subsystem processes as a set of Interrelated feedback loops
through which, at any level. Information about performance flows. Miller,
Galenter, and Pribram have called this feedback loop a TOTE unit,
"TOTE" standing for "Test-Operate-Test-Exit
.
^^Miller, George A., Galenter, Eugene, and Pribram, Karl H. , Plans and
the Structure of Behavior , (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960),
TTTT.
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The action is initiated by an ’incongruity* between the state of the
organism and the state that is being tested for, and the action persists
until the incongruity is removed. The advantage of thinking of the
feedback loop as a TOTE unit is that it can easily be applied to any
hierarchial level by considering the "Operate" phase to include as many
smaller TOTE units as is convenient for the inquiry.
11
Ibid
.
, pp . 25-26
.
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Miller, Galenter, and Pribram use the simple act of hammering a nail to
12illustrate
.
X ESr
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Of course, if the major activity were conceived as building a bookcase,
this whole TOTE unit would be one small part of the operational phase
of a much larger TOTE unit. The TOTE unit has another great advantage;
it need not be applied only to motor activities of the system. The "Test"
phase can be construed as developing a plan for behaving and the "Operate”
phase as executing that plan. Or the test phase can be construed as
developing the program which generated plans, while the operate phase
includes the plans thus generated. On whatever leve of generality we
may choose to apply the TOTE analysis the important feature is the circular
and reciprocal relationship between testing and operating. Over time,
the sequence always looks like this:
. .
.Test ^ Operate ^ Test > Operate ^ Test. . . .Exit
Two testing phases are always separated by an operational phase; two
operational phases are always separated by a testing phase. The time-lag
12
Ibid.
,
p . 36
.
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between the operational and testing phases thus becomes a crucial factor
in the performance of the system. If the time-lag is too great - part-
icularly between the operational and testing phases - the feedback will
effectively disappear and the system must perform without information
about the efficacy of its performance. There is no general rule to
determine the effects of time-lag. In some situations, writing a disser-
tation, for example, a certain time-lag is inevitable and, while frustrat-
ing, managable. Too great a time-lag, though, is counter-productive and
inefficient. In general, we can say that time-lag is least harmful in
situations where subsequent operations can be deferred without jeopar-
dizing the attainment of the desired state.
13. 7A Schools do not lack feedback loops; what they lack in many
instances is the capacity to improve their performance even with the
information that feedback provides. In terms of student performance, too
often the school will go through one TOTE cycle and then exit, regard-
less of the information that the student, or class, has not achieved the
desired congruence with the goal. Learning systems, we know, may choose
not to act upon feedback, although rarely do school people realize that
they have, in fact, made this choice. Frequently, too, schools couch
their goals and purposes in such global and amorphous terms that they
make it impossible for themselves to test their operations. The perfor-
mance objective movement has attempted to construe the learning process
in terms of specific TOTE units, and this is all to the good, although
proponents of this approach have too often focused so finely on specific
overt behaviors and have construed the conditions under which those be-
haviors are to occur so narrowly that they make it difficult for success-
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ful behaviors to become part of future operational phases in other TOTE
units. The main problem that schools have with feedback, then, is not
the lack of it but the lack of means to apply it to subsequent perfor-
mance
.
13. 7B The student in the school, on the other hand, has a very
different sort of problem. Students learn very early that the important
information is not feedback from their performance but feedback about
their performance from anotherr person, usually the teacher. Viewed one
way, this inhibits the development of TOTE units, since the "test" of
an operation is external to the system. Viewed another way, the test
becomes - not the success of the operation - but the attitude of the
teacher, the grade, or the gold star; the operation itself is externalized.
The student learns first to distrust and second to suspend his own judg-
ment or capacity to test his operations. What he has done is neither good
nor bad, right nor wrong, successful nor unsuccessful, until the teacher
has so indicated. Moreover, the pseudo-feedback the student receives from
the teacher rarely occurs at a point when it can do him any good. Evalu-
ation is too frequently at the end of a unit of instruction; tests may
indicate that a student has performed poorly, but by then it is too
late - the class has moved to another unit. The test phase of a TOTE
unit is diagnostic; the test phase in schooling is all too often
"terminal." Until students in schools can depend upon feedback from their
performance, the assumption that specific behaviors are the result of
learning is questionable at best.
13.8 The nature £f the system’s memory facility - Following Newell
and Simon, we postulate three kinds of memory, an internal Long-
^\ewell, Allen and Simon, Herbert A., Human Problem Solving^
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
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Term Memory (LTM)
,
an internal Short-Term Memory (STM)
,
and and External
Memory (EM). The LTM has, as far as we can tell, an infinite capacity
to store symbols and "chunks" (patterns of frequently associated symbols).
Information stored in the LTM is quickly accessible, although the process
of accession isi not understood. The learning system evidently does not
have to scan the LTM to have access to information stored in it.^^
Curiously, conscious attempts to scan the LTM, as when a person tries to
find the precise word he wants, or has a name "on the tip of his tongue,"
usually do not work; focussing on symbols in the LTM seems to make them
less accessible. Little is known about the capacity of information to
remain over long periods of time in the LTM. If it can be accessed, it
is, of course, there. If the human learning system is conscious of having
"forgotton" something, it may or many not be there, but at least some
chunk is there or the person would not know what it is he had forgotten.
At one time, I had in my LTM the names and dates of all the ancient kings
of Assyria. I no longer know them, but the fact that I was able to draw
from my LTM the category "ancient kinds of Assyria" to use as an example
here means that there is a residual chunk in my LTM. The names and
dates could be re-entered with ease.
The STM is the learning system’s working space. It has a very
limited capacity. George Miller suggests that the STM has a capacity to
store about seven symbols or chunks, and even this small number is
^^
Ibid
.
,
p. 793.
^^Miller, George A., The Psychology of Human Communication, (Baltimore:
Penguin, 1969).
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reduced to about two if other information processes are interposed between
presentation and recall. Fortunately, information can be retrieved and
returned to the LTM with ease and rapidity, so over time the information
in the STM can be very great, even though at any given time it is very
small. Information in the STM decays rapidly. Whether the decay is a
time-dependent process, or whether it is due to the interference among
symbols in the STM is a matter of controversy among psychologists.^^
There is no doubt, though, that the storing of information in the STM
over time requires conscious rehearsal (what we call memorization), and
that when the information is not needed it decays rapidly. It is not
necessarily true that information processed in the STM is stored in the
LTM even if it has been assiduously memorized. Nor does it appear to be
true that all information stored in the LTM must enter it through the
STM. We can, however, offer the hypothesis that as long as the informa-
tion is being used in an uncompleted TOTE it will remain accessible to
the STM. Put another way, as long as a system is executing a plan, the
information it needs to execute that plan will remain available to it,
even if the execution is interrupted or deferred. The capacity of a
learning system to construe particular plans as sub-units of larger plans
will thus inhibit the decay of information and maintain its accessibility.
External Memory (EM) resides outside the system and may be as simple
as a piece of paper and pencil or as complex as the New York Public
Library. EM is an auxilliary of the STM and compensates for the STM's
16
Newell and Simon, cit . , p. 795
17
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limited capacity. Certain kinds of tasks, which could be carried out by
the LTM and STM exclusively are made much easier and quicker with the help
of EM. As an example, the computation "7 x 6" can be retrieved from the
LTM immediately whenever it is needed. The problem ”42 x 6” can be worked
out by the STM withou the aid of EM, although it will take more time and
the probability of error is greater. The problem "252 x 46" could, with
considerable difficulty be worked out without EM, although the difficulty
in remembering the intermediate products illustrates the limited capacity
of the STM. The problem-solver would have to work hard to remember the
intermediate steps, since subsequent processing would tend to obliterate
the previously arrived at product. The problem "11592 x 252" could prob-
ably not be accomplished without the aid of EM unless the problem-solver
had a heuristic for reducing the over twenty-five separate products and
sums to approximately seven. With paper and pencil, however, this becomes
a trivial task. It is, of course, possible to store limitless information
in the EM and transfer information from the STM to the EM. Retrieval of
information from the EM depends upon the size of the relevant EM and its
organization. A book without an index, or a library without a cross-
referenced subject catalogue, makes information retrieval from the EM
cumbersome and time-consuming. Newell and Simon point out that viewed
functionally, the STM is both the internal STM and that portion of the EM
18
available to the system at any given time. That is to say, that the sys-
t^Tft's memory facility should be construed to include the EM. To expect
all information used by the STM to come from the LTM is foolish.
18
Ibid
. ,
p . 801
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13.8a Most schools are foolish. School people appear to feel that
there is greater virtue in having the names and dates of the Assyrian
monarchs in the LTM than having this information in the EM. Their folly
is compounded by their assumption that the presence of such information
in the STM at a given time (when the unit test is given, for example)
indicates its presence in the LTM. In an age of such information overload,
it seems ludicrous to expect learning systems to store vast data in their
LTMs. What we can expect, and what schools bhould be helping students to
learn, is to store accessing processes in the LTM so that when the need
for particular information is present the learner can search the EM for
it efficiently and effectively. This is, in effect, what schools as
learning systems must do, for there does not seem to be anything analogous
to the LTM at the supraorganismic level. Human organizations must rely
on the EM to provide the function of the LTM in the organism. Individ-
uals within the school, or course, will have LTMs, but since the school’s
memory subsystem is so widely dispersed, the individual LTMs taken
collectively cannot be construed to constitute the LTM of the system.
This is why minutes are taken of important meetings and why important
decisions are written down and entered in policy books. The school, thus,
must rely on EM for its information, and in a paradoxical sort of way
this is probably a good thing. We have remarked elsewhere (9.33) that
what schools may need is not more efficient memories but more efficient
"forgetters." The existence of LTM may be dysfunctional in Ashby’s
sense (13.1) if the environment changes with great rapidity and tends not
to repeat itself. That a school does not have an LTM means that it can
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more easily create new lines of behavior and is less fixated upon old
behaviors that are no longer functional. It may reasonably be objected
that many schools do appear to be fixated on dysfunctional behaviors -
that this, in fact, is the ''problem'' of American schooling. It is true
that schools act as though they had LTMs
,
but in fact the problem really
lies with their reliance on an obsolete and dsyfunctional EM. The curri-
culum of the school resides in its textbooks and worksheets. An easy solu-
tion to the problem of an outmoded curriculum is to throw the books away.
The fact that the EM is part of the environment means that it is more
susceptible to external control than is the school itself. The reader
may note a conceptual contradiction in considering, the EM to be both part
of the system's memory and part of the system's environment. This would
seem to violate our practice of looking steadily at the system and not
changing levels in mid-analysis. James Miller helps us out of this con-
fusion by introducing the concept of an "inclusion."
Sometimes a part of the enviornment is
surrounded by a system and totally in-
cluded within its boundary. That is an
inclusion . . . The inclusion is a com-
ponent or subsystem of the system if
it carries out or helps in carrying out
a critical process of the system; other-
wise it is part of the environment.^^
In other words, the EM is an example of an outwardly dispersed subsystem
(9.15).
13. 8B We have said that the STM, supplemented frequently by the EM,
is the functional working space of the memory. We have also noted the
^^Miller, James G., "Living Systems: Basic Concepts" in Gray, Duhl,
and Rizzo, General Systems Theory and Psychiatry , (Boston: Little, Brown,
1969), p. 106.
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extremely limited capacity of the STM - on the order of seven symbols or
chunks at any given time. We have finally observed that information in
the STM can come either as input from the environment or from the LTM.
The interesting question is what happens to the symbols or chunks when
the work in the STM is completed? We know that they cannot remain in the
STM. There appear to be three alternatives: they are stored in the LTM
for future retrieval; they are stored in the EM for future retrieval;
they decay. We can offer the following hypotheses related to these
alternatives
:
First, data stored in the EM are unlikely also to be stored in the
LTM simultaneously, although they can subsequently enter the LTM via the
STM. A student taking notes from a lecture will probably not remember the
material in his notes, although after the lecture he can review his notes
at his own pace and the material can enter the LTM. Underlining passages
in a book is not an aid to remembering, it is an aid to subsequent access
to the information underlined.
Second, data retrieved from the LTM are more likely to be returned
to the LTM for storage than data from the environment. Likewise, the
more frequently data are retrieved from the LTM the more likely thay are
to be returned to it. If a student makes continued use of the names arid
dates of the ancient Assyrian kings he will be more likely to remember
them.
Most important, data that are used in the execution of a plan will
be returned to the LTM until that plan is either successfully executed or
until it is relinquished. A plan, as we have said, is any process, or
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combination of processes, in the system which controls the sequence of
behaviors which constitute the system's output. As we shall see in the
next section, a plan is analogous to a computer's program. It is a set
of rules or strategies which controls the sequence of TOTE units. At the
same time it is itself a TOTE unit of a higher-order plan. Plans follow
the same heirarchial principles of roganization that appear to be oper-
ative in the natural and social worlds. We shall soon be discussing the
various types of higher order plans which are stored in the LTM. Here,
we would only suggest that this hypothesis seems to argue against the
construal of performance objectives to be such molecular units that the
satisfactory attainment of the performance criteria leads to the relin-
quishing of the plan. The more self-contained a unit of instruction of
a unit of learning, the less likely the student is to remember it once he
has achieved it. If the purpose of learning the Assyrian kings is to pass
a unit test, once the test is passed, the plan for learning the Assyrian
kings is likely to decay rapidly. If, on the other hand, the study of
ancient Assyria is part of a larger plan - to study comparative political
forms or the process of political change or the relationship between
political and religious beliefs, the information is likely to remain
available in the LTM for future retrieval - at least until the end of the
semester. If the semester of Ancient History can itself be related to
other concerns of the student, the data will remain in the LTM even longer.
In other words, the higher the order of the plan that that student is
executing the less likely the successful execution of lower order TOTE
units will result in the decay of the information used in their execution.
In the language of schools, if the performance of particular objectives
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is construed as a step in the attainment of long-range goals, the skills
developed in the performance of the objectives will remain in the student's
repetoire. It stands to reason, of course, that the long-range goals must
be the student's, not the teacher's or the school's or the community's.
13.9 The operating rules
,
or program
,
determining the system's
structure and behavior - What Cadwallader calls rules or programs we have
called "plans." They are the highest level plans, those that govern the
processing of any and all information by the learning system. We shall
discuss each of the briefly in this secion and then consider them together
in sections 13. 9A and 13. 9B.
1) rules . . . determining range of inputs - The learning system has
an internal representation of reality - an imaged of the way things are -
and this image serves as a high order plan for determining the range of
inputs into the system. Whether there is an objective reality to which
this image corresponds either closely or loosely is an epistimological
issue we shall skirt. We shall assert only that we act on the basis of
how we think things are - our subjective knowledge of reality. Our image
controls not only the way we act but also controls the range of messages
we receive from the field. In other words, our image in large measure
determines our environment. The presidential campaign of 1972 appears
as though it is going to pit two radically different images of reality
against one another. The views of President Nixon and Senator McGovern
start from such different unquestioned assumptions about the way the
world is that it is fair to say that they inhabit two different
environ-
ments. The inputs that Senator McGovern and his supporters
accept as
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compelling messages from the environment will probably not be inputs
into President Nixon or his supporters. Learning systems tend to accept
inputs that are congruent with their images and tend to resist inputs which
are incongruent. Sometimes these inputs enter the system and are then
rejected by the decider subsystem. It is just as likely, though, that
they will be outside the range of inputs which the system will accept.
Because the learning system cannot deal with them, they are excluded from
the system entirely.
2) rules responsible for the routing of information throughout the
network - Particularly at the organization level there must be a plan for
the internal transmission of information. The existence of multiple
overlapping channels could lead to a hopelesss morass of messages if
information flowed promiscuously over them. The capacity of the system
to process information is not the sum of the capacities of its channels.
The capacity of a channel is the upper limit of the bits of information
it can handle, not the optimal limit. Given a network of channels of
varying capacities, all of which must partlciapte in the processing of
information, the channel with the least capacity will determine the
capacity of the network. In such a system, the communication network
resembles a chain which is as strong as its weakest link. Other systems
may operate with a "message dispatch center." All messages entering
the system are routed through the dispatch center. It is then the cap-
acity of the dispatch center which determines the capacity of the system.
Some systems have alternate channels to relay messages if the principal
channels are at their capacity. All of the above are examples of differ-
ent plans for the routing of information within the system.
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3) rules b^out the Identification, analysis
,
and classification of
j^nformation - The patterning of information into usable chunks is the job
of the associator subsystem. Without such high level plans, the learning
system would have no capacity for dealing with novel information or
unfamiliar configurations of familiar symbols. The most compelling evi-
dence for the existence of such plans has been oft cited in this paper
i
the human being's linguistic capacity to generate and understand entirely
new sentences instantaneously. This linguistic competence is just such a
high order plan. It is intriguing - and mystifying - to watch this com-
Petencedeveloping in young children. The gradual realization that words
have meanings, that meaning can be combined to produce new meanings, that
language is a means of control over one's environment, that it is an
active meaning-producing facility, that it is an act of volition, is
testimony for the existence of a high-level plan in the LTM which, as a
single chunk, can govern the associations and classification of particular
data from the environment. We can hardly conceive of how the world
might appear if we did not have such plans. It is not only that all
phenomena would be unexpected and unfamiliar, it is also that we would
not have the catagories "unexpected" and "unfamiliar" within which to
classify them. Classification, indeed, can be considered the pre-eminent
plan which learning systems must have; classification and re-classification,
for if classification plans are not themselves subject to modification
and alteration they can become rigid and ossified. When that happens, the
internal representation of reality - the image - cannot be changed,
it can only be shattered.
4) priority rules for input , analysis , storage and output
- The
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learning system's information processing is serial; it can deal with things
only one at a time. Input into the system is not serial, but output is.
One of the great advantages of chunking is that when the "one thing" that
the system is dealing with is a chunk, it is really dealing with many re-
lated things at once. Nonetheless, the system must always have a plan for
determining the priority of inputs which may impinge simultaneously upon
the input transducers. It must, at the other end of the process, have a
plan for determining in which order outputs will be extruded. This has,
of course, implications for storage, for those inputs not immediately
processed must be held in storage for future processing. If they are
held in the STM they are taking up precious, limited space.
5) rules governing feedback mechanisms - We have tried to make the
case for the importance of feedback; now we must add the importance of
the selective use of feedback. Whereas in some areas time-lag in feed-
back would be fatal to the system or to its performance, in other areas
simultaneous feedback is neither possible nor desireable. When the sys-
tem is executing a high order plan, it must often do so without the know-
ledge of whether its intermediate steps are successful in meeting its
goal. An author writes a book in the hopes that it will be published and
reviewed favorably; a candidate runs for office in the hope of being
elected; an administration institutes wage and price controls in the
hopes of curbing inflation. All of these are long term plans which are
not ordinarily susceptible to feedback control. The author may attempt
to publish chapters of his book in magazines, but unless the book is
essentially episodic the reaction to the parts will not be a reliable
indicator of the reaction to the whole. The candidate may get "feedback
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from public opinion polls, but the feedback early in the campaign is not
necessarily a reliable indicator of the feedback at the end of the campaign.
Were he to adjust his campaign strategy every time a poll was published,
the final result might well be more disasterous than had he stuck to his
course. The long-term consequences of wage and price controls might well
be contrary to their immediate consequneces
. There are, in other wprds,
large arenas of human affairs in which behavior cannot or should not be
guided by feedback. Those who are too dependent upon immediate feed-
back - who will not take the second step until they are assured that the
first step was successful - are considered overly cautious or compulsive.
They are people who are dependent upon the opinion of others before they
can have an opinion of themselves. They may have learned this in schools.
Thus, the learning system must have a plan for determining when immediate
feedback is possible and desireable and when feedback is inhibitory.
Without such a plan, the system would be incapable of executing any other
long-range plans
.
6) Instructions for storage in the system’s memory - The learning
system must have plans both for entering and retrieving information in
the system’s memory, whether LTM or EM. These plans are themselves
information, of course, so they must be guided by still higher-order
plans which determine when and under what conditions the plans for stor-
age are to be executed. The plans for storage in EM and LTM will have to
be quite different. The plans for storage in EM are usually under the
conscious control of the system. Both entering and retrieving informa-
tion are time-consuming tasks. The LTM, on the other hand, need not be
consciously controlled. The process of retrieval, particularly, seems
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to be Inhibited by consciousness. The harder we try to remember something,
the more elusive it becomes. As Miller, Galenter, and Pribram put it,
".
. . it is not storage, but retrieval, that is the real bottleneck in
verbal learning. Building the connections seems to be far simpler than
finding them later. . .The time and effort that goes into a job of
memorization is devoted to ensuring that there will be some way to get
access to the particular association we want when the time comes to revive
it."“
7) rules regarding the synthesis of information for the output of the
system - Analysis and synthesis are opposite and complementary processes
requiring different plans. The process of synthesizing is really the
process of forming new plans from the available bits and chunks of infor-
mation. We must admit that we really don’t know much about how this is
done, but there is no doubt that it is done, by all learning systems all
the time, and with skill and rapidity. No doubt some systems are better
at it than others, and no doubt some systems actively attempt to shape
their environments to minimize the necessity for creating new plans.
Some systems will resist as long as possible the creation of new plans
even when environmental parameters clearly call for them. Finally,
there are some systems which refuse to create new plans, even though they
could. There are individuals and organizations who, on principle, per-
sist in following traditional lines of behavior, who choose not to adapt
to a current environmental condition in the hopes that the condition
itself will revert to a prior state. From the observer's viewpoint it
^*^op . cit .
,
pp. 137-138.
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may appear that such systems are incapable of change - that they cannot
formulate new plans to replace old ones. In a rapidly changing environ-
ment, however, such conservatism may make great good sense. It is often
difficult to distinguish between passing fads and enduring fundamental
changes. A system which adapts to every new condition which confronts
it may be expending so much energy in accomodation that it forfeits its
ability to play an active role in shaping the environment to its own
goals and purposes.
In looking over the vast array of plans we have discussed in this
section, two kinds of distinctions will be helpful in maintaining perspec-
tive. First of all, we will want to bear in mind that at the organismic
level most of these plans are part of the genetic template, while at the
organizational level there is nothing corresponding to a genetic template.
Constitutions, charters and by-laws, which are the closest analogies,
are still artifacts of the organization and may or may not accurately
describe organizational processes. In the second place, we want to make
a distinction between plans and the data plans control. We have resisted
using Cadwallader * s term "program” because it is too closely tied to a
strictly cybernetic model of system processes. Because computer technol-
ogy has developed the sophisticated capacity to simulate human learning,
it is tempting to turn that around and to assume that human learning
simulates computer processes. There is a great and fundamental difference,
however. At some level, even the most sophisticated computer receives
its program from the environment. Computers are designed in particular
ways and are slaves to their designers. They may manifest remarkable
abilities for self-control and program modification, but these abilities
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have been built into the system. The most amazing computer, as we have
said, is an amazing adjustment system. Just the reverse is true of
learning systems; at some level, even the most "adjustable" learning sys-
tem controls its own plans. In the truest sense, learning systems can
never be completely controlled from the environment and adjustment systems
can never completely control their own plans.
13. 9A Where does the observer find the operating rules, or programs,
which determine the school's structure and behavior? He might begin by
the school s EM for statements of policy and regulations, but
this is a highly unreliable source of information which describes, not
the actual operating rules, but the ideal operating rules. Just as the
old-time civics books in describing how a bill becomes a law omit the act-
ual back-room by-play which is an essentail part of the legislative pro-
cess, so, too, the policies and the organizational procedures of a school
omit the actual day-to-day processes of the school which may or may not
resemble the abstracted regulations. The observer or analyst cannot
assume that the school actually behaves the way it says it does; he must,
instead, observe over time the way it actually behaves, and infer from
its behavior what its jplans must be. However, this task is made extreme-
ly difficult by the problem of deciding what, in fact, the school's be-
havior is. Because it is such a poorly-defined system, it is virtually
impossible for the analyst to look steadily at it. It has been tempting
throughout this paper to decide that the school is not a system, since
we could resolve our analytical difficulties by ignoring them. But the
school a system; the fact that it is difficult to analyze - and
difficult to change - does not mean that it does not act systemically
.
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The school has an internal representation of reality which functionally
limits the range of inputs it can process. This image will set priorities
which are easily observable. Which is more important to the school,
reading or music, work or play, obedience or initiative? The answers to
these questions can be gained by observation. How does information,
in fact, travel through the school? If a person wants information treated
confidentially, how does he go about it? If he wants information dis-
seminated widely, how does he go about that? Where are the critical nodes
of interaction in a school? Who are the people who always seem to know
what’s going on? Who represent the short-cuts which by-pass the formal
channels? These are but a few of the questions that can reveal the plan
which controls the routing of information. Plans for the classification
of information are likewise ascertainable. In schools, information is
frequently classified according to its source. Information from the
textbook is true; it is the standard against which all other information
is judged. Information from students is dubious unless it corresponds to
textbook information. Information from the superintendent is supported
by the power he has to control the destinies of others. Information in
writing is treated as more definitive than information transmitted
orally. The organization of the curriculum will also indicate the school's
plan for classifying information, as will the sorts of records schools
keep about student progress and behavior. The school is really a
prisoner of its classification plans; they are the most difficult to
change without a conscious decision on the school's part to change them.
The school's rules for establishing priorities are evident in the school's
allocation of time. When the school puts "first things first, what are
the first things? The students know. The observer can ask them. Plans
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governing feedback mechanisms can be discovered first by asking whether
the school really allows intrinsic feedback - feedback from performance -
to occur, or whether students must await the teacher *s evaluation, the
teacher must await the principalis evaluation. Can ~ and do ~ members
of the school community evaluate their own performance and have confidence
in their own judgments? Can - and do - they establish their own criteria
for assessing their performance? It is particularly easy to discover the
plans for storage in the school's memory, since the school has no LTM and
must store information in its EM which is accessible to the analyst.
Pupil personnel records are one source of information about the school's
plans for storage. Not only the kind of information in the records is
significant but also who can have access to that information? I'Jhen, if
ever, is information discarded? Who makes the decisions about entering
and retrieving information? Finally, the analyst can obtain information
about the school's plans for formulating new plans. How does the school
decide to do something different? How widespread, in fact, is the decision-
making process? Who participates? Who is bound by the decision? How
are subsystems restructured to facilitate the new plan?
We can thus see that even with a poorly-defined system it is possible
to gain information both about its processes and about is plans for
carrying out these processes. It is these processes and plans which
constitute the system's organization.
13. 9B With the student, our set of questions must be different. We
can assume the existence of these plans, or operating rules, even though
we cannot observe them. Because the student is a well-defined learning
system, we can observe, analy-ze, and compare outputs at many different
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levels. We can make valid inferences about his plans from his behavior,
^^mat educators and school people must ask, is how students can be helped
in developing plans for planning - how, to use the cliche, to "learn how
to learn." Whatever their ideologies or personal biases, most thoughtful
people would agree that our age is one of information overload, and that
the purpose of education should be less the transmission of specific
data and more the development of processes for acquiring, analysing and
synthesizing relevant data. Most people would also agree that our times
are perplexing and oun perplexities are full of ambiguities and anxieties.
The situations in which individuals find themselves are unlike the
problems in school which have solutions. Schools may inhabit the realm
of right answers, but most human beings do not. One of the reasons that
so many people have difficulty in coping with life’s perplexities may
well be that their schooling prepared them only for dealing with unambig-
uous problems in the realm of right answers. In the face of uncertainty
they become fearful, in the face of complexity they become frustrated, in
the face of ambiguity they become immobilized. Some people, sustained by
faith or conviction, manage to carve out sheltered realms of certitude,
simplicity, and clarity to inhabit, but most of us cope as best we can.
hoping to find in sharing a sense of community what we cannot find
through mastery of the perplexities we face. Schools could be more
helpful than most of them are in preparing students to cope with uncertainty,
complexity, and ambiguity. They could, for example, move out of the realm
of right answers and admit that any question that is important enough
to ask has, as a legitimate answer, "I don't know," or "I'm not sure.
For every question that can be answered "yest" or "no," "right" or
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"wrong," "true" or "false," there is
"both," or "neither." Schools could
always the possibility of "maybe,"
also admit that there is no datum
so important that everyone must know it nor any datum so trivial that it
could not reshape some student’s image of the way things are. For the
student, ideally, schooling should be a process of "making the strange
familiar and "making the familiar strange." The teacher, curriculum
materials, peers, and other components of his environment can provide
the inputs, but he himself must develop his plans. Schools can help him
do so by making it important for him to be developing plans rather than
merely processing data according to someone else’s plan. To the extent
that the plans he is executing are his, and the criteria for success are
his, the student will be learning how to learn and will develop the
capacity to face the unfamiliar with confidence and the familiar with
wonder
.
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